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ABSTRACT
This thosis studies the different aspects of the petroleum industry in 
the Persian G ulf. As the G u lf* covers a vast area, three major oil producers, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran have been selected for discussion. Production 
from these countries contributes the major proportion of the Gulf's output of 
oil •
The first chapter is a brief geographical introduction to the Gulf, and 
also shows its location in relation to the main oil producing and consuming 
countries in the world. The effects of political boundaries on the oil companies 
are analysed.
The second chapter is concerned with historical geography of oil exploita­
tion and development in the G ulf, particularly with concession agreements, 
since these bore closely on the pattern of external control of the oil resource.
The location of known oil reserves are outlined in the third chapter, as 
well as the way in which labour costs and physical factors can affect the cost of 
production. Production in each of the three countries is then studied.
Chapter four deals with the internal movement and storage of o il, and the 
way it is differently affected by the physical features of the countries under 
discussion.
Means of transporting oil from the Gulf to the main oil markets are 
analysed in the fifth chapter* The comparative advantages and disadvantages 
of both pipelines and tankers are shown, and the Suez Canal is discussed in 
order to demonstrate its effect on oil transport. The main importing terminals
* I have referred throughout to the "Gulf" in order to avoid confusion, as on
the Iranian side it is known as the Persian Gulf, and on the Arab side, as 
-- the Arabian G ulf.
3.
in Western Europe are also examined.
Petroleum exports are analysed in chapter six. Areas of demand are 
discussed, along with the regionally varied influence of political crises on 
oil exports. The two Suez Crises of l956and 1967 are particularly selected, 
as they led to the consuming countries attempting to diversify the sources of 
their oil supplies from the Gulf to other parts of the world, and modified the 
geographical pattern of crude oil supply.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis will analyse various aspects of the geography of oil in the 
three main producing countries around the G ulf. After a short general intro- 
duction to the area, Chapter One first examines the location of the Gulf as 
an oil producing zone in relation to the major oil producing and consuming 
countries of the world, and secondly illustrates . the varying influences 
bearing on the exploiters of the resource by the political boundaries of the 
countries involved.
Chapter Two is concerned with the historical development of oil 
exploitation around the G ulf. It considers earliest oil exploitation with 
special attention to the Gulf, the demands of industrial advancement in 
Europe, and developments in the early 20th century, as well as the modem 
phase of rapid development, and regional differences in exploitation development 
occasioned by political influences in the countries around the G ulf.
Chapter Three outlines the locations of the known reserves of oil in 
the area, It examines closely the varying costs of production due to physical 
factors and labour costs. The actual production regimes of the three countries 
are then analysed in detail.
Chapter Four investigates the pattern of intermediate oil movements 
related to such critical features as land surface, and sea-bed topography.
These are discussed as they vary from country to country and influence inland 
transport of the resource and oil terminals.
Chapter Five analyses means of transport from the Gulf to the consuming 
areas. This includes tankers, receiving points (the main oil importing ports of 
Western Europe), the Suez Canal, and pipelines. A comparison between tankers
15.
and pipelines will be made in order to show the advantages and disadvantages 
of each mode of transport. The Suez Canal is included to show its effect on 
oil transport.
Finally, Chapter Six is concerned with the export of o i l . Here if 
is intended to show the areas of demand and the influence of political crises 
on oil export, notably the Suez crises of 1956 and 1967.
16.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE GULF
1 • A Brief Account of the Gulf
The Gulf is one of the arms of the Indian Ocean penetrating the very 
centre of the old world, the other being the Red Sea. The two arms run almost 
parallel to each other to a latitude of 30°N , giving access to Europe from the 
Indian Ocean. Topographically, the Gulf, together with Mesopotamia, forms 
a great depression, and separates the Iranian Plateau from the Arabian. The 
depression is bordered by one of the richest oil producing regions of the world.
Several different countries border the G ulf. It is bounded in the east 
by Iran, and in the north and west by a number of Arab countries and Sheikhdoms. 
(See F ig .l) ,  From the most northern point, where the Shaft al-Arab river 
enters the Gulf, the seaboard running to the west as far as Khor Abdullah belongs 
to Iraq. Thereafter, Kuwait extends for about 90 miles, and the Neutral Zone, 
which is divided equally between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, occupies about 
45 miles. From the Neutral Zone onwards to the Gulf of Salwa, 250 miles of 
the coast line belongs to Saudi Arabia, The Shaikhdom of Q atar, which occupies 
the Qatar Peninsula, has a coastline of about 90 miles, and the Shaikhdom of 
Bahrain consists of an archipelago between the extreme north point of the 
Qatar Peninsula and the mainland. From the eastern base of the Peninsula, 
the coast inclines eastwards arid then bends north, forming a great arc. This 
coastline, which is known as the Pirate, or Trucial Coast, terminates in the 
mountains of the Masandam Peninsula which overlook the Strait of Hormuz, the 
narrow passage linking the Gulf with the Gulf of Oman. 1
The Gulf, which covers an area of about 97,000 square miles, lies
1 7.
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Fig. 1 - Location of Tran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the
Middle East.
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roughly north-west and south-west between latitudes 24° and 30° North and
longitudes 48° and 57° East. The Gulf's length From the mouth of the Shatt
al-Arab river to the Strait of Hormuz is some 500 miles (from the Strait to the
Indian Ocean is about 300 miles). The breadth of the Gulf varies from 140
miles at the head and 50 miles at the entrance, to 200 miles at its widest 
3
part.
The Gulf, which has a coastal length of approximately 2,000 miles, is 
surrounded for about two-thirds of that distance by mountain ranges. On the 
Iranian side the mountain ranges run parallel to the sea, and in some places 
they run steeply clown to it .  These mountains increase in height as they 
recede inland. Wide valleys separate them, and there are belts of lowland 
of varying width between the mountains and the sea.
With the exception of the Masandam Peninsula, which is a barren mountain, 
the Arabian coast, or southern and south-western shore of the Gulf, is composed 
of low-lying sandy beaches. From the coastal line for almost its whole length, 
reefs and shoals extend for 30 to 50 miles in places. There are numerous 
islands off-shore, and many inlets, some of which extend many miles inland.^
The water in the Gulf is extremely shallow, and only in a few places 
does the depth exceed 50 fathoms. Close to the Iranian shore lies the deepest 
channel of the G ulf. Beyond the Strait of Hormuz, in the Gulf of Oman, the 
depth increases rapidly reaching a maximum of 1,800 fathoms.
The lack of water depth in the Gulf creates some difficulties for oil 
companies involved in the area, in order to transport the produced o il, the 
oil companies had to either construct long piers, or lay submarine loading lines 
for loading o il. In both cases construction costs are high. However, in recent 
years, this lack or depth has proved advantageous with regard to offshore drilling,
19.
as can be seen from the difference between the costs of drilling in the Gulf 
and the North Sea.
2 . Location in Relation to Major O il Producing and O il Consuming 
Countries
It may be noticed from Figure 2 that the oil producing areas of the world 
are widely distributed. A t present six regions appear as the major producers 
of the world. In North America, the U .S .A . with its output of 525.4 million 
tons of crude oil in 1970, leads the world. Venezuela, with an output of 
189.9 million tons, fakes second place in the Western Hemisphere. The Gulf, 
which is a part of the Middle East, counts as a secondary region among the oil 
producers. However, as far as individual countries are concerned, the 
U .S .S .R ., with its production of 347.3 million tons, comes after the U .S .A . 
Output from countries surrounding the Gulf (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
Iraq) accounted for 566.7 million tons in 1970. This represented 81.3% of 
the total Middle East production. Africa, with its production of 267.7 million 
tons, takes fourth place, and South East Asia comes fifth .^  It may bo noticed 
from Figure 2 that some producing regions are favoured in their location as 
oil exporters. For example, Venezuela is situated close to the U .S .A ,, which 
is the world's largest consumer, and North Africa is located not far from 
Western Europe. Thus export opportunities are greater for these than for the 
Gulf countries where the oil has to be transported further.
The Gulf is rich in o il, but its consumption is relatively low. This 
low consumption is due to a lack of industries which use oil as their source of 
energy and a generally low local energy consumption per capita* For 
example, in I960, the local demand for oil in Iran amounted to only 255 thousand
* Local consumption has increased recently because of the introduction of 
petrochomical industries into the countries concerned.
2 0 .
Fig. 2
barrels per day. Other countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq, 
showed an even smaller demand. Their consumption amounted to 130; 115 
and 70 thousand barrels per day respectively, but the production of these 
countries was much higher than this. It was 2,830 thousand barrels per day
7
in Saudi Arabia, 2,421 in Kuwait and 1,506 in Iraq.
Apart from the low local consumption, it is also difficult to export the 
produced oil to the neighbouring countries, because these are underdeveloped 
and their consumption counts for little, compared to the vast production. Thus 
the oil has to be moved far from the region, to the consuming market's. Western 
Europe represents the main importer of Gulf o il, while Japan and the Far East 
take second place. After these come North America, Australia and New  
Zealand, followed by the rest of the world. Moving the oil to the marlceis 
involves using large tankers, which greatly effects oil prices in the consuming 
areas. Here if is possible to say that the distances between the producing and 
the consuming countries are very important, as export competition exists among 
the producers. Competition from the new major producing areas of North Africa 
is already rising in importance, particularly where they are located near to the 
importing countries (Western Europe). For example, the distance from London or 
Liverpool to Kuwait, via the Suez Canal, is 6,500 sea miles, and 11,300 miles 
via the Cape of Good Hope route. From Ras Tanura on the G ulf, to New York 
via the Cape of Good Hope is 11,900 miles, while via the Canal it is only 
8 ,400 .8
22.
3 . A Short Discussion on the Borders of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
and Iran
This section will deal with the boundaries of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, as these are the countries with which this thesis is concerned. In the case 
of the latter two, only areas of dispute will be dealt with, while it is intended 
to analyse all of the boundaries of Kuwait because of her location in the centre 
of the countries under discussion, and because her boundaries have given rise 
to several problems where the oil industry is concerned. To clarify information 
about the area of dispute, the boundaries will be analysed under two headings:
a . Land boundaries
b. Distribution of the offshore areas of the Gulf (Continental Shelf).
a . Land Boundaries
Kuwait
To the bedouin mind the notion of a fixed boundary is completely foreign, 
as the tribesmen have roamed the peninsula since time beyond memory, in search 
of water and grazing. Usually only coastal towns, oases or water wells were 
claimed as belonging to anyone in particular, while the desert between these 
was looked upon as a sea, open to all who chose to travel on it.
However, the need for the exact delimitation of the desert was generated 
by two events. One of these was the growth of British influence in the states 
on the coast of the Gulf, in Oman, Aden and the Hadhramout. The other was 
the discovery of oil
Negotiations between Britain and the Ottoman Empire regarding some 
outstanding questions on Eastern Arabia started in the summer of 1911. These 
dealt with the Baghdad Railway and its possible extension to the head of the Gulf.
23.
On 29th July, 1913, the first major attempt to settle the boundary question
was made, when a convention was conducted by Britain and the Ottoman Empire,
10concerning the Gulf area. As a result, the boundaries were defined between 
Kuwait and the Ottoman Sanjak* of Najd in Article 5 , and Qatar and Sanjak of 
Najd in Article 11 of this convention.^
During the negotiation of the convention, events which could complicate 
its final application were taking place in eastern Arabia. For instance, in 
May 1913, working from Najd, Ibn Saud overran Hasa, driving out the Turkish 
administration. He then announced his intention of ruling the province himself. 
In the years 1925, 1926 and 1927, Ibn Saud won Mecca, Medina and Jiddah 
respectively, from the Sharifiyan King Hussein. Shortly afterwards, he pro­
claimed himself King of H ijaz. (Following the annexation of Jabal Shammar In
121932, he changed his kingdom's name to Saudi Arabia.)
However, in 1913 definitions were never ratified, and it was necessary
to reach new agreements on the boundaries of the successor states after the First
World War, anc! the fall of the Turkish Empire. An agreement was made in 1922,
with both King Ibn Saud (then Sultan of Najd) and Britain, called the Treaty
of Oqair, which defined Hie southern boundary of Kuwait. The northern and
western ones were agreed with Iraq in 1932, when she gained her independence.
Although Kuwait is lucky in knowing roughly where her boundaries are, the
definitions are open to question. The following Is the definition of the western
and northern boundaries with Iraq;-
The frontier runs from the intersection of the Wadi al-Auja with the
Batin (see Fig .3) to a point just south of the latitude of Safwan, then eastwards
to Jabal Sanam and UmmQasr, leaving them with Iraq, and so, on to the
* Sanjak (Turkish), sub-province, second largest administrative unit in the 
Ottoman Empire.
2 4 .
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Fig. 3 - Boundaries of Kuwait and the Neutral Zone in 1922
and 1967.
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junction of the Khor (Khor means creek) Zubair and the Khor Abdullah.*
This definition, which corresponds with that of the Anglo-Turkish convention,
is patently vague. A t one time a post was erected on the road between Kuwait
and Safwan to mark the frontier, but if was removed several times, and finally
was not replaced. Also, the Khor Abdullah is more or less a continuation of
the Khor Zubair, and it is by no means certain where one starts and the other
finishes. It has not yet been decided when demarcation will be commenced, but
13
it will be an extremely arduous task for the people appointed to it.
After the visit of the Ruler of Kuwait to Iraq on the 7th June, 1966, 
a communique was issued, which provided for a committee to be formed for the 
demarcation of borders between the two countries. However, this committee 
accomplished nothing, as it never came into existence.^
This lack of demarcation has a great effect on oil exploitation for both 
countries in the vicinity of this line. The oil companies always try to avoid 
surveying there to lessen the possibility of trouble between the two countries 
even if they are certain of the existence of o il . For example, Jirfan area, to 
the north of Kuwait and adjacent to the area of dispute, has not been fully
15exploited by Kuwait O il Company, although work was started there before 1965. 
Also, according to a newspaper report on the 26th April, 1964, “a Kuwait O il 
Company drilling team working in the undemarcafed areas along the Iraqi border
* H .R .P . Dickson, in his book Kuwait and her Neighbours, further elaborates:”
"As far as I can remember, Ibn Saud took little further part in the frontier 
discussion, leaving it to Sir Percy to decide for him this vexed question.
At a general meeting of the conference, Sir Percy took a red pencil and 
very carefully drew in on the map of Arabia a boundary line from the Persian 
Gulf to Jabal Anaizan, close to the Transjordan frontier. This gave Iraq a 
large area of the territory claimed by N ajd . Obviously to please Ibn Saud, 
he ruthlessly deprived Kuwait of nearly two-thirds of her territory and gave 
it to Najd, his argument being that the power of Ibn Sabah (the desert 
title of the Shaikh of Kuwait) was much less in the desert than if had been 
when the Anglo-Turkish agreement had been drawn up." (Dickson, Kuwait 
and her Neighbours, London 1956, p . 274.)
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was recently Intercepted by an Iraqi patrol and ordered to stop drilling
| ^
operations on the ground that the well site was in Iraqi territory".
At the Oqair conference of the 2nd December 1922, a boundary dividing 
the Sultanate of Najd from Kuwait and Iraq was agreed upon by both Saudi and 
British representatives. The unratified 1913 convention was also referred to.
The Following was said at the Oqair conference in respect of the southern 
boundary of Kuwait:-
The frontier between Najd and Kuwait begins in the west from 
the junction of the Wadi al Auja (Wadi a! Audja) with the Batin 
(El Batin), leaving Raqi (Rikai) to Najd; from this point it con- 
tinues in a straight line until it joins latitude 29 and the red 
semi-circle referred to in Article 5 of the Anglo-Turkish agreement 
of 29th July 1913. The line then follows the side of the red semi­
circle until it reaches a point terminating on the coast south of 
Ras al-Q aliah (Rasif Kaliyah) and this is the indisputable 
southern frontier of Kuwait territory.17 (See Fig.3).
Article 5 of the 1913 draft convention describes the line as follows:-
The autonomy of the Shaykh of Kuwayf is exercised by him in 
the territories, the limit of which forms a semi-circle with the 
town of Kuwayt in the centre, the Khol al-Zubayr at the northern 
extremity and al-Qurayyin at the southern extremity,
This definition is so loose that it is very difficult to apply. An area of
several square miles is covered by the town of Kuwait, and the centre of this is
not settled. Qurayyin cannot be used as a landmark, because a hill and a
group of wells several miles apart both bear this name. As a result, fhare are
ambiguities enough to make firm claims to immediately neighbouring ground
impossible, in spite of the apparently complete description of the b o u n d a r y .  1 9
The Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone
The boundary of the Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone, which is situated south 
of Kuwait, was also decided at the Oqair conference of 1922. This definition, 
like that of Kuwait's borders, lacks precision in the way in which the convention 
describes the limits of the Neutral Zone.
The portion of territory bounded on the west by a low mountainous ridge 
called Esh Shaq and on the east by the sea, and on the south by a line passing 
from west to east from Esh Shaq to Ain al-Abd and "thence to the coast north 
of Ras ai Mishab (Ras al Mishaab), in this territory the Governments of Najd 
and Kuwait will share equal rights until through good offices of the Government
of Great Britain a further agreement is made between Najd and Kuwait concerning
.* »20 it.
The inability of the two parties (Britain and Saudi Arabia) to agree, led
to the establishment of the Neutral Zone. Between Saudi Arabia and Iraq a
similar Zone exists. It did not seem necessary to bring the two parties to further
agreement, as the Zone concerned was devoid of both water and permanent
21habitation, and gave rise to no trouble.
However, the Zone became of great importance as a result of oil dis­
covery in the area. In 1948, two oil companies were granted oil concessions in 
the Zone.* The first of these was from Kuwait to the American Independent O il 
Co. (Aminoil) covering its undivided half of the Zone. It was shortly followed 
by Saudi Arabia signing an agreement with Pacific Western Corporation (now 
Getty O il C o .). These two agreements covered the land of the Neutral Z o n e  .22 
in 1957 and 1950, similar concessions were granted to the Japanese Arabian Oil 
Co. by both governments with respect to the offshore areas of the Zone/ 0 
From this it can be seen that the idea of joint sovereignty over the 
Neutral Zone as proposed in the 1922 Agreement, prevented neither Kuwait 
nor Saudi Arabia from granting separate concessions to different companies, regard­
ing the undivided share of each country in the Neutral Zone. Thus, if seems 
that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia deemed it unnecessary to come to a joint concession
* Major Frank Holmes, in May 1924, secured the first oil rights over the 
Neutral 2,one. Holmes, who was representing the Eastern and General 
Syndicate of London, lost his rights over the Zone in 1927 due to lack of 
capital.
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agreement with regard to their equal rights in the Zone. Hitherto, the 
Neutral Zone was run as a condominium, with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait sharing 
equal responsibilities for the administration of the entire territory of the /-one.
The Oqair convention of 1922 did not establish any constitutional 
system or joint administration, and neither of these exist as yet. This is probably 
because the Zone was unimportant before oil exploitation, as previously 
explained. As further development took place, especially the granting of the 
offshore concessions of 1957-8, people surged info the Zone to work for oil 
companies. If was estimated in 1962 that the number of workers in the Zone was
4 ,000 . 55% of this total were from Saudi Arabia, 25% from other Arab countries,
2420% non-Arabs, and none of Kuwaiti nationality. As the Zone's inhabitants
increased, the problems relating to administration required more attention.
Therefore It became necessary for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to implement a joint
meeting in order to find a workable solution to the problem of administration in
the Zone. Thus a series of negotiations lasting intermittently from March 1964
to July 1965 were held between the two parties. In July 1965, they finally
reached an agreement to partition the Zone info two equal parts with each party
annexing to its own territory one part of the partitioned Zone.2^ The partition
agreement of 7th July, 1965, put an end to the temporary state which existed
under the convention of December, 1922.
The boundary line between the two sections of the Zone is to be 
the line which divides them into two equal parts and which begins 
from a point at the mid-eastern shore on the low-tide line, and ends 
at the western boundary line of the Zone* . . . .  (A rt.I). (See Fig .3 .)
The partition line was ratified by both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
on the 19th of January, 1970, and the 21st of the same month, 
respectively. (M,E JE.S. N o ,14, 30th January, 1970.)
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Article III provides that "each of the Contracting Parties shall exercise 
the rights of administration, legislation and defence over the part of the 
partitioned Zone annexed to his territory."
The agreement also clarified other vital problems concerning the ,£one. 
Article V II dealt with the exploitation of the natural resources in the territorial 
sea of the partitioned Zone, for which purpose it was fixed at six nautical miles. 
Here, each party has the same rights as those applied to the partitioned Zone.
With regard to employment and the labour force, the agreement guarantees
26freedom of work to both Kuwaitis and Saudis in the partitioned Zone.
On reading the provisions of the agreement it becomes obvious that the 
parties were concerned mainly with solving the problems arising from the lack of 
joint administrative machinery in the Zone. What was required was a satisfactory 
and workable solution that could represent usefully and fairly the rights of both 
parties in the area. Thus, after the failure of the parties to agree on a joint 
administrative system in the Zone to represent their joint authority, if was decided 
that the Zone should be divided into two equal parts, and that each side should 
annex the part nearest to its own boundary.*
Therefore the northern section of the Zone became part of Kuwait, and 
the southern section became part of Saudi Arabia (Art. II) . The equal rights of 
both parties in respect of the exploitation of natural resources of the entire Zone, 
are not affected by the exercise of the exclusive rights of administration, legis­
lation, and defence retained by each state (A rt. I I I) .  A Joint Permanent 
Committee, comprising an equal number of members and a Minister of Petroleum 
from each side, will be set up to regulate measures for the exploitation of the 
Zone*s natural resources, as well as those of Hie territorial waters and the adjacent
The agreement did not deal with the offshore areas of the Neutral Zone.
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offshore area. If has been agreed that the status of existing oil concessions 
in the Zone, both on land and offshore, should continue as at present.
However, should the granting of any new concessions be necessary in the 
future, they would be referred to the Joint Permanent Committee, who are 
authorised to deal with such matters.
In conclusion, it may be said that the partition agreement solved the 
problems of administration and jurisdiction of the Zone which had for many 
years obstructed both parties in the exercising of their sovereign rights on an 
equal basis. The most significant effect of the 1965 agreement is that if paves 
the way for the possibility of complete co-operation between the two countries, 
with regard to future exploitation of the Zone's natural resources.
The demarcation of the Neu tral Zone and the common boundary between 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
The partition agreement of 1965 paved the way for another vital agree­
ment, that is the demarcation of the Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone and the Common 
border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
An Amiri Decree was issued by the Ruler of Kuwait on the 24fh of 
December 1967, ratifying the documents relating to the.final demarcation of the 
land boundary of the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Neutral Zone and the common 
boundary between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In accordance with an exchange of 
letters between the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments in 1963, a joint Saudi-Kuwaiti 
technical committee was set up and entrusted with the demarcation of these 
boundaries. The committee supervised the work of the Jajsanese firm which did 
the main work of surveying and demarcation, Pacific Aero-Survey Company ltd .
From the results of this work a "Final Boundary A/lap" (see Fig ,3) was drawn up
27in 1966 by the committee.
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However, neither the status of the islands of Qaru and Umm aWvlaradim, 
nor the demarcation of the northern offshore boundary between Kuwait itself 
and the Neutral Zone are dealt with in the agreement. The problem of off­
shore demarcation is of some consequence, as the overlap between the Shell- 
held offshore concessions in Kuwait itself and those held by the Arabian O il 
Company in the Neutral Zone includes some land which is very possibly o il- 
bearing. Kuwait claims for herself exclusively the islands of Qaru and Umm 
al-Maradim, which are located off the Neutral Zone, and these two, along with 
Kubar Island, which is off Kuwait proper, are the subject of a separate concession
grant to Aminiol. However, Saudi Arabia claims that both Qaru and Umm ai~
28Maradim should be included in the Neutral Zone.
Due to the demarcation some adjustment was made to the southern 
boundary of Kuwait with the Neutral Zone -  it moved slightly northward. As a 
result, Umm Gudair oil field was divided info two parts; the northern section, 
as before the demarcation, was within the boundary of Kuwait, whereas the 
southern section was now in the Neutral Zone. If should also be mentioned that 
the oil companies operating in the Neutral Zone (Getty and Aminoil) did not 
have a single well in that section before the demarcation. Now, however, they 
have a number of producing oil w e lls .^
The south-eastern boundary of Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia was able to define its north-eastern frontiers in the areas 
adjacent to Iraq and Kuwait. However, its boundaries with Qatar, the Trucial 
Coast, Muscaf-Oman, and Aden remained undefined. The only valid 
document which the frontier discussion can be based upon is the Anglo-Turkish 
conventions of K 13 and 1914.
In Article X I of the 1913 convention, the boundary between Sanjak of
Najd and Qatar was defined. This line was to divide the limits of Ottoman
jurisdiction in eastern Arabia from that of British influence. It was known
later as the "Blue Line", and began to the west of Qatar on the Gulf coast
opposite Zakhnuniya Island and took a southerly direction to Rub al Khali
desert. However, the Blue Line was never ratified, because of certain events
taking place at the time, i .e .  Ibn Saud driving the Turkish administration from
30Hasa, and announcing that the province would be ruled under his jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, the 1913 convention did not prove unimportant, as two of its 
provisions concerning Kuwait and Najd, were used as a basis for later negotiations.
Following the annexation of Jabai Sharnmar in 1933, Ibn Saud, on 14th July, 
granted an oil concession to Standard O il Company of California, covering the 
eastern region of his kingdom within its frontiers. As these frontiers were not 
specified, making it impossible to define the exact limits of the concession, the 
United States government made inquiries, asking the Turkish and British govern­
ments for information. On 24th April, 1934, the British government informed the 
Embassy of the United States in London that the Blue Line of the 1913 convention
represented the eastern boundary of Saudi Arabia, and that Ibn Saud succeeded
31the Turkish sovereignty to the west and north-west of that line. Soon afterwards, 
the British informed the Saudi government of their view regarding the line. The 
Saudis denied the validity of the line on the ground that considerable changes 
had taken place in the position of Saudi Arabia, i .e .  the annexation of Hasa,
Hijaz, Asir and Jabal Shammer. This was expressed in a note dated 13th May,
1934, to the British Ambassador in Jeddah, Sir Andrew Ryan, which declared 
readiness to enter into negotiations to define the frontiers.^ A t the beginning
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of 1935/ the Saudi government was asked by Britain to define the frontiers.
On 3rd April/ 1935/ a memorandum was handed to the British Ambassador
in Jeddah, proposing these frontiers with Qatar, theTrucial Coast, the
33Sultanate of Muscat-Oman and the eastern part of Aden.
Qatar's boundary, which started at a point 15 miles from the head
of Dauhat Salwa on the west coast of the Peninsula, ran eastwards for about
5 miles, then south eastwards to end on the coast about 7 miles north of Khor
al-Udaid. (See Fig .4 .)  The proposed boundary would cut off approximately
one-sixth of the total area of the Peninsula in favour of Saudi Arabia.
At a point about 16 miles south of Khor al-Udaid, the Trucial Coast
boundary with Saudi Arabia started. The line took a southerly direction for about
10 miles, then went ecst-south-east in a curve until it met longitude 56°£ at
its junction with latitude 2 2 °N . From there if ran down longitude 56°E to its
junction with latitude 19°N . Then it turned sou tin-west wards until it reached
longitude 520E at its junction with latitude 17°N , which it followed as far as
the "Violet Line" .* This was known later as the "Red Line".
Two reasons can be given for the refusal of the British to accept the Red
Line, (a) If claimed for Saudi Arabia a coast line of about 23 miles, and
separated Qatar from Abu Dhabi, the nearest Trucial Coast Sheikhdom; (b) If
took a substantial part of the hinterland for Saudi benefit.
The non-acceptance of the "Red-Line" by Britain provoked new
negotiations between the two governments concerned. On 25th November, 1935,
* The Anglo-Turkish convention of 9fh March, 1914, agreed on a boundary 
dividing the Aden Protectorate from the Ottoman territory in Arabia,
In Article 3 of the convention, the boundary line (thereafter known as 
the "Violet Line") was defined. The line ran at a 45° angle from 
Lekemaf al-Shoub, northeast towards Rub al-K hali, where if mot the 
"Blue Line" of the 1913 convention at 2Q°N .
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Fig. U The eastern boundaries of Saudi Arabia
Sir Andrew Ryan handed a memorandum to Fuad Bey Hamza, the Saudi Foreign
Minister at Riyadh, which proposed a new frontier between Saudi Arabia and
34the Truciai Coast, and Q atar. Starting at the head of Dauhat Salwa the 
proposed line took a south-eastward course, till if struck the southern tip of 
Sabakhaf M affi. Then it went eastward, running along the northern edge of 
Rub a l-K hali, till it joined with latitude 22°3G, N and longitude 55°E. From 
this point the line ran south along longitude 55°E until its junction with 
latitude 2Q°N . it then turned approximately south-westwards, and continued 
in a straight line fill its junction with longitude 52°E and latitude 19°N , and 
then again in a straight line to meet the “Violet Line" at its intersection with 
latitude 18°N , The line thereafter was known as the "Riyadh Line".* This line 
was presented to Saudi Arabia by Britain as the furthest possible concession they 
could make. Within 24 hours the proposal was rejected by Ibn Saud, who 
maintained his claim to Jabal Naksh and Khor a l-U d ia d .^
The Riyadh Line ran approximately parallel to the Red Line, leaving the 
Rub al-Khali desert to Saudi Arabia. However, in contrast to the Red Line, it 
cut off the southern-most portion of the Qatar Peninsula from Saudi Arabia, 
providing for a meeting of Qatar and Abu Dhabi territories, which deprived the 
Saudis of access to the sea coast south of Q atar. Apart from that, it claimed 
more territory for the shaikhdoms in the hinterland and a vast area on the outer 
edges of Rub al-Khali for Muscat and Oman.
Early in 1949, the dispute between the two governments over boundaries
* Before this, a line known as the "Green Line" was suggested by Britain
on 9th April, 1935 * it ran from the head of Dauhat Salwa south-eastwards 
to a point about 5 miles north-east of Sikak, then almost due south to 
latitude 2 9 °N , eventually joining the "Violet Line" at a point to be agreed 
upon. 1 his proposal was rejected by Saudi Arabia.
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was resumed because the Arabian American O il Company (ARA/v'CO) personnel 
were carrying out exploration activities on land in the vicinity of the border. 
After an investigation, the British Political Officer, on the 22nd of April, 
handed a written protest to the leader of the ARAMCO party, claiming that 
they were exploring in territory belonging to Abu Dhabi. Saudi Arabia protested 
about this a few days later, to the British Embassy at Jeddah. The British 
answer to that v/as that if there was any doubt about the territorial rights in the 
area, it could be removed by discussion between the two governments.
Thus the Saudis agreed to reopen discussion, and negotiations began 
at Riyadh on the 30th of August. On the 14th of October, as a result of this, 
the Saudi government proposed the following;
(a) The frontier between Qatar and the Saudi Kingdom starts from a 
point at the coast of Dauhat Salwa at 24°56' North (point A ).
(b) From point A the line runs due east until if intersects longitude 
5l°Easf (point B).
(c) The frontier runs in a straight line from point B until if 
reaches the sea coast at latitude 24^8* North (point C), leaving 
Amirah to the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.
The Saudi Arabian Government consider that the frontier line 
between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi starts from a point on the 
Gulf between Bandar al-M irfa and Bandar al-Maghira, two kilo­
metres east of Bandar al-M irfa (point A ). From this point the 
boundary runs in a straight line to the south-west until it reaches 
latitude 2 3 °5 6 l North (point B). From there it runs due east till if 
intersects longitude 54° East (point C) and from that intersection if 
runs in a straight line as far as latitude 240 25' North and longitude 
55° 36* East (point D).
The Saudi Arabian Government consider that these frontiers 
correspond with reality, having regard to their authority and the 
authority of Abu Dhabi and relying on the fact that the lands thereby 
allocated to Saudi Arabia are inhabited by tribes owing allegiance 
to the Saudi Arabian Kingdom, the Murrah, the Dawasir and other 
tribes.
As regards what lies to the south and east of the position 24°25' 
North and longitude 55°36* East, this is under the authority of 
sheikhdoms which are not in treaty relations with the British Govern­
ment. Therefore, the frontier between the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and 
these shaikhdoms will be agreed between the Saudi Arabian Govern­
ment and the shaikhdoms in question. ^
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However, this new claim was rejected by Britain on the 30fh o f  
November, 1949, on the ground that it was unrealistic, as the Saudis claimed 
new territories which belonged to the Trucial Coast in the definition of 1935 
(Red Line). Because of this, the British considered themselves to have no 
option but to fake the definition of the Anglo-Turkish convention of 1913-14 
as their legal rights.
In the above definition, the Saudis claimed a coast line of about 175 
miles from Khor al-Udaid and Mir fa, which was considered by Britain to be part 
of Abu Dhabi. Moreover, the Saudis claimed a vast area in the hinterland of the 
Trucial Coast, including the oases of Liwa and Buraimi, leaving the Trucial 
Coast Shaikhdoms with a narrow strip of land along the coast. Furthermore, it 
is possible to say that the activities of the oil companies concerned with Oman 
and the shaikhdoms in surveying the hinterlands of these territories with special 
attention to the Buraimi region in 1947-8, might have been one of the reasons 
for Ibn Saud to claim Buraimi as a part of his territory.
in order to renew border negotiations, Amir Faisal, the Saudi Foreign 
Minister (now King of Saudi Arabia), visited London in 1951 . His talks In the 
British capital resulted in an agreement between the two governments to have a 
round-table conference, to be attended by the Saudis on one hand, and the rulers 
of Qatar, Abu Dhabi and a representative of Muscat and Oman on the other.
It was also agreed in London that up to the conclusion of the conference, the 
activities of oi! companies on both sides, as well as the movement of Trucial Oman 
Levies (a British officered force in Abu Dhabi) would be restricted to the area 
outside the disputed territory.
The round-table conference was opened at Dammam on the Gulf coast 
in Saudi Arabia on 28th January, 1952. The Saudi Arabian group was under
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the chairmanship of Amir Faisal, and the others were chaired by Sir Rupert 
Hay, the British Political Resident in the G ulf. Much of the discussion was 
concentrated on the historical allegiance of various tribes which roamed 
the borderland between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. Collection of Zalcat 
(alms tax) was also frequently invoked as evidence by the rulers to support 
their respective claims to sovereignty. Thus, on 29th January, Sir Rupert 
Hay presented the boundary claimed by the Shaikh of Q atar. The line began 
at Ghar al-Buraid on DauhafSalwa, and then ran eastward through three points 
to Hamz Sauda Nathil, and from there through Aglat Manasir to a point on the 
west shore of Khor al-Udaid. A section of land 25 miles wide at the base of 
the Peninsula would be regained by Qatar if this frontier was accepted, as 
the Saudis had claimed it in 1949. Then Sir Rupert advanced the boundary 
claimed by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. This line started at Hamz Sauda Nathil, 
and ran in a straight line to the most southern part of Sabkhat M atfi. From 
there if ran roughly south-east to al-Quraini then east-north-east to Umm a l-  
Zamul.
However, the two parties did not reach agreement, because the British 
insisted on taking the 1935 proposal (Red Line) as a basis for their negofiations. 
The Saudis denied the validity of the 1935 proposal on the grounds that they 
suggested the line as a compromise, and if had been rejected by Britain, thus 
becoming a "dead letter proposal", therefore they could not consider if binding 
to Saudi Arabia.
By mid-February, 1952, the conference had adjourned without reaching 
agreement.
The Buraimi dispute
in an effort to show authority in the area of dispute, a party headed by 
Amir Turki ibn Abdullah ibn Afaishan arrived at the Buraimi oasis in August,
1952, sent by the Saudi government. The Amir, who was to act as Governor, 
was accompanied by a large number of men, doubt about whose occupations 
caused much dispute. The Saudis claimed that the men were clerks, technicians, 
attendants and policemen, and numbered only 40, while the British asserted that 
there were 80 men, 50 of whom were armed troops. To the British this constituted 
an act of aggression. Also, the Saudis were following a policy which the British 
deemed to be one of "blandishments and bribes". They had collected reaffirmations 
of allegiance from 59 tribal chiefs of the Buraimi region, with the promise of 
others to follow, within a month of the Amir*s arrival. To counter these activities, 
the British sent troops to the vicinity from Muscat and the Trucial Coast, while 
at the same time, R J \ ,F . aeroplanes based at Sharjah dropped anti-Saudi 
literature over Buraimi.
Just when it seemed that fighting must break out, the Saudis sought the 
good offices of the United States, whose ambassador in Jiddah, Raymond Hare,
suggested a "standstill agreement". Both British and Saud? representatives signed
38this agreement an the 25th October, 1952. Then Saudi Arabia proposed a 
plebiscite in the area of dispute, but this was rejected by the British, who 
proposed arbitration instead.
Negotiations were considerably hindered at first, however, by argument 
over the presence around Buraimi of British-led troops, which the Saudis 
referred to as a blockade. Eventually, an arbitration agreement was concluded 
on the 30th of July, 1954, between the British and the Saudis, at Jiddah.
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They also agreed to the withdrawal of all irqpps from the area, excepting 15 
policemen from each side, Saudi oil operations were to be authorised in the 
south and west of the area of dispute, and British oil operations were to bo 
authorised in the northern part.
In 1955, on the 22nd of January, arbitration proceedings began in 
N ice . The members of the tribunal were Sir Charles De Visscher of Belgium, 
who was the chairman, Dr. Ernesto Dihigo of Cuba, Dr, Mahmoud Hasan of 
Pakistan, Sir Reader Bullard of Great Britain* and Shaikh Yusuf Yasin of 
Saudi Arabia. During the discussions both countries stated their cases somewhat 
lengthily. The British agent informed the tribunal in August that he would be 
submitting 5 complaints on Saudi violations of the arbitration agreement to the 
September meeting of the tribunal. The charges were: (1) that there were 4 to 6 
men more than the allotted 15 in the Saudi detachment at Buraimi; (2) that the 
Saudis tried to send arms into the area of dispute; (3) that aeroplanes supplying 
the post carried passengers; (4) that British relief supplies for fire victims in the 
village of Hamasa, in Buraimi, did not reach them because of Saudi intervention; 
and (5) that the Saudis had attempted to bribe some of the Buraimi chiefs,
Regarding the last and most serious charge, the British claimed that a 
man named al-Q uraish i,*** acting for the Saudis, had offered £30,000,000  
($84,000,000) in cash to Shaikh Zaid ibn Sultan, who lived in Hamasa, and 
was the brother of the ruler of Abu Dhabi, if he would join th e m .^  Another 
version of this states that if Zaid was ready to accept the Saudi terms, they
* Sir Reader Bullard had a wide experience of the Middle East, and had
served as a Minister in Jeddah and Ambassador in Tehran.
* *  Deputy Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia,
He was a member of the Saudi Arabian Security Service at Buraimi.
would reward him with as much as Rs.400,000,000 from the proceeds of any
40oil which was discovered in the disputed area.
The tribunal commenced hearings on the British complaints at the session 
which began on the 11th of September, 1955, and a verdict was expected within 
a week, either to censure or exonerate Saudi Arabia. But suddenly, on the 16th 
of September, Sir Reader Bullard, the British member, handed in his resignation, 
and left, despite the pleas of the chairman, who then also resigned, along with 
two more of his colleagues. Needless to say, this was the end of the arbitration 
proceedings.^
Sir Reador Bullard issued the following statement with regard to his 
resignation
I have been shown by the President a copy of the letter which 
the United Kingdom delegation sent to him today, and I have in 
the meantime taken very serious consideration of my own personal 
position as a member of this tribunal. I have always felt uneasy 
about the position of Shaikh Yusuf Yasin in connection with those 
proceedings, but I had not realized until yesterday, when Shaikh 
Yusuf Yasin openly asserted the fact, that he himself was the Saudi 
Arabian official in charge of affairs at Buraimi, and that he 
accepted full responsibility for the conduct ofQureishi. Moreover, 
in the last few days it has become abundantly clear that Sheikh Yusuf 
Yasin is, in fact, in effective control of the conduct of the proceed­
ings on behalf of the Saudi Arabian government on this tribunal 
rather than acting as an impartial arbitrator.. . . .
I am afraid the position of the tribunal has been hopelessly 
compromised by the conduct of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and by other 
distasteful matters which have come to notice. I do not think that 
the tribunal is any longer in a position to reach a unanimous or 
judicial conclusion on the matter before if, and I feel the only step 
I can take which is consistent with my own independence and honour 
is to fender my resignation. 42
On tho 26fh of October, the British-led forces of the Shaikh of Abu 
Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat overran Buraimi, driving out the Saudi police 
detachment, and occupying the entire oasis. A t the same time a note in which
Britain proclaimed a new border based more or loss on the Riyadh Line of 1935 was
handed to the Saudi government. The note also warned against violation of the 
43new line.
The Saudis, of course, protested, and followed protest with condemnation, 
and a call on the 14th of November, 1955, for neutral supervision of the contested 
region, from the Arab League's Political Committee. A ll to no avail. British-led 
troops remained in Buraimi. Also, the Sultan of Muscat's forces took tho town of 
Nizwa, seat of tho Imam of Oman, the religious and secular leader of Muscat- 
Oman's hinterland, in a movement to strengthen Britain's position in south-east 
Arabia ^
Thus tho dispute was ended for the time being, through the use of force 
by Britain.
The definition and demarcation of southern Kuwait, in 1922 and 1967 
respectively, did not give rise to many problems. This cannot, however, be 
said about the settlement of the frontier between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, 
the Trucial Coast, and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, over which 
negotiations lasted for many years. Despite this prolonged discussion, no con­
clusion was reached by the two parties.
No further attempt has been made by either Britain or Saudi Arabia to 
renew negotiations on the boundary between Saudi Arabia and the Trucial Coast. 
Obviously this has a profound effect on the exploration for o i l . For instance, 
as mentioned earlier, the work of an ARAMCO exploration party was stopped 
by Trucial Oman levies based in Abu Dhabi.
The proposed withdrawal of Britain from Hie Gulf in 1971 may Jcad 
to further negotiations on the boundary. Despite this, however, it is very 
difficult to predict the exact location of the boundary line between the two 
areas because of the large gap between what Saudi Arabia claims to be its border,
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and what Britain states it is.
b. Distribution of the Offshore Areas of the Gulf (Continental Shelf)
The ownership of the small, and for the most part, barren islands
scattered around the waters of the Gulf is a fairly constant source of contention
among the countries surrounding the G ulf. Prior to the discovery of o il, these
islands were unwanted, but since then, many opposing claims have been made in
various forms. These range from planting flags, which were speedily removed by
rival claimants, to building cairns on tidal banks, thus forming new islands. The
pearling banks, however, remain unaffected, as no one State has control over
them, and they are open to all Gulf countries as far as pearling is concerned.
When the oil companies showed an interest in the drilling for oil in the sea,
claims increased, and the question of ownership of the sea-bed arose. It became
essential for this to be resolved in 1949, as during that year the Rulers of all the
States in the Gulf issued declarations claiming jurisdiction over the sea-bed and
sub-soil of the Gulf adjoining their territorial wafers and extending seawards to
undefined boundaries. The granting of concessions off-shore made it necessary
45to define the areas in which the companies were to work. Here it is intended 
to look closely at these areas with regard to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran and 
Iraq .
On behalf of the Federal Government, President Truman of the United
States, on 15th September, 1945, issued a proclamation laying claim to the
natural resources of the sub-soil and sea-bed of the continental shelf* of the
* “Continental shelf was considered as sea«bed not exceeding, at its
outer limits, a depth of 100 fathoms ot 200 metres, (approximately 
600 feet)." Such was the definition given unofficially in the United 
States and officially in Mexico.
The United Nations Law Commission in 1956 defined the term “Continental 
shelf" as the “seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the =
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United States. In this proclamation, President Truman claimed neither
sovereignty nor jurisdiction over the natural resources. The proclamation also
provided for the possibility of sharing the continental shelf with other states,
46in which case the definition of the boundary becomes necessary.
In the Gulf, Saudi Arabia was the first state to follow the American 
example by issuing a Royal Decree on the 28th May, 1949, with regard to the 
territorial wafers of the Kingdom. This was followed by a pronouncement of the 
same date, claiming the "seabed and subsoil of the Persian Gulf seaward from 
the coastal sea of Saudi Arabia but contiguous to its coast" as belonging to the 
kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and saying that it would be subject to Saudi jurisdiction 
and control
Although the Saudi pronouncement of 28th May followed generally that 
issued by President Truman in 1945, it differed in three points: (a) the pronounce­
ment did not mention the term "continental shelf". This might have been due to the 
shallowness of the Gulf (much less than 100 fathoms); (b) it referred to the areas 
adjacent to the Saudi territorial waters without limiting how far seawards these 
areas were to go, and that the boundaries of such areas would be determined in 
agreement with the neighbouring countries on an equal basis; (c) if put the 
seabed and subsoil under the jurisdiction and control of Saudi Arabia, instead of 
limiting its claim to natural resources.
_ coast but outside of the territorial sea to a depth of 200 metres, or
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent wafer admits 
of the exploration of the natural resources of the said areas."
The International Conference on the Law of the Sea, which took place 
in Genova between February 24th and April 24th, 1958, defined the 
continental shelf as "seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent 
to the coast but outside the area of tho territorial sea to where the depth 
of superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of 
the said areas." (G . Lenczowski, O il and State in the Middle East, 1960, 
pp. 130-131.)
This example was followed by the shaikhdoms of the Gulf, with the
issue of proclamations almost Identical in form to that of Saudi Arabia,
48These were issued in the following order:-
Bahrain 5 th May 1949
Qatar 8th June 1949
Kuwait 12th June 1949
Trucial Shaikhdoms
Abu Dhabi 10th June 1949
Dubai 14th June 1949
Sharjah 16th June 1949
A jman 2Qfh June 1949
Umm al-Qaiwain 20fh June 1949
Ras al-Khaimah 1949
One possible reason for the issue of these proclamations by the 
shaikhdoms is that they were encouraged by the hope of discovering oil deposits 
under the high seas of the Gulf ^  In order to give a clear picture of the forms 
of these proclamations, the Kuwaiti proclamation may be quoted as an example. 
The proclamation declared that:
the sea-bed and subsoil lying beneath the high seas of the Persian 
Gulf contiguous to the territorial wafers of the State of Kuwait 
and extending seawards to boundaries to be determined more 
precisely as occasion may arise on equitable principles by the Ruler 
of Kuwait after consulting neighbouring states, appertain to the 
State of Kuwait and are subject to its exclusive jurisdiction and 
control.
Nothing in this proclamation shall be deemed to affect 
sovereignty over the islands or the status of the seabed 
and subsoil beneath any territorial waters.
Nothing in this proclamation shall be deemed to affect the 
character as high seas of the Persian Gulf above the seabed and 
outside the limits of the territorial wafers or the status of their air
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space above the water of the Persian Gulf outside territorial ^
waters or fishing and traditional pearling rights in such waters.
With the introduction of the above proclamations, the Gulf States claimed 
large areas of seabed and subsoil lying beyond their territorial waters. Besides, 
all the 1949 proclamations share common features, which are as follows:
a) They all seem to avoid the use of the term "continental shelf".
As in the case of Saudi Arabia, this could be related to the shallowness of the
sea, whose depth is much less than 100 fathoms, in contrast, the Iranian draft
legislation of 1949, which was passed as law on 19th June, 1955, mentioned the
51term "continental shelf".
b) Tho rights of the states along the coast to control and rule certain 
undefined sections of the high seas outside their territorial waters ?s recognised 
with one reservation. This is that the areas claimed shall be delimited with 
neighbouring states, fairly by agreement,
c) Only the seabed and subsoil will be affected by these proclamations; 
internationally recognised rights ( i .e .  fishing, pearling and flying) on the wafer 
and in the air above the seabed will remain.
The Iranian proclamation regarding the seabed and subsoil was presented 
on 19th June, 1955. It claimed that "the areas as well as the natural riches of 
the seabed and subsoil up to the limits of the continental shelf which extends from 
the coast of Iran and the Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman 
belong to the Iranian government and are under its sovereignty."
Iraq was the last state in the Gulf to put forward its claimftl to sovereignty 
over the seabed and subsoil of the high seas. The statement of 27th November, 
1957, which was very similar in its form to those proclamations made earlier by 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf shaikhdoms, defined the Iraqi rights to wafers lying
beyond its territorial waters. This statement was followed by another on 9th April,
1958. The latter was due to the increased Iranian interest in the offshore zones
of the Gulf as shown by their declaration in 1957 that certain zones were open
for oil operation,* This act led the Iraqi government to issue a new statement
on 9th April, 1958, with regard to its offshore areas. This stated that “oil
operations or installations made or to be made in this area of contiguous waters
are subject to Iraqi sovereignty, and are not permitted to be carried out except
by Iraqi authorities". The statement ended with a warning that the government
of Iraq "does not recognise any statement, announcement, legislation or
demarcation related to territorial waters or to contiguous waters issued by any
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neighbouring country which might be contrary to this statement."
Definition of territorial waters
The above-mentioned claims made by tho Gulf states with regard to
the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of the high sea areas adjacent
to their territorial wafers gave rise to the question of the limits of these territorial
waters. In 1949, no proclamations were issued by the Gulf shaikhdoms in respect
of the definition of territorial wafers. If is understood that the usual British limit
of three miles (which is now 12 nautical miles) from the iow-water mark would
appertain to them. But in recent oil concessions the limits of the territorial wafer
53was extended to six nautical miles from the coast. Although it may be seen 
that the offshore extension of Kuwait O il Company*s land concession for Kuwait
itself was fixed at 6 nautical miles by the 1951 agreement, the mileage extent
54of its territorial wafers has been officially fixed. * On 24th December, 1967,
an Amiri Decree was issued by the Ruler of Kuwait which extended the territorial
* On 24th August, 1957, Agip Mineraria (S1RIP) was granted an oil
concession in the offshore areas of Iran contiguous to those of Iraq.
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waters of Kuwait to 12 nautical miles whether for the mainland or for the islands
of Kuwait. The decree also established a starting point from which the coastal
sea of Kuwait was to be measured.
In a memorandum which preceeded this decree, it was explained that
Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia had officially extended their territorial waters
to 12 nautical miles, whereas Kuwait had not done so, except where concession
rights were concerned. However, now that Kuwait was a state with all the
attributes of sovereignty that went with the position, it was time that the
55territorial waters were defined.
Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two main coastal states on the G ulf have
passed legislation with respect to the definition of their territorial waters.
Saudi Arabia presented its earlier official declaration with regard to the breadth
of the Saudi territorial waters on 28th May, 1949. Here, the territorial v/aters were
extended seaward for a distance of 6 nautical miles. This distance was altered
once again by the Royal Decree of 16th February, 1957. Article 3 of the Decree
claims a strip of inland waters between the coasts of the kingdom and shoals or
islands stretching seawards for a distance of 12 nautical miles, while in Article 4
it claims that "the territorial sea of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia lies outside
the inland waters of the kingdom and extends seaward for a distance of 12 nautical
miles.1 Article 5 gives detailed information about the base-line from which the
56territorial waters of the kingdom are measured.
According to the Iranian law of 19th July, 1934, the territorial water 
of Iran was defined as 6 nautical miles from the low-water mark. This was altered 
on 12th April, 1959, and was extended to 12 nautical miles. Iraq, at the head 
of the Gulf, issued her decree in respect of territorial waters on 4th November,
1958. In this decree Iraq fixed her territorial v/aters at 12 nautical miles, 
extending seawards from the coast. With regard to Iraqi rights over the continental
shelf, the Decree states that it "affects in no way the international right which
Iraq holds over the two maritime zones called the contiguous zone and the
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continental shelf situated beyond the limits of the Iraqi territorial sea".
It may bo noticed from the above declarations that while the Gulf
shaikhdoms were adopting a breadth of territorial waters varying from 3 to 6
nautical miles for the purpose of oil concession, other states such as Iran, Iraq
and Saudi Arabia were introducing legislation in order to extend their territorial
waters to 12 nautical miles.
v lt is to be regretted that after some 15 years of concentrated submarine
drilling by several oil companies in the Gulf, only a few offshore boundaries have
been settled. These are between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Bahrain, and Qatar,
and between Qatar and Bahrain, and Qatar and Abu Dhabi .* This problem
affects the whole of the Gulf, from Basra in Iraq to the Strait of Hormuz at the
Gulf entrance, and there is continuous discussion between Iran and the Arab
States on the one hand, and among the Arab States themselves on the other.
A t the moment the upper part of the Gulf is of especial interest, par-
ticularly in the area where at least three proven or semi-proven oil bearing zones
of great potential intersect the putative boundary lines of overlapping oil
concessions. This makes each country even more determined to protect its national
• * * 58 interests.
The Commencement of Border Disputes:
Pre-announcement of the National Iranian Oil Co. N o .228/15
On 1st April, 1963, N!. I .O ,C . announced via Plat's O il gram News
Service that two areas (District I) of continental shelf of the Gulf adjacent to the
* To date, Britian has conducted negotiations on behalf of the states of
the Trucial Coast, as they are still British Protectorates.
Iranian mainland would be open for international bidding with effect from
5 0
1st July, 1964. ' Area 1 of District 1, relinquished recently by I.P .A .C *,
originally comprised an area of 720 square miles, but it was extended by the
addition of 380 square miles. It now extends well to the west of the original
l,P J k ,C . concession. It is the latter extension that appears to have cut
into Iraqi territorial waters in the north, and the Shell Kuwait concession in the
s o u t h ( S e e  Fig. 5 .)  Area *i of District I is located to the south of the 3 ,P .A *C .
concession, but is separated from it by a wedge of some 10-15,000 square
kilometres of w ater.^
The Iranian pre-announcement of 1st April, 1963, provoked
diplomatic protests against Iran from the Arab States. The Iraqi government, in
its statement dated 1st May, 1963, stated that since “most of the areas declared
open (for bidding) are exclusively Iraqi territorial waters,* it will not recognise,
nor permit, any concession granted to any party whatsoever for oil exploration
in these areas A ll the parties concerned must ascertain the ownership of
the areas before seeking to grant or acquire any exploration concessions in them .. . .
The Kuwaiti government, in its statement of 4th June, 1963, described
the Iranian pre-announcement as a violation of its territorial sovereignty. In
addition, the statement declared that Kuwait had already fixed its continental
63shelf boundaries when she granted a concession to Shell Co.
On 15th June, 1963, Saudi Arabia followed the example of Iraq and 
Kuwait by issuing a statement protesting about the delineation of Area ii of 
District i (south of I.P .A  .C . concession) declared in the Iranian pre-announcement 
of 1st April, 1963. In addition, the statement also did not recognise the 
delineation of the Pan American Petroleum Corporation (I .P «A .C .) concession
* Possibly the government is referring both to Iraq's territorial waters
and the continental shelf.
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Fig, 5 ” Area I of District I opened for bidding by the
National Iranian Oil Company on April 1st, 1963*
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area on the ground that this constituted an "infringement of the legitimate rights 
of Saudi Arabia to the natural resources in the off-shore area opposite Saudi 
Arabia's territorial waters or the territorial waters of the Saudi Arabia*Kuwait 
Neutral Zonel^ '
Definition of the overlapping areas
The overlapping concession areas that have provoked the afore-mentioned
» * claims and counter claims may be described as follows:*
Iraq-Iran The area in question is Area 1 of District I .  This zone/
which comprises some 1,100 square mites, extends northwards to within three
miles of the coast and southwards to the limit of SIRIP's offshore concession 
65area. The Iraqi government claims that Area 1 as defined by Iran in the pre* 
announcement of 1st April, 1963, infringes upon her territorial waters at the 
head of the Gulf.
Kuwait*Iran Kuwait claims that its offshore areas, where a concession 
has been granted to Shell, are infringed upon by Iran's Area 1. A t the same time 
Iran claims that Shell's concession cuts info offshore areas on the Iranian side held 
by SIRIP and SPAC under concession granted in August 1957 and April 1958 
respectively. ^ ig .6.)
For a full description of these disputes see M.E ,E ,S, Suppl. N o . 11,
18th January; N o .31, 7th June; Suppl. N o .32, 14th June; and N o .33 , 
21sf June, 1963.
There has always been confusion over the ownership of the offshore 
area at the head of the Gulf, though this has never yet given rise to 
serious dispute. Both Iran and Iraq lay claim to territorial wafers extending 
12 miles from their coasts, plus contiguous waters.
It may be noted that Kuwait-Shell C o ., which holds Kuwait's offshore 
concession, had informed Kuwait of its decision to suspend its drilling 
operations within the concession area pending the settlement of the 
Kuwaiti*Iranian border dispute. The Company informed the Kuwaiti 
government that "its best drilling prospects lie in the south-eastern 
part of the concession, nearer to IPAC's Cyrus discovery. However, 
drilling in this area will not be possible until some agreement is reached 
between Kuwait and Iran on the offshore boundary". See M.E .E .S .,
No .51, 25th October, 1963.
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Saudi Arobiq/kuwaifr Neutral Zone-Iran Saudi Arabia claims 
that the IPAC concession of 1950 cuts into the offshore of the Neutral Z.one
where a concession in respect of the Saudi half interest was granted to A . 0 * C •
68
in 1957.*°
Saudi Arabia -  Kuwait The definition of the offshore of the Neutral 
Zone's most northerly boundary is the prime factor in the Kuwait-Saudi con­
troversy which arose from the Kuwait Shell concession agreement of 1961. Thus 
the area in question, which Kuwait has allocated to the Kuwait Shell concession 
area, is said by Saudi Arabia to constitute an overlap with the Neutral , *one 
1957 concession area. The problem appears to have stemmed from the difference 
between the definition of the concession area given in the Saudi Arabian agree­
ment of 1957 with A .O .C . ,  and that given in the Kuwaiti concession agreement 
of 1958 with the same company. The concession area granted by Saudi Arabia
to A .O  .C . extends further northward. This area of difference is reported to be
69of great production potential, which makes if important to both countries.
Saudi Arabia-lran The prolific Fereidoon field is the scene of yet 
another overlap botween the concessions of IPAC In Iran and ARAMCO in 
Saudi Arabian wafers. Fereidoon, which was discovered by IPAC in 1966 
is believed to have production from three horizons. The Middle Cretaceous 
Burgan Sands (27° A .P , ! , ) ,  the Lower Cretaceous Yamama limestone, and the
* It is interesting to note that oil was proved in the disputed aroa by
drills of both A .O .C . and IPAC# In the beginning of 1966, Esfandiar 
oil field on the Iranian side, produced oil from the Lower Cretaceous 
Ratawi limestone formation at a depth of about 9,000 feet. Subsequently, 
in February, 1967, in a well drilled by A .O  ,C • on the Neutral . ’one side. 
Lulu N o . 1, oil was found in the same structure at the same depth. Both 
wells are reported to have an output of about 30,000 b/d with an 
A ,P .1. ranging between 30° and 34°. See M.E .E «S. N o ,16,
16th February, 1968.
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Upper Jurassic Arab Zone (38° A . P. I . ) .  This Is the field from which AAV.'CO
was ordered to move by the Iranian Navy on the 1st of February, 196C, while
7:>
preparing to drill apparently within the borders of Its own concession area. 
However, Saudi Arabia claims that its offshore areas, held under concession by 
ARAMCO since 1v4o, are infringed upon by both the IPAC concession of
71
1958 and Area ii of District I as defined in the Iranian pre-accouncemenf,
The negotiation process on the settlement of the offshore boundaries
Representatives of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, in their meeting In
Geneva in October, 1963, reached an understanding on the settlement of
offshore demarcation of the G ulf. No Kuwaiti representatives were present
at the Geneva meeting, but if was hoped that Kuwait would agree to tho under™
72standing reached by the above countries.
Soon afterwards, in November, 1963, Iranian delegates arrived in
Iraq to discuss the question of the delimitation of the offshore boundaries
between the two countries. In conclusion, the two governments agreed on "a
basis for joint exploitation of oil in the disputed areas, whereby the interests
73of both parties would be observed".
In April 1964, Iran announced its intention of beginning negotiations 
with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia about the settlement of the offshore demarcation 
in the G ulf. The Iranian intentions were realised when its Foreign Minister paid 
visits to both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Consequently, Kuwait and Iran issued 
a joint communique on 2nd April, 1964, in which they agreed to establish a 
joint committee of specialists in order to study the matter and to reach a final 
sottlament in respect of the division of the continental shelf. Discussions were 
held with regard to offshore demarcation on 6th April, 1964, between fho Iranian 
Foreign Minister and Saudi officials. As a result, If was agreed that an exchange
56.
of delegates should take place in the near future to define the boundaries
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of the offshore areas between the two countries.
Ever since then, negotiations between Iran and the Arab States on the
definition of the offshore boundaries have continued. The main problem
is the difficulty in finding an equitable basis for working out the Gulf median
line which should more accurately separate those areas of natural resources
claimed by Iran from those claimed by the Arab States.* When agreement
has been reached it could become possible for both Iran and the Arab States
to reconsider the boundaries of the concessionary areas of their respective
oil companies, on either side of the line, and to determine them. These would
75be settled according to the delineation settlement reached among themselves.
Only those agreements between Iran and Kuwait, and Iran and Saudi 
Arabia will be discussed here.
i) The offshore boundary agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia
On the 13th of December, 1965, representatives of the governments 
of Saudi Arabia and Iran initialled an agreement relating to the definition of 
the boundary line separating the submarine areas belonging to Saudi Arabia from
The Geneva Convention of 1958 laid down the international legal 
principles controlling the demarcation of continental shelf boundaries 
between states whose coasts are adjacent or opposite to one another.
Though this convention was never ratified (probably because of its failure 
to agree on the establishment of a world limit for the breadth of territorial 
waters) and its principles are somewhat vague, it is useful as a guide and 
starting point for discussion. Article 6 of the Convention stipulates that 
the continental shelf boundaries between these states “shall be determined 
between them11. In cases of non-agreement and “unless another boundary 
line is justified by special circumstances", the boundary where the states 
are opposite each other is "the median line every point of which is equi­
distant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea of each state is measured". Where the states are 
adjacent the boundary is determined “by application of the principle of 
equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the 
territorial sea of each state is measured", Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
have all agreed in general that the median line principle of the convention 
should be applied to negotiations between them. However, offshore islands
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those of Iran. The agreement also provided a solution to the long-standing
dispute over the ownership of the two islands of al-Arabiyah (50°10, 23,IE,
27°45,49UN) and Farsiyah (5 0 °9 ,48 IIE, 27°48*22" N ), by recognising Saudi
sovereignty over the former, and Iranian sovereignty over the latter.
One of the agreement*s main factors was that the Iranian island of
Kharg, which is 23 miles from the coast, should be given "half-effect" status
in fixing the boundary line .* This was a compromise between the Saudi Arabian
requests for a shore-to-shore median line and the Iranian claim for "full-effect"
status for Kharg Island.
However, the Iranians never ratified this agreement. The probable
reason for this appears to have been that the disputed areas, which was where the
concessions of IPAC (Iran) and ARAMCO (Saudi Arabia) overlapped, contained
a very large oilfield. The Iranian portion of the field (the "F" structure,
subsequently named the Fereidoon Field) was discovered by IPAC in early 1966.
IPAC extended its activities to drill at least another six wells in the disputed
area, west of the Kharg half-effect line. On the Saudi side, ARAMCO found
oil in the same structure, and the field was called Marjan. Furthermore, from
evidence available, it seemed to the Iranians that the greater part of the "F"
77structure lay in Saudi waters west of the Kharg full-effect line.
-  are not referred to, and the weight which should be given to them in
determining the baselines is not settled. St is precisely the question 
of the status of islands (Kharg off Iran, and Failaka and Kuber off 
Kuwait) that has been the cause of the trouble in the demarcation talks. 
(Middle East Economic Survey, N o . 16, 16th February, 1968.)
* The Iranians, in their negotiations with Saudi Arabia, considered Kharg
Island to be a suitable candidate for a median line basing point for several 
reasons. Firstly, that the island could not be regarded as barren and 
waterless? secondly, that it was a major export terminal; and finally, 
that it was connected to the mainland by a 30 inch pipeline. Thus, it 
should have been regarded as a part of the mainland. (Middle East 
Economic Survey, N o .l6 , 16th February, 1968.)
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If would appear, therefore, that the Iranians had not fully considered 
this proposal at first, but after studying its effects more carefully, they 
realised that the Fereidoon Fieid would be more or less outwith their 
boundaries, thus they decided against signing the agreement.
Once again, in order to reach a settlement in respect of the de­
marcation question, the Saudi and Iranian negotiators adopted a new approach 
to the problem by avoiding the degree of status to be given to Kharg Island in 
determining the boundary line. The new approach was to divide the recoverable 
oil reserves in the disputed oil-rich zone, on the basis of available seismic and 
drilling data. This was regarded as a possible and appropriate compromise 
solution to the problem. Subsequently, as a result of a series of talks held in 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, an agreement was signed in Tehran on the 24th of
October, 1968, by the Saudi O il Minister, Ahmad Zaki Yamani, and N IO C
78chairman, Manuchehr Eqbal. Briefly, the provisions of the agreement were 
as follows:-
Article I of the agreement provides for the "sovereignty of Saudi 
Arabia over the island of al-Arabiyah and of Iran over the island of Farsiyah.11 
Furthermore, the above Article provides for territorial waters of 12 nautical 
miles for each island, “measured from the line of lowest low water" on each 
island. In the case of territorial waters overlapping, "a boundary line separating 
the territorial seas of the two islands shall be drawn so as to be equidistant 
throughout its length from the lowest low water lines on each island."
Articles 2 and 3 provide that "except in the vicinity of al-Arabiyah
and Farsiyah the boundary line separating the submarine areas which
appertain to Saudi Arabia from the submarine areas which appertain to Iran 
shall b e .. . . .  determined by a straight line" the points of which were specified,
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and that each party would recognise the sovereignty over the seabed and
subsoil, of the other on its side of the line. (See Fig.7 .)
Article 4 of the agreement prevents both parties from carrying out
drilling operations "within a zone extending 500 metres in width in the
submarine areas" on both sides of the boundary line. (The zone to be measured
79from the boundary line.)
ii) Iran-Kuwait offshore verbal agreement
The concessions for the head of the Gulf have been granted to several 
oil companies, among which are Kuwait/Shell on the Kuwaiti side, and SIR IP 
and IPAC on the Iranian side. These companies have surveyed various sections 
of their concession areas, and it has been concluded by them that the area is 
potentially rich in o il . in particular, after extensive surveys had been made, 
the Kuwait/Shell O il Company believes strongly that oil is to be found in the 
south-eastern part of its concession area. However, this is the area in dispute, 
referred to as the "Golden Triangle", and as a result of this dispute, Kuwait/
Shell has suspended operations in the area since 1964 while awaiting a solution. 
Thus the area is important to both Iran and Kuwait, making settlement vital if the 
resource is to be utilised.
During the Ruler of Kuwait's state visit to Iran in mid-January 1968, 
a joint communique was issued to the effect that Iran and Kuwait had arrived 
at a "final solution to the continental shelf question in respect of the offshore 
areas of the two countries". Details of the agreement have not yet been 
officially released, beyond those mentioned in the announcement. However 
it is understood that the basic principles of the solution included the acknowledge­
ment of full-effect status in determining the median line for certain offshore 
islands including Failaka on the Kuwaiti side, and Kharg Island on the Iranian
6 0 .
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Fig. 7 - IPAC concession overlapping that of ARAMCO, and the
boundary line separating the Saudi Arabian section of 
the Gulf from that of Iran.
The Kuwa if-Iran agreemenf was less than fwo months old, and not
even ratified when the Iraqi government objected to if in March, 1968.
The Iraqis protested on the grounds that they had not been consulted about
the agreemenf, although they considered that they had rights in the matter*
The Iraqi Foreign Minister issued a statement on the 25th of February, 1968,
emphasising the Iraqi refusal to recognise "any statement, proclamation,
legislation or demarcation affecting Iraq's territorial waters and continental
shelf which is issued by a neighbouring country and which infringes the rights
81and sovereignty of Iraq in respect of the area in question".
To conclude, if is beyond doubt that the boundary settlement, either 
on land or offshore, creates a great problem for the concerned countries in the 
upper part of the G ulf. So far, little has been done to solve this problem*
Still in the case of onshore boundary definition, the problems between Kuwait 
and Iraq, and Saudi Arabia and theTrucial Coast have high priority. Offshore 
demarcation between Iran and the Arab States is not less in its complexify than 
the on-land problem. Finding the solution to these problems will require both 
time and patience from the parties concerned, and International Law holds no 
effective remedy as yet. The dispute has to be solved by direct government 
to government talks in each case, and from this means of settlement, little can 
be expected.
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CHAPTER 18
HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF OIL EXPLOITATION AROUND THE GULP
The above heading will be analysed in two sections:
(1) Tho earliest oil exploitation (especially in the Gulf area);
(2) The modern phase -  inland and offshore concessions.
The first section will deal with the utilisation of oil in ancient times, 
and the way it was obtained. Furthermore, it will show how petroleum became 
important in the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century, as one 
of the main sources of energy.
In the second section, it is intended to examine the details of the 
concessions under which the oil has been exploited, and the terms of the 
concessions, as well as the volume of oil extracted.
1 . Earliest oil exploitation
Although the Middle East has become one of the main world oil 
suppliers quite recently, petroleum has been known and used there for many 
years.
Results obtained from the work of archaeologists in different parts of 
the Middle East indicate that petroleum served many purposes. For example, 
in Sumarian times (that is some 5 or 6 thousand years ago), bitumen was used 
as bonding material (particularly at the city of Ur in Mesopotamia), fixing
•j
the blades of tools info handles, and for sticking jewels info settings. St was
also utilised in the paving of the Hanging Gardens of Babylon and in the plumbing
2and drainage of the city.
If is beyond doubt that petroleum gas played an important role in the 
religion of the ancient Persians as fuel for the "eternal" fire which they
venerated, They constructed many of their temples over places where 
petroleum gas escaped from the ground, in order to use the escaped gas as a 
constant inexhaustable fuel supply. Such temples were found at Baku,* and 
near Damghan (180 miles east-north-east of Teheran, Masjid-Sulaiman, and 
elsewhere,^
Other important values attached to petroleum in ancient times may be found 
in the inscriptions which record that in about 1500^ B,C* Thothmes I I I ,  Pharoah 
of Egypt, extracted a tribute of bitumen from certain cities. This material was 
used in the preparation of mummies .4
Aristotle ,  Pliny, and other ancient Greek and Roman authors also 
mentioned petroleum in their writings. Marco Polo, in the thirteenth century, made 
reference to camels being anointed with petroleum against mange. It was also 
used by the people of India, Burma, and the East Indies for the purpose of building, 
waterproofing, and as a source of lamp o il.
In North America, the Indian tribes collected it from natural springs
for centuries and prized it highly for medicinal purposes. In Central America,
5the ancient Mexicans found that bitumen could serve as chewing-gum.
In more recent times, as early as the thirteenth century A .D . ,
Persians used oil for artificial lighting.^ Thus, if is possible to give numerous 
examples of the way oil was utilised throughout past centuries.
Withlhis long association with petroleum, the Middle East naturally 
was regarded as a likely source of oil supplies when the modern oil industry 
came into being in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
This place and its oilfields were for many centuries within the confines of 
Persia.
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As mentioned previously, petroleum collected from seepage has been
used for many centuries. However, it was not until August 27th, 1859, that
the first attempt was made to drill specifically for oil by Colonel Drake at
Titusville, Pennsylvania. Drake succeeded in finding oil at a depth of 69^ feet.
The well was not considered to be a large producer, but the amount was enough
7to launch an industry which is now among the world's largest.
However, Drake's discovery preceded intensive drilling throughout 
the United States. This was followed by intense competition among thousands 
of oil producers, and between the producers and the marketers, which led to 
bitter conflict and to much wastage of gas and o il , Gradually, however, the 
foundation for a more orderly and scientific industry was laid, and the 
petroleum industry grew steadily.
Within a decade, Drake's example was followed in Russia, Rumania, 
Canada, and Italy. 1900 showed oil discoveries in Poland, Japan, Germany, 
India, Peru, and the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia). In 1908, Iran v/as 
among such countries as Mexico, Argentina, and Trinidad in discovering oil 
in commercial quantities. It was the first country in the Middle East to do so, 
at the site of Masjid-i Sulaiman, which is still producing o il. The next sig­
nificant find was in 1927 at Kirkuk in Iraq, and the 1930's brought further oil 
discoveries in the Arabian Peninsula.
The rapid expansion in the oil industry was caused by increased 
domestic and industrial needs. Before the nineteenth century, animal and 
vegetable fats and oils were adequate to serve all purposes, but thereafter 
proved inadequate to cope with more sophisticated demand.
For example, in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, kerosene 
was the principal petroleum product, mainly used for lamps and stoves, while
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gasoline and lighter products had no commercial uses and were normally 
dumped or burned. With the development of the internal combustion engine 
and the subsequent growth of the automotive industry, gasoline became important 
and acquired a fair share of the oil market. Thereafter, oil refining was changed 
from a relatively crude process to a highly sophisticated operation.
World War i also had great influence in increasing oil productivity. 
Development occurred in engines, especially in the field of heavy transport 
equipment, tanks and aeroplanes. This was followed by the conversion of the 
world navies, and then merchant fleets from coal to o il.
The Russian revolution also affected oil development throughout the 
world. In 1900, Russian output and exports accounted for more than half of the 
world's o il. Their withdrawal from the oil market after the revolution in 1917 
created a shortage in oil supplies. This was soon replaced by increased pro-
g
duction in Venezuela and Iran.
During World War II, the Middle East oil industry was hampered by 
transportation problems, although some of its oil fields, such as those of Iraq 
and Saudi Arabia, were utilised to a certain extent to supply the Allies, while those 
of Iran were fully utilised. By the end of the War, international oil companies 
again turned thoir attention to the Middle East, and they developed areas where 
previous explorations had revealed vast quantifies of crude oil (e .g . Kuwait).
Since the war, the Middle East oil industry has seen great progress, and at 
present it counts as one of the main sources of world oil supply,
2 . The modern phase -  inland and offshore oil concessions
The development of oil exploitation in the Middle East has been made 
possible through the investment of foreign capital, and this involved Middle 
Eastern countries in international politics. These countries have at different
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times, signed oil concessions with a number of oil companies from various 
countries. The system of concessions in these countries (Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
and Kuwait), differs from that in the United States, where the rights of subsoil 
are owned by the Federal Government, State Government, and individuals.
In places where the Government regards itself as the owner of petroleum 
resources, concessions have been granted in order to exploit oil resources. 
Concessionaires were thus permitted to exploit the oil .They paid a percentage 
of their net profit to the host government, and thus were exempt from customs1 
taxation and other duties. The D'Arcy concession was one of those, and paid 
16% of the company’s profits to the Iranian Government. Such concessions 
were granted in the early twentieth century.
This system was later changed for another. Instead of paying percentages 
of the net profit, the concessionaires paid royalties per ton of oil produced and 
exported. The companies were still, however, exempt from taxation.
After World War I, this type of concession became common in the 
Middle East, and the 1933 Iranian concession was of this nature.
In colonies and protectorates, the situation was different. The govern­
ments of these countries could not grant concessions without the approval of their 
parent countries, and these, naturally, preferred to grant concessions to their 
own people.
Venezuela was the first country to improve on these conditions. In 
order to increase her income from oil production, she introduced the system of 
sharing 50-50. Saudi Arabia followed this example, then the rest of the Middie 
East.10
In order to deal with the governments of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, 
with reference to their concession agreements with international oil companies,
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each country will foe discussed separately. The reason for this is that the 
type and terms of the Iranian agreements with the operating oil companies; 
differ in many cases from those granted by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
a , Iran
D ’Arcy Concession
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the international oil 
industry was dominated by the American companies and mainly by the Standard 
O il Company. They believed that there were abundant oil reserves in the 
United States, which in turn led the companies to think less of obtaining con­
cessions for new oil deposits than of acquiring more overseas markets for American 
o il. Also, entry of non-British prospective concessionaires to the Gulf area 
was made difficult by the British Government, thus further isolating the Middle 
East.
In the early 1890’s Jacques de Morgan headed a scientific mission sent 
to Persia by the French Government. Among their archaeological reports 
were those showing significant indications of oil seepages. In February, 1892, 
the results of the investigations were published in Annales des Mines.^  This, 
and other technical notices, came to the attention of William Knox D ’Arcy, who 
had made a fortune goldmining in Australia. Sn 1900, he formed a small group 
(his own assistant, A„L. Marrlot, a French ex-diplomat, and a Persian-Armenian), 
and set them to work in Tehran to obtain an oil concession. On May 28th, 1901, 
D ’Arcy was granted a concession by the Shah Muzaffar e d -D in .*^  At this
* Zuhayr Mikdashi, in his book, "A Financial Analysis of Middle Eastern 
O il Concessions (1901-1965)“ elaborates: "social unrest, corruption 
of the administration, foreign political influence and arbitrary rule of 
ignorant leaders" were dominating the country at the time when the 
D ’Arcy concession was granted.
Hme neither the concessionaire nor the government had any idea of the future 
of oil exploitation in Persia, and the science of petroleum had by no means 
reached today’s standard to be able to assess the future of petroleum. Tho 
financial backers were ready to gamble their money on the existence of oil in
D • 1 3Persia.
The D'Arcy concession provided for the exclusive privilege of exploiting 
the hydrocarbon resources of Persia, with the exception of the five northern 
provinces, ( i .e .  Azerbaijan, Mazandaran, Gilan, Astrabad, and Khorasan), 
the right to build pipelines to the Gulf Coast, and if included exemption from 
taxation and customs duties. (See Fig. 1A.) It covered an area of 500,000 
square miles for a period of sixty years beginning from May 28th, 1901. The 
holder of the concession had to form a company (or companies) within two years, 
and when the first one was established, was to pay £20,000 (#97,580) in cash, 
and another £20,000 in paid-up shares to the Persian Government. Also, 16% 
of the annual net profit was to be paid as royalty* to the Persian Treasury.^
If is possible to say that the main reason for connecting the payments to 
the Government of Persia with profits from trading was to protect, to a certain 
extent, the concessionaires, should they make little or no profit, or even sustain 
a loss in any year. In this event the company was not expected to pay anything 
to the Government, which, however, paid nothing towards a loss. Naturally 
the Government hoped that the industry would always be prosperous, which was 
not the case. Thus the Government^ income from oil did not comply with its 
aim of acquiring a regular source of public revenue.^
Two areas were selected by D ’Arcy from the total as likely to contain
oil deposits. One was Chah Surkh near Qasr-i-Shirin, close to the Iraq-Sran
A payment of royalty calculated either on the basis of volume of oil 
produced, sold or exported, or on the basis of profits, or both.
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Fig. 1 - A D*Arcy Concession Area of 1901.
B The territory of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company con­
cession, which until 1938 comprised all the area south 
of what was known as the "Violet Line". Since that 
date, the concession has consisted of the areas shaded 
to the south of the "Violet Line".
border, and the other was in the south-west, to the east of Ahwaz city. ^
In 1902, D'Arcy began drilling at Chah Surkh, with G .B . Reynolds supervising
the operation. At the end of 1903, the First Exploration Company was
registered. Opinion differs as to the amount of capital it started with, the
range being from £400,000 $1,947 ,200) to £600,000 (#2,920,800).* In 1903
and 1904 respectively, wells Nos.l and 2 were drilled and proved to contain oil
at an approximate depth of 1,665 feet. Unfortunately the output of 180 barrels
per day fell rapidly to 25, and production of this order made it pointless to
construct a pipeline to the coast of the G ulf.
As D'Arcy by this time had spent about £300,000 (#1,461,600) from
his own resources, they were now somewhat strained, and he was reluctant to
further burden them. Lord Strathcona and the Burmah Oil Company were
persuaded by the British Amiralty to co-operate with D'Arcy and prevent the
concession from falling into non- British hands.**17  a resuj^  jn 1905,
Concession Syndicate Limited was Formed, and this took over the First
Exploration Company and the D'Arcy concession, and established itself
financially. In 1905, the first work of the Syndicate was to remove the drilling
apparatus from Chah Surkh to the south-west, where the semi-autonomous
Bakhtiari tribesmen lived .*** Two areas were selected with 80 miles between
them. One was in Mamatain, and the other was Matdan Naftoon (Masjid-i-
* John Marlowe in his book, The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century,
mentions a sum of £400,000, p.80, and Fathulla Sa'adat, in Geghrafiyaye 
ekttsadiye nafti Iran (Economic Geography of O il in Iran), mentions 
£600,000, p .114.
* *  Other investors from Europe and America approached D'Arcy, and those
from Germany especially were willing to buy the concession, and even 
to cover his expenses. D'Arcy, however, was not interested.
* * *  To compensate the Bakhtiaris for their grazing and other land used by
the company, and to enlist their co-operation, the chiefs were promised a 
3% ownership interest in all companies to be established to exploit oil 
resources in their district, plus £3,000 annually, beginning in 1905, for 
the safeguarding of property and the pipelines.
Plate 1 - Iran’s first producing oil well - Masjid-i Sulaiman
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Sulaiman). Between 1905 and 1907, two wells were drilled at Mamatain to a 
depth of 2,000 feet, but they did not prove to be productive. In 1907, drilling 
facilities were moved to Maidan Naftoon, and the first well proved productive 
at a depth of 1,100 feet (or 1,180 feet), on May 26th, 1908 J 8
Discovery of oil in commercial quantities at Masjid-i-sSulaiman led to 
the establishment of the Anglo-Persian O il Company on April 15th, 1909, 
with the object of faking over the First Exploration Company and the D'Arcy 
concession. The initial capital of the Company was £2 million ($ 9 ,752,000) 
which was largely held by the Burmah Oil Company.
Further investigation in the Mas{id-i-Sulaiman area confirmed tho 
existence of large oil deposits. Anglo-Persian, however, had little capital 
left, and could not have developed these resources without the help of the 
British Government, which bought a controlling interest of about 56% in 1914,sup­
plying the company with £2,200,000 (SHO,727,200) and leaving Burmah Oil
19with about 26^% of the ordinary shares.*
The provisions of the D*Arcy concession led to disagreement in 1920, 
between the concessionaires and the host Government, with regard to (a) “revenue 
payments", (b) "security obligations of the Persian Government", (c) the right of 
the Persians to share the profits made by the subsidiaries of the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company (APOC) and on various other counts. On the other hand, the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company claimed £500,000 (XI r830,500) for the loss sustained 
from the damage done by Bakhtiaris) in blowing up her pipelines in February, 1915. 
Negotiations which took place in London and Tehran failed to resolve these 
questions, and in mid-1920, a financial adviser to the Persian Government,
* In 1913, the British Admiralty (headed by Winston Churchill), decided 
to shift from coal to oil as fuel for the Royal Navy. Thus the Iranian 
oilfields became of special interest as a principal supplier of petroleum 
for the British Empire.
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S . Armitage-Smiih, was appointed by the Persians to settle all the questions
20in dispute with APO C. An agreement was reached on December 22nd, 1920,
The Armifage-Smith agreement differed greatly from the original
D'Arcy concession, and unfavourably for the host country. The Persian Government
lost many important rights and interests, and the financial losses sustained were
substantial. The cessation of royalty payments from the APOC owned British
Tanker Company was a major loss, as were the agreements that the subsidiaries
should not pay royalties on income earned from trading in non-Persian oil,
and that the companies dealing with oil outside Persia should deduct large
amounts of money before royalties were calculated. Also, the term subsidiary
was redefined to include only those companies of which at least 50% was owned by 
21
APOC , Apart from the above terms of the agreement, the Persians received
22a payment of £1 million in respect of all their claims.
The 1933 Agreement
Work continued under the above concession until 1932, but if became 
increasingly difficult for the two parties to agree. The direct reason for the 
Iranian complaints was the sharp decrease in the amount paid to Iran as 
royalty by APOC. The decline was from £1,288,000 (#6,259,680) in 1930, 
to £307,000 (#1,492,020) in 1931. This was due to a cut in prices in the oil 
industry. The result was that the net profits of APOC fell from £3.8  million 
(#18,468,000) in 1930, to £2,400,000 (#11,664,000) in 1931. The dissatisfaction 
of Iran with APOC may have been increased by the agreement of Iraq with the 
Iraq Petroleum Company. The latter country in their negotiations secured a 
minimum of £400,000 (#1,944,000) per annum starting from 1931, although 
their oilfields were not producing for export
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Other complaints were that the Company sold oil to its subsidiaries
and the British Navy at lower prices, and that it charged as a cost of oil
operations, expenditures incurred by investment abroad. Iran also demanded a
share in the profits of companies formed by APOC, but operating outside Iran.
The company, however, refused to pay an income tax imposed by Iran in 1930,
on the grounds that they were exempt under the terms of their concession agreement.
Due to, the company's failure to meet the demands of the Iranian Government, the
concession was cancelled by Iran on November 27th, 1932, but five months later,
24on April 29th, 1933, a new agreement was reached.
The 1933 concession agreement between Anglo-lranian O il Company 
(AIOC)* and the Iranian Government was not with a new concessionaire, and 
its contents were more or less a revision of the D'Arcy concession of 1901.
The new agreement provided for an increase in the amount paid to Iran. The 
basis of royalty v/as changed from 16% of net profits to 4 / -  sterling (gold)
(84 cents) per ton, with a guaranteed minimum payment of £750,000 ($3/163,500) 
in any year. Additionally, 9d (15 cents) was to be paid in order to replace 
taxation, and if more than £670,000 ($2,826,060) was distributed to the 
shareholders in any one year, the equivalent of 20% of the difference 
between the Company's General Reserve on December 31st, 1932, and on the 
date of expiry or surrender of the concession. Royalties for the years 1931 and 
1932 were to be recalculated on the new basis, and Iran was to receive £1,339,000  
($5,647,000) and £1,585,000 ($6,685,000) respectively for those years. An
additional £1,000,000 ($4,218,000) was also to be paid by the company for
25the settlement of all or any outstanding claims.
* In 1935, R iza Shah changed the name of the country from Persia to
Iran, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was renamed the Anglo- 
lranian Oil Company.
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Apart from the above factors, the company's concessionary rights
were extended for a further 32 years, to the end of 1993. The concession
was confined to the south-west of Iran, and the area was limited to half of
the D'Arcy concession, and this was to be reduced once again to 100,000
29sq. miles on December 31st, 1938. (See Fig. IB .)
Nationalisation of the O il Industry and the Consortium Agreement
The 1933 agreement produced a temporary solution to the Iranian oil 
dispute. Tension was renewed, however, after the second World War, and 
the outcome was Iran's accusations against A lO C .
According to their agreement, AlOC was to pay to the Iranian 
Government 20% of any dividends issued to the shareholders over £671,250 
(£*2,831,331). In the years 1941-48, this 20% amounted to o n ly i of the 
royalty received from tonnage, although at that time, A IOC's profits were 
high. The government had no control over the amount of dividend issued, and 
therefore could do nothing to increase its share. AiOC's subsidiary 
companies' dividends were also beyond the control of the Persian Government, 
which claimed that the dividends issued by these companies were kept as low 
as possible, so as to reduce the amount paid out by A lO C , thus reducing 
considerably the Government's revenue, e .g . the British Tanker Company, 
which was completely owned by A IOC and had a capital of £4,000,000  
(XI 6,120,000) reportedly made a net profit of £10,000,000 (#40,300,000) 
in 1948, but only paid £240,000 (0967,200) to A lO C , according to the 
Persian Government.
In 1947, the British Labour government put an upper limit of 30% 
on all dividend distribution, which reduced the Persian Government's revenue 
even further, and although the amount deficient would have been paid when
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the concession ended, they were more interested in immediate revenue. The
Persian government also complained about the loss of revenue incurred
because of the British government's increase in the taxes on company profits,
which affected its share of A IOC's dividends.
On the face of if, A IOC's payment of £51,000,000 ($205,500,000) in
taxes to Britain looks much more than its payment of £16,000,000 ($64,400,000)
in royalties to Iran. However, the £51,000,000 covers taxes on all AIOC's
subsidiaries operating outside Iran, whereas the £16,000,000 was directly
linked to the quantify of oil produced in Iran. Nevertheless, the difference
was very marked, and did not pass unnoticed.
Iran then accused AlOC of concealing from the Iranians the true
amount of oil exported. The discrepancy between the 32 million tons declared
by A lO C , and the 56 million tons reported to have been exported was 24 million
tons. The Persian Prime Minister mentioned this in October, 1951, at the U .N .
Security Council, but he received no reply from the British Delegation.
However, the British Government's representative at the Council did state that the
27Iranians seemed to have little say in matters concerning themselves.
In June, 1948, A lO C approached the Persian Government to discuss 
a method of compensating them for the loss of revenue due to the British Govern­
ment's policy, and in July 1949, a supplemental agreement was put forward by 
A lO C .
The new agreement provided for an increase in royalty payments, from the
1933 rates of 4 / -  (56 cents) per ton to the 1949 rate of 6 / -  (84 cents),*
and from 9d (10.5 cents) to 1 /-  (14 cents) per ton instead of the Iranian taxation.
The terms of the supplemental agreement were considered by AlOC to be the
most favourable for any oil-producing country in the Middle East, at that time,
* Between 1933 and 1949 the dollar was revalued from $4,218 per £1, to $2 .80 .
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However, the offer was criticised by Dr. Mossadeq (who was the 
instigator of the Majlis's* rejection of the supplemental agreement) in that if 
was lower than an offer already made to Saudi Arabia by the Pacific O il 
Corporation on February 20th, 1947, and that agreement was made with a non- 
oil-producing company. In October, 1950, the supplemental agreement was 
submitted to the Majlis by the Prime Minister, General Razmara, for ratification. 
A parliamentary commission, headed by Dr. Mossadeq, had been set up to make 
recommendations to the Majlis regarding the supplemental agreement in December, 
1950, the commission reported against the supplemental agreement on the grounds 
that it did not adequately guarantee Iranian rights and interests. Accordingly 
the Majlis refused to ratify it.
The news of the 50-50 profit sharing agreement between Saudi-Arabia 
and ARAMCO in January 1951, led to an increase in the demand for 
nationalisation of oil in Iran. A lO C , in order to settle the dispute, announced 
its readiness, on February 10th, 1951, to negotiate a new agreement on the 
basis of 50-50 profit sharing, but this was kept secret by the Prime Minister 
(General Razmara) for a propitious moment.** The outcome of the disagreement 
was that on February 19th, 1951, a draff project for the nationalisation was 
submitted to the Majlis by Dr. Mossadeq, On April 30th, the Majlis voted on 
the nationalisation of the oil industry, and on May 1st, 1951, the law was 
promulgated by the Shah.^8
Immediately after nationalisation, the National Iranian O il Company 
(N IO C ) came info being. N IO C was to take over the existing A lO C facilities; 
to restore the flow of oil products for internal consumption; to find ways and
* The Majlis is the Iranian Parliament.
* *  General Razmara was assassinated shortly afterwards without revealing
A IOC's offer.
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means for the resumption of exports of Iranian crude oil and products; and
29to engage in all phases of oil operations.
Unfortunately, the new company was not able to carry out the above
tasks, due to financial difficulties and boycotting or Iranian oil throughout
world markets. The result of the nationalisation of May 1st, 1951, was that
production in Iran dropped sharply, the daily average production dropped from
664,300 barrels in 1950, to 349,600 in 1951, 27,600 in 1952, and 26,800 in
1953, as the dispute dragged on. Alternative oil resources in the Gulf region, of
30which those in Kuwait are a good example, were developed rapidly.
On October 29th, 1954, after three years of deadlock, a settlement was 
reached between Iran on one hand, and the British and U .S . Governments, and 
eight major oil companies on the other. The new agreement was concluded 
between Iran and a group of oil companies including British Petroleum (formerly 
AlO C ), formally known as Iranian O il Participants/ but generally called 
Consortium. The Consortium was initially composed of eight international 
oil companies, but was later joined by eight independent American oil companies. 
The shareholders of Consortium are shown in the following table.
Table 1 The shareholders in Consortium
Nationality Company Percentage
British British Petroleum 40
British-Dutch Royal Dutch-She :l Group 14
French Compagnie Francaise de Petroles 6
American Standard O il Co, (New Jersey) 7
Standard O il Co. oPCalifornia 7
Socony Mobil O il Co. 7
The Texas Co. 7
Gulf O il Corporation 7
Iricon Agency Ltd ,* 5
Source: George Lenczowski, O il and State in the Middle East, Cornell University 
_______ Press, Ifhica, New York, 1960, p . 10._______________  „ . - ■ ■ -
*  Iricon Agency Ltd, is owned by nine American independent oil companies 
whose share of its 5% is in the following proportions: Richfield O il =
02.
In the course of trying to reach a settlement for the turnover of ASOC^s
fixed assets, and for the loss of 60% of her interest to other oil companies, if
was calculated that the Anglo-lranian O il Company owed £51,000,000
(£142,800,000) to Iran and N IO C , but also that Iran and N IO C  owed
£76,000,000 (£212,800,000) to A lO C . This left a difference of £25,000,000
(£70,000,000) due to A lO C , which was to be paid in 10 equal, yearly
installments of £2,500,000 (£7,000,000) beginning on the 1st January, 1957.
31(Article 1 of the Agreement.)
Although the Consortium agreement did not differ fundamentally from
the pattern of concession which had been set up elsewhere in the Gulf,
three factors could be pointed out, i .e .  Consortium operates on behalf of the
Iranian government and not as a concessionaire, the government being the sole
owner of its oil resources. The Consortium constitutes a multi-national group,
whereas the previous concessionaire represented a single nation, i .e .  Britain.
The non-basic operations (health, medical aid, education, training, housing and
welfare) were left as the responsibility of N IO C throughout the concession area.
32(The cost was to be refunded to N IO C  by the operating companies.)
Under this new agreement, consortium was granted rights of exploration, 
drilling, refining and transportation in a specified area of south-west Iran 
cal led the Agreement Area. (Fig .2 .)  The agreement was to run for 25 years 
and the companies had the right to extend it by three periods of five years each, 
these extensions being conditional upon reductions in the size of the Agreement 
Area which would have approximately halved the original area (100,000 sq. miles) 
by the commencement of the last extension. The agreement embodied .
— Corporation, 1.25% , American Independent Oil C o ., 0.833% , and
Standard O il Company (Ohio), Getty O il C o ., Signal O il & Gas Co., 
Hancock O il C o ., Tide Water Associated O il C o ., and San Jacinto 
Petroleum Corporation, 0.417% each.
8 3 .
v
Fig. 2 - Consortium agreement, and areas relinquished in 1966
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the provision of 50-50 sharing of net profit, (which is further discussed under
Saudi Arabia). According to this provision, each barrel of oil exported would
have yielded the Iranian Government an income almost four times that received
prior to nationalization. The agreement was to be operated on behalf of
Consortium by two operating companies: The Iranian O il Exploration and
Producing Company, and the Iranian O il Refining Company, jointly to be called
33the Iranian O il Operating Companies.
However, operations under the Consortium Agreement continued without
any changes until December 1966, when a modification occurred with regard to
areas under concession. According to the agreement, Consortium relinquished 25%
of the area (65,000 sq. km.) in three places, the first being south-west Kirmanshah,
the second starting from the Gulf coast, running northwards to a point north of
Shiraz, and the third north of Bandar Abbas. The Agreement Area is now composed
of two blocks, ono containing the main oil fields in the south, and the other extending
34eastwards along the coast where exploitation is expected in future. (Fig* 2 .)
The provisions of the new agreement provided for Iran's oil income to be 
calculated on a new basis, and the result was that the country's income per 
barrel was increased. In 1954 the oil revenue from tho Consortium, area was 
£ 3 ,100,000 (#8,680,000),this mounted to £265,600,000 (^43 ,680 ,000) in 
1967, which was an increase of £58,100,000 (#162,680,000) over 1966.35
Post 1957 Law Agreements
In order to speed up the development of the Iranian oil resources, on 
July 29th, 1957, a new law which opened the doors for additional foreign oil 
companies was approved by the Iranian government. This reversed the policy 
adopted by Iran in September 1944 (during the Second World War) which forbade
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36the granting of any more concessions to foreign companies. Quite apart from 
association with Consortium and its own operations, the 1957 law made NIOC  
responsible for the development of oil resources in all parts of the country out­
side the Agreement Area and the Continental Shelf.
The company was also authorised to grant concessions to foreign companies 
on the basis of partnership. Under this law, terms of agreement are more harsh on 
foreign partners, payments are fixed at a principle of 75-25 per cent sharing of
net profit in favour of Iran, including a payment of a sum as a bonus, heavier
37drilling obligations and compulsory surrender of territory.
It appears that the oil companies were more or less undeterred by the 
restrictions provided by the new taw . N IO C signed an agreement with Agip 
Mineraria, a state-owned Italian firm, on August 12th, 1957, (14 days after the 
passing of the Law). This was followed by a series of agreements. A ll the agree­
ments granted by N IO C  can be put into two categories: (a) joint venture 
agreements, and (b) contracting agreements. The main provisions of the first 
type are as follows:
1. Ih e  profits will be divided on the basis of 75-25 (including 
income tax).
2 . Income tax payable equal to 50% of the second party*s share of 
the profits calculated on the posted price without any discount*
3. AN the exploitation expenditures should be undertaken by the 
foreign partner, in the event of commercial discoveries, N IO C  is liable to a 
payment of 50% of the amount spent, otherwise nothing.
Under the above provisions, joint-venture agreements with N IO C  were 
granted to Agip Mineraria (thereafter known as SIRIP), on August 12th, 1957;
Pan American Petroleum Corporation (subsidiary of Standard O il Co. of Indiana,
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later called IPAC) on May 31st, 1958; and Sapphire Petroleum Ltd. (a
Canadian corporation -  1RCAN) on June 22nd, 1958. The last agreement came
38to an end in 1959 because of a dispute between N IO C and IRCAN.
During 1965, N IO C granted 6 separate concessions. (See Fig. 3 .)
The bidders were composed of 5 groups and one individual company totalling 25
companies in all -  12 American, 7 German, 3 French, 1 Anglo-Dutch, 1 Italian,
and 1 Indian. As a result, 6 new companies were set up in equal partnership
with N IO C , their agreements embodying the usual 75-25% profit sharing
agreements. The companies referred to are as follows:
Table 2 The companies which signed agreements with N IO C  during 1965
Parties to the agreement Name of company Agreement area
sg. kms.
Dashtestan Offshore Petroleum Co 6,036
(DOPCO)
Iranian Offshore Petroleum Co. 2,250
(IROPCO)
Iranian Marine International O il Co. 7,960 
(IM IN O C O )
Farsi Petroleum Co. (FPC) 5,759
La van Petroleum Co. (LAPCO) 8,000
Persian Gulf Petroleum Co. 5,150
(PEGUPCO)
Source: N IO C  Publication, The Aims and Achievements of the Iranian Oil
Industry, pp. 1 -2 .
The above mentioned agreements were identical in their main provisions 
and all paid various types of bonus except for SIRiP.
The Iranians were pioneering in the Middle Hast when they started the 
joint structure agreements, and their example was emulated in countries like 
Egypt, Tunisia and others.
NIOC-Shell Co.
NIOC-Tide water Group
NIO C-Agip, Phillips 
Hydro Carbon Private 
(Indiana) Ltd.
NIOC-French Group
NIOC-Atlantic Group
NIOC-German Group
F ig#  3 -  O f fs h o r e  a g re e m e n ts .
In December, 1966, the Iranians concluded a revolutionary agree- 
ment with a French group (ERAP). This was completely different in nature from 
those oil agreements previously made.
According to this new agreement the French Group acts as a special 
contractor on behalf of N IO C to carry out all the activities relating to 
geological surveys, exploration, drilling etc. The contractor provides the capital 
for the implementation of these activities. In the case of oil discovery in com­
mercial quantities, expenditure will be regarded as a loan to N IO C without any 
interest, otherwise it is regarded as the contractor's loss.
In March, 1969, another oil exploration contract was concluded between 
NIO C and AREPI (Association de Recherche et d'Exploitation d'lran). The 
provisions of the contract were similar to those given to ERAP in 1966.
In concluding this section it may be remarked that the above history 
shows that fundamental changes have occurred over the years in the nature and 
context of oil agreements, and that the efforts which have been made by the 
producing countries to obtain maximum benefit from their natural resources have 
been rewarded, albeit gradually.
Also, it should be noted that Iran Is dependent upon its oil revenues for 
unique reasons. Whereas as far as domestic products are concerned, oil 
represents less than a quarter of the national income, foreign exchange accrued 
from oil companies' activities represents a very high proportion of the foreign 
exchange income. Naturally if is from this foreign exchange income that 
Iran finances its economic development programme,
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b. O il Concessions in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Neutral Z.one
While Iran on one side of the Gulf v/cts becoming prosperous from its
oil, the Arabian side wcs left far behind, and no real consideration was given
to it in the pre-1920 period with regard to the possibility of exploiting its oil
resources. This was due mainly to Turkish maladministration and consequent
political instability and lack of security. The Gulf at this time was under
British control. Britain entered the Gulf for the first time in the 17th century,
but its control over the Gulf began in 1820, when it signed a peace treaty with
all the shaikhdoms of the Western Coast, where piracy was a constant source of
turmoil and trouble. In the Gulf, the threat of the Baghdad Railway* with all the
possible disturbances that if could bring to the British position in the Gulf, led
Britain to arrange with the ruling Shaikhs of the Gulf Principalities (these were
British Protectorates) that all exploitation of oil in the territories should be
undertaken by British interests. One such agreement was reached in 1899 with
the p 'lrr of Kuwait whom the Turks claimed as a subject, though admitting his
de facto independence. This agreement received confirmation on October 27th, 1913,
when the Shaikh (Mubarak) undertook that no oil concession would be granted
without the consent of Britain. In May, 1914, a similar agreement was concluded
with the ruler of Bahrain. Then the Trucial Coast Principalities and Oman
followed suit in signing similar agreements with B rita in .^
The dl-Hasa province of Arabia at this time was under the control of
Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, the ruler of Najd. In 1915, a treaty was signed between
Ibn Saud and the British, the general terms of the Treaty being that Ibn Saud
* On the 5th March, 1903, Germany obtained a concession from the
Ottoman Sultan to build a railway line connecting the Gulf with Berlin, 
passing through Basra, Baghdad, and Turkey. This project was opposed 
by the British on the grounds thqt Britain hqd vital oil interests in Iran, 
and that her imperial communication with India would be threatened 
should this line be controlled by another great power.
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would not grant any oil concessions to foreign subjects unless they were
40appointed by Britain. (This came to an end in 1927.) Clearly such an agree­
ment excluded foreign oil companies from securing oil rights in the area.
However, in spite of their privileged position, British oil companies did not 
show great interest in the area. One factor which may have discouraged them was 
the lack of political siability at the time. (Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud took over the 
al-Hasa province on the Gulf from the Turks in 1913; Jabal Shammar, the nort** 
east part of Saudi Arabia in 1921 when he conquered Ibn Rashid; and Hijaz on 
the west of Saudi Arabia from its Sharifian ruler, King Hussein, in 1925.), The 
continual political conflict, coupled with the possibility that they might not 
find oil, were major factors which made the companies wary of investing in the 
area. Britain began to show real interest in the oil of the area in 1920, when 
Major Holmes began to take interest in Arabian o il, and more particularly in 
al-Hasa, the Kuwait/Saudi Neutral Zone, Kuwait and Bahrain. Major Holmes 
was the representative of the Eastern and General Syndicate, which was formed in 
London in 1920, and although little attention was given to it at the time, it 
was to play an important role later on. In May, 1923, Holmes obtained oil 
exploitation rights in al-Hasa province from Ibn Saud, and the Syndicate started 
drilling under the supervision of a Swiss geologist. Unfortunately, drilling 
revealed no oil-bearing structure, and since the Syndicate could not meet the 
costs of further development itself, and failed to interest any major oil companies, 
the rights to al-Hasa lapsed in 1927 .*^  After obtaining the rights over al-Hasa, 
Holmes' next move was to look at Kuwait, the Kuwait/Saudi Neutral Zone and 
Bahrain. He was able to secure oil rights over the Neutral Zone from Kuwait
Af)
and Saudi Arabia in 1924, over Bahrain in 1925, and he also secured oil
* Longrigg, O il in the Middle East, mentions that the rights lapsed
in 1927 after two renewals.
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rights for the Kuwait mainland and its islands in 1926. In the event, since the 
Syndicate again could not raise the capital itself for the exploitation of these 
concessions in the Neutral Zone and Kuwait, the Neutral Zone rights lapsed in 
November, 1927, though the Syndicate still had in its possession the Kuwaiti 
rights.43
Saud? Arabia
In 1930, the world was suffering from an economic depression, which 
adversely affected Saudi Arabia. The country was then almost entirely 
dependent on the pilgrimage for its revenue. The anticipated income from 
pilgrimage visitation for 1931 was expected to fail below average, due to the 
sharp fall in the prices of agricultural products in India and the Far East, which 
made it more or less impossible for members of the agricultural communities 
of these parts to visit Mecca. Although the political situation in Saudi Arabia 
in 1931 was reasonably stable, and the King's authority was unquestioned, it 
cannot be doubted that stability and security could not have lasted long without 
the government being able to rely on a steady source of income, rather than 
having to depend on an unstable one. A t that time, Ibn Saud's government 
was in a great deal of debt, and could not pay either its creditors or disburse 
subsidies to local tribal groups. To illustrate to what extent the government 
needed money, Phi I by, in his book "Arabian O il Venture", states that "on 
one such occasion, a tT a if, (1930) the King blurted out: *Philby! If anyone 
would offer me a million pounds now (in gold), I would give him all the con­
cession he wants'.11 This gives a clear picture of how badly the country was in 
need of money. The situation became worse when no-one approached the King 
to secure an oil concession, because of the understanding that the prospect of 
oil discovery in the Gulf region had been virtually written off with the collapse
92.
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of the Syndicate's concession.
However, in 1933, while the counfry was in such a state, the Standard
Oil Company of California, encouraged by the discovery of oil in Bahrain in
1932, applied to the Saudi Government for an oil concession in al-Hasa
province.
Apart from Standard O il Company, only Iraq Petroleum Company (SPC)
was interested in obtaining the al-Hasa concession. But since the latter could
not meet the terms asked by the Saudi government, the concession was granted
to the Standard O il Company of California, and it was signed under the name of
California Arabian O il Company.*
The concession covered an area of about 360,000 sq. miles, as well
as preferential rights** to additional concessions which could be obtained by
meeting the terms of any offer made to the government, and which was to run
for 66 years. The Company agreed to advance loans (in gold) to the government,
repayable from the future royalties which were fixed at 4s gold (84 cents) per ton.
Thus an amount of £30,000 ($’126,540) was paid by the company as an initial loan,
plus an annual payment of £5,000 ($21,090) and if the agreement lasted for more than
18 months, a second loan of £20,000 ($84,360) would be paid. The government
was also to receive a loan of £50,000 ($210,900) upon the discovery of oil in
commercial quantities, and a similar amount one year later. According to the
agreement, the company was to construct a refinery and to supply the government
* S. Longrigg, the IPC negotiator for the concession, in his book
O il in the Middle East, with reference to the loss of the concession 
illustrates how the "IPC directors were slow and cautious in their 
offers and would speak of rupees when gold was demanded" and their 
negotiator was "handicapped and could do little " , p .107.
Philby, who played an important role in this agreement, mentions in 
his book Arabian O il Venture, how in his meeting with Longrigg, he was 
told that "IPC did not need any more o il, as they already had more in 
prospect that they knew what to do with". A t the same time, IPC were 
vitally interested in keeping out all competitors, p .106.
**  The preferential area was approximately 177,000 sq. miles, located in
the central and western parts of N ajd .
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free of charge with 200/000 gallons of gasoline and 100,000 of kerosene per 
45annum. Comparatively, Iran was leading all its neighbouring countries 
with respect to bonuses, rentals, tax commutation, free delivery of oil and 
other benefits, as if was sharing in the overall profits of APOC, and these 
profits were derived from Persian concessions and other operations.
Although both Saudi Arabia and Persia received a royalty of 4s gold 
(84 cents) per ton, the Saudis were, in fact, better off, as they received a higher 
valuation of the shilling gold, since this was made before the devaluation of 
sterling in 1933, and Persia's valuation was made afterwards. The difference was 
35 shillings ( /6 .1 )  -  from 85 shillings (X14.8) per fine ounce of gold, to 120 
shillings (# 2 1 ,0 ) /^
The Standard O il Company of California, the holder of the Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabian concessions, faced difficulties in marketing the Bahrain output.
In order to tackle this problem and take account of the production that might de­
velop in Saudi Arabia, the company concluded an agreement with Texas O il 
Company, in December, 1936, whereby the Texas Company received a 50% 
interest in the Bahrain and Saudi Arabian concessions. In return the Standard 
O il Company obtained a 50% interest in Texas O il Company's Far Eastern 
marketing facilities and also a sum of $3 million in cash, and million 
in deferred payments from future production in Saudi Arabia. In 1934, 
the California Arabian O il Company, under its agreement with Saudi Arabia, 
began drilling and on October 16th, 1938, oil was discovered in commercial 
quantities.
On May 31st, 1939, a supplemental agreement was concluded between 
the government and the California Arabian O il Company, whereby additional 
areas in the north and south were added to the original area, including the 
Saudi Arabian half interest in the two Neutral Zones on its borders with Kuwait
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and Iraq. Following this agreement the exclusive concession area reached
48approximately 496,000 sq. miles. (Fig. 4 .)  Comparatively, this area 
was the largest covered by any concession in the Middle East at the time.
The Iraqi concession area was about 164,000 sq. miles, the Iranian 100,000 sq. 
miles, and the Kuwaiti about 6,000 sq. miles.
In return for extensions and modifications made to the original con­
cession agreement, the Company agreed to make several payments in gold. 
£140,000 ($564,200) as a bonus and an annual rental of £20,000 ($80,600) 
until the discovery of oil in the additional areas was due to the government.
The Company was alsot o pay to the government a sum of £100,000 ($403,:0Gp), 
as a bonus, or on early relinquishment of those areas. No changes were made 
to the royalty payment, but the duration of the concession was extended to 60 
years from 1939. ‘ '
In the early 1940‘s, the Company carried out significant exploration and 
development work, which proved the existence of vast oil resources in areas under 
concession. Meanwhile the Company had plans for the construction of a large 
diameter crude oil pipeline to the Mediterranean. There was no doubt that the 
Arabian American O il Company (ARAMCO)* was capable of supplying oil in 
quantities far beyond its pre-war production. Once again the Company was 
faced with the problem of finding outlets for its o il. Thereafter, it started 
negotiations with other American oil companies that had marketing facilities 
as well as capital, i .e .  Standard O il Co. (New Jersey), and Socony Vacuum 
(now Socony Mobil). In March, 1947, the Standard O il Co. (New Jersey) 
acquired 30% and Socony 1Q% of ARAMCO’s shares, The remaining 60% was
held in equal parts by the two original owners, Standard of California, and 
50Texas O il Company. In return for the sale of 40% of ARAMCO's shares,
* On 31sf January, 1944, the name of the California Arabian O il Company
was changed to Arabian American O il Company (ARAMCO).
9 7 .
Fig. ^ - ARAMCO areas, including the preferential areas, and
areas relinquished since 19^7.
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the California and Texas were to receive from Standard (New Jersey) and 
Socony a sum of $76,5  million and $25.5 million respectively. In addition, 
the two companies agreed not to receive dividends until the full payment of
51
the specified amounts. Consequently, production in Saudi Arabia increased 
from an average of 246,000 barrels per day in 1947, to 390,000 in 1940, and 
to 477,000 in 1949.
For oil companies, exemption from taxes was a usual term of concession 
agreements, although a royalty of 4s gold (84 cents) per ton of oil produced was 
payable. After World War I I,  production increased greatly, and governments 
started pressing for a larger share of the profits from crude o il.
On December 30th, 1950, the Saudi Government and ARAMCO 
agreed to revise the 1939 agreement so as to provide for 50-50 profit sharing 
after U .S . taxes. Then, on October 2nd, 1951, a new formula was reached by
52which the government was to receive its 50% of the profit before the U.S. faxes.
The 50% was to be paid to the King as a form of income tax .* This started other
countries to ask for the same terms, which they obtained, causing oil revenues
to rise rapidly. The rise was not entirely due to the tax, however, as the 50-50
arrangements necessitated the fixing of a price for crude o il, which was higher
than that used previously. A t first, companies were allowed large marketing
allowances by the governments of the producing countries, but this was 
53eventually stopped.
* This fax actually cost ARAMCO nothing, as the amount paid was
deducfable from the Company's liability under U .S . income fax laws, 
which meant that the U .S . Treasury was, in fact, paying the fax. This 
was probably because the U .S . government was very interested in 
consolidating the positions of the U .S . oil companies in the Middle 
East. Also, in 1948, royalty payments in terms of dollars had increased 
considerably when Iraq and Saudi Arabia insisted that their payments 
should be based on the free market price of gold in the Middle Hast, 
and not on the lower price fixed by the British and U .S . governments.
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ARAMCO, since 1939, Has relinquished 391,000 sq. miles from
ifs concession as it then existed. Thus, in 1968, 105,000 sq. miles covering
5 sections was left from the total area. Apart from that, in 1963, if
relinquished all of its rights over the preferential area. According to the 1963
agreement between the government and the Company, there are to be further
relinquishments of undeveloped areas at 5 year intervals, so that the total area
54 .
will be 20,000 sq. miles by 1993. (See Figs. 4 , 5 , and 6 .)
Recently, Saudi Arabia has signed two contract-type concessions with 
AUXIRAP and AGIP (EN I), but to date, information about these is not available.
Kuwait
As previously mentioned, the Eastern and General Syndicate's oil
rights in al-Hasa and the Kuwait/Saudi Neutral Zone lapsed in November, 1927,
due to the Syndicate's financial difficulties, but if still retained the Kuwaiti
rights. Because of these Financial difficulties, the Syndicate sold its rights in
Kuwait to Gulf's subsidiary, Eastern Gulf O il Company of U.S JK . ,  in November
1927, after if had failed to interest the British Oil Companies.*
In 1931, negotiations between Kuwait and the G ulf Company (acting
through the Syndicate) were at the point of success, when the British Government
intervened, and opposed any such agreement on the grounds that if contravened the
1899 treaty** which stated that only British interests were to be granted oil 
55concessions.
* "In the summer of 1933, Gulf paid Eastern and General Syndicate
£175,000 to relinquish any rights it might have with regard to Kuwaiti 
O il ."  (E .H . Brown, The Saudi Arabia/Kuwait Neutral Zone, Beirut,
1963. p .92 .)
* *  The following was accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait! "He further binds
himself, his heirs and successors not to cede, tease, mortgage or give 
for occupation or for any other purposes any portion of his territory to 
the Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous con­
sent of Her Majesty's Government for these purposes." (Milcdashi,
pp .80-01 „)
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In 1932, the Anglo-Iranian (which changed its name in December,
1954, to British Petroleum -  B.P.) showed interest in obtaining oil concessions
in Kuwait, and in fact was permitted to survey the territory and even to drill
56two shallow wells. This action by Anglo-Iranian clearly angered Gulf
O il,  who in turn protested to the United States Department of State, who sent
a Note to the British Foreign O ffice. This was delivered by the American
Ambassador in London, Andre Mellon (who, incidentally, owned a large
number of shares in Gulf), and it required equal treatment of American firms
57under the "open-door" policy.* The reason why Gulf and Anglo-Iranian
were so determined not to lose Kuwait was clearly that substantial oil deposits 
were indicated, and this belief was strengthened by the discovery of oil in 
Bahrain in 1932.
After a period of about two years of intense negotiations between the 
two companies, (Anglo-Iranian and Gulf Corporation), on December 14th, 1933, 
the two parties agreed that they were to apply jointly for the use of Eastern and 
General Syndicated rights in Kuwait. After this, in February, 1934, the 
Kuwait O il Co. ( KOC) was formed, administrated equally by the two partners 
and acting as their agent. Opinion differs as to the amount of capital if started
fjj?
with, the range being from £100,000 to £200,000 $504,100 to ^1 ,003 ,200 ).**
* The "open-door11 policy consisted of three main provisions, the
first being that in all mandated territories, nationals of all nations 
should receive equal treatment in law; the second was that in any 
such territory, no economic concession was to be so big as to exclude 
all others; and the third was that no concession regarding any com­
modify should be granted to one country only.
* *  Zuhayr Mikdashi in his book Middle Eastern O il Concessions (1901-
1965), mentions that a sum of £50,000 was paid by each of the partners 
(p .82), and Charles Issawi and Mohammed Yeganeh in The Economics 
of Middle Eastern O il ,  mention £100,000 paid by each of the parties 
(p. 35).
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The two parties also agreed that "neither party was to dispose of its interest
therein without the consent of the other, and each would abstain from
59action damaging the other's marketing position." '  Then, on December 23rd,
1934, the concession was granted to KOC, Tho terms of the concession were
generous, and covered the whole area of Kuwait, about 6,00Q sq. miles, and
its territorial wafers as far as 3 nautical miles offshore. As mentioned previously,
this was the smallest area covered by a concession in comparison with
neighbouring countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq). (Fig.7 .)  The 75 year
duration was the same as thof of Iraq and longer than the 60 years of Saudi
Arabia and Iran. The Kuwait O il Company was liable for a bonus payment of
rupees (Rs.) 470,000 (£35,625 or $179,585) paid within a period of one month
counted from the date that the concession was signed; a royalty of Rs. 3
(4s.6d. or $1 .10) per ton; and an annual minimum of 250,000 rupees
60 —(£18,750 or $80,525). This payment may be compared unfavourably with 
those agreed by Iran and Iraq. Under her agreement of 1933, Iran was to 
receive not less than £750,000 gold $3 ,163 ,500) per annum, and Iraq in 1931 
agreed to £400,000 $ 1 ,944 ,0 00 ). Also KOC agreed to pay 4 annas (4^d 
or 9 .3  cents) per ton as a tax exemption fee, and dead rent of Rs. 95,000  
(about £7,125 or #35,917) .61
Generally, it may be noted that although KOC's concession was 
granted at a later date than the others, i .e .  when the Gulf region was already 
known to be a likely oil bearing territory, the financial terms obtained by 
Kuwait were less favourable than those of the neighbouring countries.
Payments to Kuwait were made in Indian rupees (the currency of Kuwait) and 
were not backed by gold, while Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq received theirs 
in gold. In the period prior to 1951, royalty payments of 10 cents per barrel
1 0 4 .
V
«> je tg m
■ ■ K» ■
■■Himffmi^ SSSS&iEH-E-KE^EEE '^ifttrrntttmi
Fig. 7
105.
to Kuwait by the concessionaires were less than those given to neighbouring
countries. When payments in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq amounted to 22
cents per barrel, Kuwait was receiving the equivalent of 13 cents per barrel.
This was reduced to 9 cents in 1949, due to the devaluation of the Indian 
62rupee.
Following the introduction of profit-sharing agreements in Saudi Arabia
and Iraq, in 1951, Kuwait, in order to increase her income from oil, requested
Kuwait O il Company to modify the terms of the 1934 agreement, Kuwait asked
for 50% of KOC*s actual net profit as payment of income tax in the
proposed new agreement and also asked that the Company relinquish the islands
which had hitherto been included in the concession area. In return for their
acceptance of the Kuwait Governments demand, the Kuwait O il Company was
fo have the period of its concession extended by a further 17 years, and also
an increase was fo be made in the offshore area of Kuwait and the islands located
63in the concession, from 3 to 6 nautical miles. (See Fig. 7)
On May Oth, 1962, an agreement was concluded between tho govern­
ment and KOC, whereby the latter relinquished an area of about 9,262 $q. 
kms., mostly in the west of Kuwait, and equivalent fo roughly 50% of the 
original concession area. In respect of the above agreement, a further acreage 
of 1,000 sq. kmsr from the offshore areas of Failaka and Bubiyan Islands were 
relinquished in 1 9 6 8 .*^
There were many exploratory attempts by the Kuwait O il Company, 
in those areas which were relinquished, and the company was not 
successful in finding oil in those areas in commercial quantities.
106,
Kuwait Shell Development O il Company:
When oil was discovered in commercial quantities by Arabian Oi!
Co* (AOC), in 1961, the sea-bed of the Gulf became more attractive fo the 
oil companies as a potentially oil-bearing region. This became more obvious 
when Iran signed agreements with various foreign oil companies for the purpose 
of exploring the Iranian offshore areas.
In order fo fully utilise its resources, Kuwait invited bids in i960,
*
from oil companies for an oil concession over its offshore. The
Shell International bid was chosen by Kuwait from other bids. The motive
behind this, as explained by a Kuwaiti Government O ffic ia l, was that She!!
"(i) has as great an interest in maintaining a high posted price for crude as 
Kuwait does, (ii)  is large enough to be able fo move our oil into its own es­
tablished markets without having to resort to price cuts, and ( iii)  because of its 
strong marketing position in the Eastern Hemisphere, would be in the best position
to help our newly-established Kuwait National Petroleum Company get started
65in overseas refining and marketing," On January 15th, 1961, Kuwait granted 
exploration and production rights over an area of approximately 1,500 sq. miles 
to the Royal Dutch/Shell Group. (See Fig. 7 .) The agreement was to run for 
45 years, A new company, the Kuwait Shell Petroleum Company, was to be 
established to handle all the matters connected with the undertaking. Shell 
was to pay a rental for the area of £1,000,000 (#2,300,000) for each of the first 
two years, and £2,000,000 (#5,600,000) a year after that, until regular exports 
began. The bonus payments would be £7,000,000 (#19,600,000) on signature,
* In February, 1956, the Kuwaiti Government had done likewise,
and a numbor of companies were known fo have been interested, 
but after the Suez crisis, no attempts were made to obtain a 
concession in the area. (Middle East Economic Survey No .20,
March 25th, i960).
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and a further £7,000,000 at the end of the fourth year or when production 
reached 100,000 barrels per day, which ever was sooner . Bonuses totalling 
a further £16,000,000 ($44/800,000) were to be paid in four equal installments 
when production rates reached 300,000, 400,000, and 500,000 barrels per 
day respectively. The agreement was signed on the basis of 50-50 with an 
option of 20% for the government to join as a partner in the venture upon the 
discovery of oil in commercial quantities.^
Unfortunately, in 1964, the Company, after a period of three years 
of exploration activities, stopped its operations because of border problems 
between Kuwait on the one hand, and Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq on the other. 
(See before: Boundary Disputes in the Higher G ulf). The Company may resume 
its activities if an agreement is reached between the four dissenting nations.
The Kuwait/Saudi Neutral Zone
As mentioned previously, in the Oqair Agreement of December 1922, 
between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, a Neutral Zone of about 2,000 sq. miles, 
located between Kuwait and the province of al-Hasa in Saudi Arabia was left 
undetermined. The Zone was left to be controlled on the basis of equal rights 
by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.* O il interest in the Zone dates from 1924, when 
Major Holmes, representing the Syndicate of London, obtained oil rights from 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Since the Syndicate could not itself bear the cost 
of development and failed fo interest any other major companies, the rights 
lapsed in 1927. The Zone remained without oil concessions from then until 
1939 when ARAMCO acquired oil rights for the Saudi’s half share of the Zone.
* For more details see Land Boundaries in Chapter 1.
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In order to develop its share of the Zone, in 1946, Kuwait invited bids for 
concessions by competitive auction. On July 25th, 1947, in Delaware, a group 
of American investors who up to then had no Middle Eastern investments, formed 
the American independent O il Company, or by abbreviation, "Aminoil".
67The total shares of the Company were one million, priced a t f t  .00 each. 
Aminoil is composed of several companies as shown in the table below.
Table 3 Shareholders in American Independent O il Company
Companies %age
Phillips Petroleum Co, 37,30
Signal O il & Gas Co. 33.54
Ashland O il and Refining Co. 14.13
James S. Abercrombie 7 .06
Sunray Mid-Continent O il Co. 2.95
LarioO il & Gas Co. 1.77
Globe O il and Refining Co. 1.77
Pauley Petroleum 1.48
Source: General O il Affairs Department, Ministry of Finance & Industry*
The O il of Kuwait (Facts and Figures), Kuwait, September, 1965, 
p .37.
On June 28th, 1948, Aminoi!*s bid was successful, and a 60 year 
concession to explore for, produce, and utilize oil over Kuwait*s onshore 
half-rights of the Zone was granted. (Fig. 7 .)
The Government of Kuwait was fo receive a royalty of $2.50 (about £1) 
per ton, (33 cents a barrel), compared with f t  .1 (4s.6d) paid by KOC.
This payment was by far the highest in the Middle East, (ARAMCO paid Saudi 
Arabia 22 cents a barrel). Kuwait also received a bonus payment of $7,250 million
and an annual rental of $625,000 (about £223,214) until the discovery of
o il. The company was also liable fo give Kuwait on demand 15% of Aminoil *s 
shares.^ (Article 3 .)
On September 22nd, 1949, the Company was granted another 60 year 
concession covering the islands of Kuber, Qaru, and Umm al-Maradim (Fig. 7) 
and their territorial waters extending to 3 miles.*
In 1961 Kuwait asked Aminoil for a revision of their concession agreement 
of 1948, in order fo conclude an agreement more beneficial to the country. In 
July, 1961, the company reached agreement by not refusing fo meet the country's 
demands while negotiating the revision of the concession in favour of Kuwait. 
Accordingly, Aminoil was fo pay whichever of the following was greatest:-*
(a) "57% of profits based on realisation", or
(b) "50% of profits based on posted prices."
The amounts due were fo be discharged by the payment of:-
(a) "Royalty at 12.5% of the posted price af oil won or saved", and
(b) "Kuwait income tax, royalty being a credit against income ta x ." ^
With regard fo the Saudi share of the Zone, in 1939, ARAMCO secured
oil rights, but did not fake practical steps to develop them. In October, 1948, 
because of the terms of Aminoil's concession with Kuwait which was the highest 
in the Middle East af that time, especially when compared with the amount paid 
by ARAMCO to Saudi Arabia, ARAMCO surrendered all its rights over the 
Neutral Zone. The reason behind this might have been the refusal of ARAMCO 
to follow the example set by Aminoil in paying 33 cents a barrel while if paid 
22 cents for its concession over Saudi Arabia's land. On the other hand, in return
* The terms of this agreement are not available, but it could be similar
fo that of 1948.
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for surrendering iis rights in the Neutral Zone, it obtained oil rights over
70Saudi territorial wafers.
As a result of the above developments, in February, 1949, the 
Pacific Western O il Corporation* obtained a 60 year concession covering Saudi 
Arabia’s undivided half-share of the Zone. The terms of the Company*s con­
cession exceeded in their severity even those of Aminoil. Saudi Arabia was to 
receive a royalty of 55 cents a barrel, a bonus of $9.5  million, an annual rent
of $1 million until the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, and 25% of
71the Company’s shares.
Both companies, Aminoil and Getty O il Company, lost no time in 
arranging a working organisation, but not in a joint company. Each company 
has its own terminal and a separate administration. The oil produced is shared 
by the two companies, but sometimes, according to an agreement between the 
two, one company takes a greater percentage of the oil when it has more ability 
to market the oil than the other, e .g . in 1965 Aminoil took 55% of the total 
produced o il. Surveying and drilling of the area began in 1949 and oil was 
discovered in the Y/afra area at a depth of 3,800 ft . Ih 1954, the first 
exports were made from the area.
The Kuwait/Saudi Neutral Zone Offshore Area 
For a long time there had been a strong belief that oil could be found 
in abundant quantifies in the offshore section of the Gulf. This belief was con­
firmed when ARAiVCO discovered oil in the Safdniya and Manifa fields in the 
Gulf, offshore of al-Hasa in Saudi Arabia in 1957. As a result of the oil dis­
covery in Safaniya and Manifa, the Neutral Zone offshore area became of great
* On April 24th, 1956, the name of Pacific Western O il Corporation
was changed to Getty O il Company.' -G’'' r : . ‘ 11!
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interest to various oil companies, especially Japan Petroleum Trading 
Company. On December 10th, 1957, Saudi Arabia granted a forty year 
concession (starting from the discovery of oil in commercial quantities) for its
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own undivided half of the offshore of the Kuwait/Saudi Zone to this company.
On July 5th, 1958, Kuwait followed the Saudi Government's example by granting
the same company a concession for its half share of the offshore area excluding
the territorial wafers of the Zone extending to 6 nautical miles offshore, the
islands of Qaru and Umm al-Maradim and their surrounding waters extending fo
733 miles. (F ig .7 .)  The concession was fo run for 4 4 i years. No figure was 
mentioned regarding the area of this concession, but during field work in 1970, the 
figure 5,976 sq. kms. was given by A O C .
The company was to exercise its concession rights through a 
subsidiary, the Arabian O il Company, (AOC), v/hich was formed in February, 
1958, in Japan with a capita! of £24.8 million. The company is owned by a 
group of Japanese companies, with the two interested countries, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia, each holding 10& of the total shares.^ The following table 
shows the shareholders of AOC and their holdings.
Table 4 Shareholders in the Arabian O il Company and their holdings of shares
N o .* Shareholders N o . of Shares
11 Electricity & Gas Companies 10,460,500
8 Steel ct Metal Companies 7,208,000
7 Shipbuilding & Heavy Industry 2,207,000
2 Shipping Companies 1,820,000
11 Other Industries 2,492,000
9 General Merchant Companies 5,917,200
10 Insurance Companies 1,106,000
7 Security Companies 6,967,500
2 Foreign Governments (Kuwait & Saudi 
Arabia) 10,000,000
263 Individuals 1,821,000
330 Total 50,000,000
Source: Arabian O il Co. Statement on O il Operations Tokyo, Japan,
________1958-1961, pp .10-11.___________________________________
* The number of Companies, Countries, and individuals.
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The financial terms of both agreements were similar, except that 
the Saudi Government was to receive 56% of the profits made by the Company 
(crude oil production, refining, transport, and marketing), while the cor- 
responding figure for Kuwait was 57% *  Both governments were to receive a 
rental of $1 ,500 ,000, plus $1 million a year from the date of the agreement 
until the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, and a minSmum payment 
of $2 .5  million after the discovery of o il . In addition, both governments 
were to receive 10% of the company's shares after the discovery of oil in
75commercial quantities, and they had the option of taking 20% of the oil in kind.
From tho contents of the agreement signed by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
and A O C , if was evident that the latter company pursued a very generous 
policy in granting a fairly high percentage of profits, the like of which was never 
before granted by any other oil company fo the oil producing countries in the 
Middle East.
It may bo concluded that the attitude which was followed by the company 
towards Saudi Arabia and Kuwait suggests their total conviction of the high 
probability of finding oil in the area in quantifies sufficient to give high commercial 
potential.
In concluding this chapter it is important to mention certain changes in 
the structure of concessions. The Middle Eastern countries in the period |3re- 
Second World War concluded a number of oil concessions with different oil 
companies. A t the time when these concessions were granted, certain circum­
stances ruled the area, The granting countries did not possess free will for one
* E .H . Brown in his book The Saudi Arabia/Kuwait Neutral Zone
mentions that "in another separate confidential letter agreement 
of the same date as the Saudi Agreement, the Company agreed fo raise 
the terms and conditions given to the Saudi Arabian Government in 
order fo make them correspond to any better terms given fo the Shaikh 
of Kuwait,"
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reason or another; they were not sufficiently aware of what they were 
giving away; also, petroleum was not then the vital source of energy if 
later proved to be. Moreover most, if not a ll, of the granting countries were 
not only politically weak and dependent af the time, but also economically 
undeveloped, and this could have been the reason for their acceptance of any 
payments from the concessionaires. The terms obtained by the host countries 
more or less adhered fo the following pattern:
(a) The concession area was large, covering the largest part of the 
state, if not all of it .
(b) The duration of the concession was rather long, usually running 
between 60 and 75 years (Kuwaitfs was 92 years).
(c) The financial terms were modest, a payment of royalty which was 
fixed at 4 /~  gold (84 cents) per ton of crude oil (Kuwait received payment in 
rupees).
However, after the Second World War, the host governments showed 
their disapproval of the fixed royalty system, because of the large profits 
made by the oil companies, as production had increased enormously. The 
nationalization of the Iranian oil industry in 1951 and the introduction of 50-50 
profit sharing in the same year,may have caused this ill feeling.
In 1957, with the entry of the American independent oil companies 
and some European newcomers info the Middle East, a new departure from the 
50-50 principle was established, i .e .  when Iran signed a partnership agreement 
with A G IP . Nine years later Iran signed another controversial agreement, this 
time with ERAP. Under the terms of this agreement, N IO C retained overall 
responsibility for decisions, and the sole ownership of all oil produced, making 
ERAP, in effect, contractors rather than partners.
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The present mood of the host governments was clearly indicated by 
Mr. Yamani, the Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, during 
his talk af the American University of Beirut in 1969. He was against the 
nationalization of the oil industry in the producing countries, because he 
thought it would lead fo the disintegration of the present structure of the 
industry and the collapse of prices. A t the same time he was in favour of 
participation in the major international oil companies, both at the producing 
end and in the marketing. He believes that oil producing countries should aim 
to "preserve the stability of the present world oil price structure in order fo 
maintain the unit revenues of the producers" and fo "promote the growth of the 
national oil companies in order fo secure an ever increasing role in the oil 
business for the producing countries", and these aims could be realised only
y /
by participation in operations.
However, Professor Edith Penrose of London University, states 
that the large international firms may "fear partnership with governments".
She believes that the oil companies might allow governments to own 50% 
of the shares, thus giving a semblance of partnership, but that it is unlikely that 
they would actually allow the governments fo have 50% of influence over the 
company, or half of the profife. She feels that they would probably be afraid 
that governments would meddle in company business on political grounds, or 
that the governments would reduce the companies' control over their output, thus 
adversely affecting prices, and restricting the companies' management of their 
international operations.^
Rel inquishment
Very large areas, and sometimes whole countries were covered by the 
first concessions granted in the Middle East, and no provision was made in 
the agreements for relinquishment.
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In 1925, the agreement between Iraq and IPC included some 
relinquishment, which was never implemented, and was eventually omitted 
from the revised agreement of 1931 . ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia also included 
the surrender of certain parts of the concession area, fo be chosen by the 
Company. However, in 1948, ARAMCO agreed fo a programme of gradual 
relinquishment.
By 1957, IPC and its affiliates had held some concessions for over 30 
years, and had made no real attempts to explore and prospect ail of it .  A f 
the end of that year, Iraq asked IPC fo relinquish a part of its concession 
area.
After much bargaining, the government finally proposed that IPC 
should retain 2% of the area under concession, 90% would be immediately 
relinquished, and 8% would be developed by a new company in which Iraq 
was to have 20% participation.
On I PCs rejection, in 1961, of this proposal, the government passed 
a law compelling the company to relinquish 99.5% of its concession area, 
leaving 1,935 sq. kms» of actual producing fields to the company.
This was the famous Law N o .80, which had as great an effect on the 
changes in the oil industry as the nationalization of Iran's oil in 1950. Its 
influence was felt by the major oil companies all over the Middle East, who 
had to accept the idea of relinquishment despite their obvious reluctance.
Law N o .80 led to ARAMCO's agreement in 1963 to relinquish all 
of its concession area exceeding 125,000 sq. miles, and other areas af 6 inter­
vals of 5 years each, thus leaving ARAMCO with 20,000 sq. miles after 30 
years.
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In spite of the fact that the big oil companies were not keen on
the relinquishment concept, they still kept under concession areas containing
more oil reserves than they are likely to use even to the end of their contracts.
There is more oil than they can properly market internationally, so naturally
they are not as keen to explore and prospect their area as a newcomer would be,
Therefore, host governments have to follow up relinquishments rigorously, and
they have been asked to start a schedule of quicker, more progressive
relinquishment to apply fo oil agreements already in force.
This, however, is not the whole solution, as which party should
decide the acreage to be relinquished is also an important question. To date,
the company has usually been the one to choose, and naturally enough, they
tend to select areas which show little promise* A stipulation is now being
added to present and future agreements, which states that the government is
fo have a part in deciding the acreage fo be relinquished, and to approve the 
78
choice.
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CHAPTER HI
REGIONAL PRODUCTION
 ^■ Reserves
In discussing oil exploitation, it is essential to determine the oil 
reserves of each country and region, since these determine production 
flexibility. Although it appears that the larger the oil reserves, the greater 
the production should be, there are many other factors to be considered. 
Among these are political stability, the market situation, and the gravity 
of the oil produced. However, the volume of reserves does have some bear­
ing on production, as it sets an upper lim it. Also, modern techniques have 
taken a great deal of the guesswork out of the estimation of the size of 
reserves. Table 1 gives a set of estimates of reserves in the three countries 
under study, compared with those of others in the world, from 1945 to 1970 
in five-year intervals. An obvious feature of this is the vast rise in Middle 
Eastern oil reserves, (mainly in the countries bordering the Gulf), the 
average rate of increase every five years is 103.3%, compared with 77.5%  
for the rest of the world.
Table 1 World crude oil reserves 1945 -  1970 (million Barrels)
Western 
Hemisphere
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
U .S .A . 20,500 24,600 29,560 31,615 31,352 37,012
Venezuela 5 ,600* 9 ,000* 12,000 18,500 17,366 14,000
Others 1,900 3,000 5,723 17,590  15,978 22,935
Subtotal 28,000 37,600 47,283 67,705 64,696 73,947
% increase (32.6) (27.1) (43.1) (-4 .4 ) (14.3)
cont'd.
122
Table 1 (cont'd)
Eastern
Hemisphere
M , East:
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
Iran 5,500 7,000 27,000 35,000 40,000 70,000
Iraq 4,000 5,100 20,000 27,000 30,000 32,000
Kuwait 4,000 11,000 40,000 62,000 70,000 67,100
S. Arabia 2,000 9,000 37,000 50,000 63,000 128,500
Others 200 300 2,206 7,085 25,000 46,974
Subtotal 15,700 32,400 126,206 183,085 228,277 344,547
% increase (106.5) (289.5) (45) (24.7) (50 •9)
Africa:
Algeria - - - 5,200 6,230 30,000
Libya ~ - «■ 13,000 29,000
Nigeria - - - 2,503 9,300
Others - - 2,350 1,178 6,257
Subtotal 
% increase
7,550 22,978 74,757 
(204.3) (225.3)
World total 51,200 76,400 188,817 304,545 364,961 611,397
Represents 1944 and 1949
Sources: Zuhayr Mikdashi, A Financial Analysis of Middle Eastern O il 
Concessions (1901 -  1965), New York, 1966, p .9 .
Gulf Publishing Company, World O il ,  Houston, Texas,
August 15th, 1967, p .34.
The Oil and Gas Journal, December 28fh, 1970, pp.92-3*
December 26th, 1955, pp.91-2.
American Petroleum Institute -  Petroleum Facts and Figures, 
(Commercial Edition), New York, 1959.
Most of the Middle Eastern oil reserves have been discovered since 
World War I I,  and since then the centres of proven reserves have begun to 
move away from the Western Hemisphere. O f all producing countries in the 
world, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran have the greatest known oil reserves, 
estimated at 11,500 million barrels in 1945, and rising to 147,000 million 
barrels in I960, and fo 265,000 million in 1970. The proven reserves in these 
three countries account for 76.9% of the total known reserves in the Middle 
East, and its proportion of proven oil reserves in the world in 1970, was 43.3%
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However, due fo new finds of oil in North Africa, Alaska, the North Sea, 
and elsewhere, the share of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran in the known 
world reserves increased by only 38.7% between i960 and 1970, compared 
with 703.9% in the previous ten years. It is believed that the reserves will 
decrease in the long run if no new fields are discovered. To illustrate the 
extent of holdings of proven oil reserves compared with other regions, the 
present (1970) Saudi percentage of world reserves (21%) surpasses those of all 
the American countries, which together have only 12.1% . The result is that 
American countries have much less flexibility in the exploitation of their 
reserves than Saudi Arabia. It is almost impossible for the United States* and 
Venezuela to sustain a rapid expansion of production.
Middle Eastern production has not been commensurate with the proven 
reserves, as shown in Table 2 . U .S . production amounted to roughly 10.57% 
of its reserves in 1970, while in contrast, fo the iVliddle East the figure is on 
average less than 2% .
Table 2 O il production as a percentage of reserves
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
U .S .A . 8.3 8 .0 8.32 0 .3 9.2 10.6
Venezuela 5 .7 6.0 7.04 6.0 7.8 10.1
Iran 2 .4 3.4 0.45 U 1.8 2 .0
Iraq 0.9 1.0 1.24 1.3 1.6 U'7
Kuwait - 1.1 1.01 1.0 1.2 1.5
Saudi Arabia 1.0 2.2 0.95 0 .9 1.2 1.0
Source: able 1 and B.P. Statistical Review of the World O il Industry 
954 and 1969; the Financial Times, January, 1961.
In 1969, oil reserves per well in the United States were about 60,397 
barrels, in Venezuela -  15.7 million barrels, as compared with 330.9 million
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in Saudi Arabia, 206.7 million in Iran, and 91.7 million in Kuwait.
2 . Factors influencing the economics of oil production
The production of oil in any country must be related to world demand, 
and fo its own reserves. The ability of any producer to compete in world markets 
is dependent primarily on its costs of production, and also on transport costs to 
consuming points. The vital question of production costs is governed by a 
number of factors; these are mainly the physical ease of extraction, the 
specific gravity of the o il, the production method employed, and the cost of 
labour.
In addition to their proven oil reserves, the countries concerned have 
several advantages in oil exploitation which lead to the cost of production 
being lower than many of their foremost competitors in world markets. The cost 
of crude oil production is recognised as the total expenditure which the company 
incurs on oil production from the time of extraction until it reaches the 
tanker loading terminal, and including the depreciation cost while excluding 
investment expenditure, royalties, and refining costs.^ The cost of production 
in Middle Eastern countries is only about 7,7  U ,S . cents per barrel on the 
average, while in Venezuela it is 62 cents, in U .S .S .R , 80 cents, and in 
the United States 151 cents. The cost of production of oil in the important 
countries in the four major oil producing areas has been given in the following 
table.
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Table 3 Crude oil production costs
Area and 
Year
Operation 
Cost (cents 
per barrel)
Development 
investment 
per initial daily 
barrel
Development 
cost (cents 
per barrel)
Total cost 
(cents per 
barrel)
U .S .A , 1961-62
Texas 18 3,250 138 156
Louisiana 10 2,542 108 no
Total 17 3,155 134 151
Venezuela
1962-64 6.2 863 55 62
Africa 1963-64
Libya 1963-64 2.2 149 13(a) 15
Algeria 1962-64 3 .9 656 42(b) 46
Nigeria 1964 2 .7 590 28 31
The Gulf 1962- 64
Iran 1.0 130 6 7
Iraq 1.2 69 3(c) 4
Kuwait 1.8 167 8 10
Saudi Arabia 1.5 160 8 10
(a) Including 6 cents pipeline cost.
(b) Including 10.7 cents pipeline cost.
(c) No pipeline allowance since Kirkuk Field has net transport
advantages in pipeline outlet to East Mediterranean, and
cost comparison is on the G u lf basis.
Source; Naft al-Arab, N o .6, March, 1970, Beirut, p .10 and P .P .$ *,
May, 1966, p .178.
Since 1964, there has been little or no information about rises in the 
cost of production, however, it is believed that the position is now as follows.
The average cost of producing one barrel of oil in the Middle East is about 15 cents. 
However, the cost in Iran is 13 to 14 cents a barrel, 8 or 9 cents in Saudi Arabia, 
about 6 cents in Kuwait, and even less in Iraq. The Iranian high cost is partially 
because the Iranian oil industry has over the years become heavily over-manned.
The comparable figure for Venezuela is 51 cents, for Indonesia 82 cents, and
1 2 6 .
mm
Plate 2 - An aerial view of4 an operational drilling rig in 
Kuwai t .
127.
2
for the United States 131 cents.
The reason for Iraq’s low figure is the laclc of exploitation effort 
during the past 7 or 0 years, due to a dispute between IPC and the government. 
As any exploration costs are reflected in the cost of production, Iraq’s costs have 
remained low.
In conclusion it is possible to say that the countries concerned can 
compete very favourably in world markets with rival producers, especially the 
American and African countries. The low cost of production is discussed under 
t he headings of extraction, production methods, topography, and labour costs. 
Ease of Extraction
In Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, it is not necessary to drill deep
to find o il . In Kuwait the average depth of a well is between 3,500 and 8,000
feet, while in Saudi Arabia it is around 7,000 feet, and in Iran if ranges from
3,000 feet (these are shallow wells) to 10,000 feet. Often these wells have a
dual producing capacity ( i .e .  they are drilled in a position that penetrates
through two oil producing strata).
Usually the operation time taken to drill an exploratory well is longer
than that taken for a development w e ll. To drill an exploratory well in the
offshore area may fake 5 -6  months, while the time would be reduced to 3-4
months for a development w ell. Onshore, however, the length of time needed
to drill an exploratory well is about 4 months, while a development well would 
3take about 2 months.
The further down one has to drill, the more expensive the operation 
becomes. However, as a result of improvements in equipment and technique 
in almost all phases of drilling operations, the time and costs of drilling have 
been reduced. For example, in Saudi Arabia in 1960 if was possible to drill
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at an average rate of 99.3 feet per day in development drilling, while in 
1968 the average penetration increased to 419 feet per day. The table below 
shows the average penetration per foot on the onshore of Saudi Arabia.
Table 4 Onshore drilling in Saudi Arabia -  1958-68
Year Average rate of penetration • 
Exploratory Wells
- foot/day 
Development Wells
1958 52.58 114.26
1959 48.69 107.58
1960 - 99.30
1961 - 177.38
1962 - 157.56
1963 88.73 136.38
1964 75.00 180.02
1965 141.34 314.76
1966 115.68 298.07
1967 166.84 316.36
1968 150.71 419.04
Source: See source of Table 5 .
In 1958 the average exploration drilling cost per foot was $139.17, 
and in spite of a drop to $45.33 in 1965, it rose again in 1967 and 1968, 
because of deep exploration drilling in parts of the Rub a l-K hali, which was 
expensive due to the difficulties of the terrain and the distance from the supply 
base.
During the 1960's the average development drilling cost per foot was 
reduced from$71.35 in I960, to $39.66 in 1965, and to $31.86 in 1968. Thus 
a 55.4%  reduction in the cost of development drilling was achieved by Saudi 
Arabia. The following table shows the average cost of drilling in the onshore 
areas of Saudi Arabia.
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Table 5 The average cost of onshore drilling in Saudi Arabia -  1958-60
Year Average cost of drilling $ / f t .  
Exploratory Wells Development Wells
1958 139.17 70.04
1959 116.30 69.38
1960 - 71 .35
1961 - 46.95
1962 - 48.73
1963 59.62 47.70
1964 69.59 48.95
1965 45.33 39.66
1967 95.25* 36.59
1968 107.68* 31.86
* The cost of exploratory wells is high for the years 1967 and I960
because some of these wells are located in the Rub al-Khali«
Source of Tables 4 and 5 is Prilling Techniques and Cost in Saudi Arabia
b y A .K . Ghalayini, a paper presented to the Seventh Arab Petroleum 
Congress, Kuwait, March I6th-22nd, 1970.
Although no information is available with regard to these costs in Kuwait 
and Iran, it is believed that they must be fairly similar. In contrast to Saudi 
Arabia, the U .S . producing industry is drilling an increasing number of wells 
to about 15,000 feet each year in its search for commercial gas and oil deposits. 
Deep well costs are increasing. During 1958-62, it cost an average of $756,000
4
to drill a deep exploratory well, and in 1966 the average cost was $1,286,000.
Collectively, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have the highest rate 
of production per weli in the world. Also, when considered separately, each 
of these countries has a higher rate than other oil producing countries. The 
average daily production in Iran in 1969, was 14,164 barrels per well, while 
in Saudi Arabia the figure was 6,973, and in Kuwait it was 3,416 barrels per 
w ell. Comparative figures for the United States and Venezuela are 12 and 361
Plate 3 - A well producing oil by natural pressure.
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A pumping unit operating on a producing oil well
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barrels per well, respectively.
Raising oil to the surface
In most oil producing countries, especially the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and Venezuela, pumping systems have to be used in order to 
bring oil up to the surface, because of the lack of sufficient pressure of 
natural gas in the wells. In 1969, in Venezuela, 68.63% of a total 9,909 wells 
were dependent on pumping, while in the United States the percentage was 
higher. In contrast, all the producing countries around the Gulf have an 
abundance of natural gas in the reservoirs, which pushes the oil to the surface 
by natural pressure. This, however, excludes the onshore area of the Kuwait" 
Saudi Neutral Zone, The advantages of this natural gas pressure are that it 
speeds the rate of production and reduces the labour and power which are 
necessary in running a pumping system, with the obvious implication for reducing 
the cost of production.
Topography
In any country, topography plays an important role in determining 
the cost of production. In the countries being dealt with, the effect of the 
relief is clearly noticeable. Although they are known for their low cost of 
production, each country has its own particular advantage over the others.
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have the advantage over Iran in that Iran's 
major oilfields are in the mountains, with the exception of a very few on the 
plains, and in order to have access to these, costly roads have to be 
constructed. Another expense incurred in Iran is the cost of maintaining 
personnel in production units in remote areas. Also the mountainous terrain 
renders pipe-laying more difficult and expensive.
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Plate 5 - Moving a drilling rig from one site to another 
in Kuwait,
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Kuwait has several advantages over both Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
and the major ono is the terrain. The relatively flat and barren countryside 
makes it possible to move drilling rigs by towing them to their new locations, 
without having to dismantle them. Also, the wells are located fairly close to 
each other. Another advantage of the terrain is the convenient location of a 
ridge between the fields and the coast. Ideal conditions for the storage of 
petroleum are provided there, and oil flows down to the terminal on the coast 
by force of gravity, without pumping, thus reducing costs. In Kuwait, the 
concession area is much smaller than the others, and the fields are adjacent 
to each other and to the shore, which again cuts the costs of production by 
reducing the number of pumping stations and length of pipeline required.
Iran’s main advantage is the high production capacity of her wells.
It is possible to produce over 100,000 barrels per day from some wells. Thus 
Iran is able to produce oil at a cost as low as the other two countries.
Labour costs
A large number of people are employed in the various concerns connected 
with the oil industry in the Gulf area. These employees are both local and 
foreign, the foreign element falling into three categories. Top administrative 
and technical posts are mostly filled by Europeans and Americans, while clerical 
and skilled labour is provided by Pakistanis and Arabs from the Levant. Semi- 
and unskilled labour is provided by immigrants from other parts of the Gulf 
when there is not sufficient available locally. In Kuwait, Q atar, and Bahrain, 
this is particularly true, and foreigners play leading roles in most branches of 
the economy. However, the proportion of foreigners is declining, particularly 
in Iran and Saudi Arabia, where they are being replaced by local people. In
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Kuwait, the situation differs in that the decrease is only in non-Arabs, who 
are being replaced by Arabs. The following table shows the numbers of 
employees in four major oil producing countries of the G ulf.
Table 6 Comparative numbers of employees in oil companies in the Middle East
(in thousands)
Year IOOC C« N IO C  
Non-basic
ARAMCO KOC IPC
1960 43.1 14.8 7.2 13.4
1961 38.G 14.1 6.2 12.9
1962 33.3 13.6 5 .8 14.2
1963 41.4 13.0 5 .6 11.5
1964 30.7 12.9 5 .4 11.2
1965 29.6 12.8 5 .3 11.1
1966 20.2 12.7 5.2 11.0
1967 25.9 12.0 5.1 -
1968 23.2 11 .5 5.2 -
1969 2 0 .G 10.8 4 .9
Sources: Iranian O il Operating Companies' Statistics, 1967,
Annual Reviews 1968 & '69; ARAMCO, Facts and Figures 
1969; Kuwait Oil Company Annual Reviews, 1967, '68 &
'69.
The most remarkable features of the above table are, firstly, the con­
tinuous reduction in the number of employees, and secondly, that while Iran 
has the highest figures, Kuwait has the lowest. The number of employees in 
Iran was reduced by 51.74% between 1960 and 1969, while those in Saudi 
Arabia were reduced by 27.02% , and in Kuwait by 31.94% for the same period. 
The reduction can be related both to automation and to an attempt to reduce the 
cost of production. This latter is very true in the case of Consortium, whore 
employment in non-basic work is particularly high, as shown in Table 7 . Although 
the number of these workers has decreased by 40*61% between 1961 and 1969,
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the amount is still 39.48% of the total personnel employed by Consortium.
Table 7 Salaries and wages paid by the Iranian O il Operating Companies
Year Non-basic
operations
Basic
operations
Total personnel Total Payment 
(£  million)
1961 13,880 24,939 38,919 78.6
1962 12,875 20,407 33,282 79.2
1963 12,345 19,024 31,369 61.0
1964 11,908 18,800 30,708 63.5
1965 11,603 18,054 29,657 965.5
1966 10,946 17,300 28,246 71 .4
1967* 10,155 15,763 25,918 -90.1
1968 9,012 14,204 23,216 83.2
1969 8,243 12,635 20,878 86.6
From this year the figures include employees' benefits (the 
company*s contribution to social insurance organisations, 
pension and savings schemes, and leave pay).
Sources: Iranian O il Operating Companies, Annual Reviews, 1965,
'66, and '69.
However, it is to be noted that wages paid in the oil industry in the 
Middle East are higher than those paid to workers in other branches of the 
economy. Also, wages have been steadily rising, while in other major oil 
producing countries, i .e .  Venezuela and the United States, they are only a 
small part of the total wage b ill. The following figures illustrate the 
relative level of wages paid in the oil industry in the Middle East as against 
other major producing areas. In 1945, the minimum daily wage in Saudi Arabia was 
40 cents. This rose to 81 cents in 1950, $1 .62 in 1955, and J82.13 in 1950. In 
Iran in 1948, it was #1 .50 *, in 1955-56 it was f \  .08, and in 1957, £1 .30.
In Iraq in 1948 the minimum wage was 90 cents, $1.10 in 1950, #1.60 in 1955, 
and £1 .80 in 1959. In Kuwait in 1959, it was $1.79, and in Venezuela in
* The rial (local currency) was greatly overvalued in the early years. The
rise was from 40 rials in 1948 to 82 rials in 1955-56, and to 99 rials in 1957.
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1950 it was ^2.00, and #3.70 in 1959.6
As regards average annual income, for employees of the Kuwait 
Oil Company this was £1,500 in 1958, and abouf£l,700 in 1959. Saudi 
Arabian employees in Saudi Arabia had their annual earnings more than 
doubled between 1953 and 1959, when the figure reached £1,888 . In the 
United States, average annual earnings were £3,470 in 1948, in petroleum and 
natural gas production, and £3,750 in refining. In 1958 the figures were £5,700  
a n d /5 ,9 7 0 .7
A number of striking points are revealed by the above figures. In 
1959, the Kuwaiti minimum daily wage of 170 cents was less than 50% of that 
of Venezuela. Furthermore, within the Middle East, costs were lowest in Kuwait. 
Equally striking, however, is the obvious narrowing of the difference between 
the Middle East producers and Venezuela. Thus, for example, in 1950, wage 
rates in Saudi Arabia were only 20% of those in Venezuela, but they had increased 
to about 60% in 1959. The Kuwaiti annual payrolls were only about 12% of 
those in the United States in 1958. The high cost of labour in Venezuela and 
the United States contributes to the higher cost of oil production in both countries, 
and thus they cannot compete successfully with the countries under study in world 
markets.
Although recent exact figures are not available, it is known that since 
1959 in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, wages generally have risen by over 50%, 
associated with increased revenues from oil, and the consequent rise in the 
standard of living. As made clear by Table 8, the annual average income of a 
Saudi Arab was increased from £2,187 in 1963 to £2,835 in 1966, and to £3,399 
in 1969 -  an increase of 55.41% over 7 years. Even so, this remains lower than 
the wages in the United States and Venezuela, but if the upward trend 
continues, the Middle East will soon cease to enjoy an;/ competitive advantages
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in terms of cheap labour.
Table 8 Average annual income of Saudi Arab employees
Year Saudi employees Payments (0)
1963 10,391 2,187
1964 10,299 2,374
1965 10,257 2,605
1966 10,238 2,835
1967 9,813 2,975
1968 9,452 3,148
1969 9,015 3,399
Source: ARAMCO Statistical Review, and ARAMCO Facts and Figures, 1969.
3. Production in various countries
At present, more than 30% of the world's oil is supplied by 4 ma|or 
areas. These are North America, (mainly the United States), the Middle East, 
the Caribbean, and the Soviet Union. Other, lesser producing areas are North 
and West Africa, and the Far East. During recent years, some fundamental 
changes have occurred in the oil trade, and in each area's share in the production 
totals. Figure 1 shows the development of oil production in the major producing 
countries.
The most notable aspect of the period since World War I! is the increase 
in production in the Middle East. A good example is Saudi Arabia, which 
started exporting oil after 1945, and in 1969 was the fifth biggest producer in 
the world, after the United States, the Soviet Union, Venezuela, and Iran, 
with a production of 160.2 million tons. Apart from the main producers around 
the Gulf, (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and Bahrain), there are 
other areas now producing oil, such as Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Oman, v/hich 
started production in the early and mid-1960's.
1 3 9 .
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Fig. 1 - The development of* oil production in the major 
producing countries - 1932-1970.
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In recent1 years, the output of the Middle East has increased greatly, 
with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq being the main contributors. 
Production in the Middle East has increased from 261.8 million tons in I960, 
to 415.5 million tons in 1965, and to 697.1 million tons in 1970. This 
increase has mainly been due to new oil discoveries around the Gulf, and to 
rising world demand for o il .
Political issues sometimes have great influence on oil production.
The temporary halt in Iranian output following the nationalisation of 1951, 
led to increased demand for oil from other producers, and a consequent stimulus 
t^o increase production in Kuwait and elsewhere. Conversely, in 1967, because 
of the Arab-lsraoli War, and the oil embargo on the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and West Germany by the Arab countries, production in Iran was 
increased to fulfil the needs of these countries.
Large new fields were discovered in North Africa, in Libya, Algeria, 
and Egypt. Libya, which started production in 1961, had an output of 156.4 
million tons in 1970, which exceeded Kuwait's production, and placed Libya in 
sixth place in the world. This tremendous Increase in Libyan output is due in 
part to its geographical position, near to the consumers of Western Europe, 
reducing the distance which the oil has to travel. Another factor is the quality 
of the Libyan o il, which contains less sulphur than most o il, making it more 
desirable to the consumer. Also, oil companies trying to recover their initial 
outlay tend to push up the production in their Libyan areas, regardless of the 
danger of exhausting the fields, The following pages deal with production 
from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.
The first oil discovered in the Middle East was found in Iran by 
the D'Arcy concessional in 1908, 7 years after the concession was granted.
The discovery was made at Masjid-i Sulaiman, in the south-west of Iran. By 
1911, control of both the oilfields and the Abadan refinery was in the hands of 
The Anglo-Persian O il Company*, and in 1914, this company signed a contract 
with the British Admiralty, which led to the rapid expansion of the Iranian oil 
industry. The contract was for the long-term supply of fuel oil to the British 
Navy, while at the same time, the British government bought a controlling 
interest in the Anglo-Persian O il Company. Thus, during and immediately after 
the First World War, production expanded from 655,735 tons in 1917, to 1,124,170 
tons in 1919. In 1929, production was again increased when Haft Kel Field 
started producing, and in 1937 a further increase was recorded as Gach Saran 
Field was commissioned. Major discoveries were also made at Naft Safid, Lali, 
Agha Jari, and Pazanan.
The advent of the Second World War, and the closure of the 
Mediterranean led to a drop in production in Iran from the pre-war figure of 
over 10 million tons. However, in 1944, production was up to 13.7 million 
tons, and an even greater increase was recorded in 1945, when the Agha Jari and 
Naft Safid fields were put into production. By 1949, Iran was producing 27 .6  
million tons of oil per year, and of this, 25 million tons were exported as crude 
oil or products. In 1950, Iran was the major oil producer in the Middle East area, 
with a production of 32.8 million tons.
The nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry on May 1st, 1951,
due to a dispute between the Iranian government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company,led to a steep drop in production. The same yea$ production was only 16
The Anglo-Persian O il Company changed its name to Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company, in 1935.
million tons, and in 1952and 1953 it had dropped to 1 million tons. At 
this time, exploitation of other oil sources in the Gulf (particularly Kuwait), 
began to expand rapidly,
A group of international oil companies, Including British Petroleum
(formerly A IO C ), had reached an agreement with the Iranian government
in October, 1954. Thus, these companies, acting under the name of the
Iranian O il Participants (generally called Consortium), undertook oil 
exploration in Iran. The Agreement Area includes the fields of Agha Jari and
Gach Saran, which are the main producing fields. In 1967, Agha Jari 
produced an average of 909,000 barrels per day, and Gach Saran produced
665,000 barrels per day, while a net total of 2,467,000 barrels per day was
obtained from Karanj, Faris, Marun, Ahwaz, Haft Kel, Masjid-i Sulaiman,
Lali, Bibi Hakimeh, Naft Safid, Pazanan, Kharg, Ramshir, Rag-e Safid,
and Binak, the other fourteen fields in the area.0 While Gach Saran supplies 
important quantities of heavy crude, the Consortium's higher exports of 
light crude have increased the value of the Agha Jari Field. The following 
tables show the net production per field, and the number of producing wells 
for different years.
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Table 9 Net crude oil production by fields, and the percentage of increase
1963-69 (mill ion barrels)
Field 1963 1965 % 1967 % 1969 %
Agha Jar i/Karan j /
Marun/Faris 286.6 329.1 14 429.9 30 561.8 30
Gach Saran 130.7 185.7 42 422.6 127 264.4 -37
Ahwaz 35.4 60.7 71 59.6 -1 87.5 46
Haft Kel 47 .0 38.0 -14 28.0 -26 17.8 -36
Bibi Hakimeh 14.0 - 03.2 494 134.6 61
Pazanan 6 .6 20.4 209 14.8 -27
Masjid-i Sulaiman/
Lali 17.5 14.3 -18 12.9 -9 8.8 -31
Naft Safid 10.0 8.5 -15 7.9 -7 11,3 43
Kharg 3.0 - 4 .8 60 7.2 50
Ramshir - 3,1 - 1.7 -45
Rag-e Safid - - 7 .9 - 8.5 7
Binak - - - - 13.3 -
Total: 527.2 659.9 - 900.3 - 1,131.7 -
Table 10 Number of producing wells in different fields 1963-69
Field 1963 1965 1967 1969
Agha Jari/Karanj/
Marun/Faris 38* 46 64 68
Gach Saran 12 22 24 26
Ahwaz 7 20 23 18
Haft Kel 15 15 10 10
Bibi Hakimeh 3 17 12
Pazanan 1 4 3 1
Masjid-i Sulaiman/
Lali 29** 32 29 22
Naft Safid 15 16 15 11
Kharg 4 4 2
Ramshir ~ - 2 1
Rag-e Safid - 3 2
Binak ~ 1 1
Total 117 162 195 174
* This figure applies only to Agha Jari.
* *  O f this figure, 26 refer to Masjid-i Sulaiman, and 3 to Lali.
The sources of Tables 9 and 10 ares Iranian O il Operating Companies, Annual 
Reviews, 1963, *65, '67 and '69.
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The above two tables show clearly that although the output from 
some fields is increasing steadily, others are decreasing just as steadily.
Two examples of the increase are Agha Jari, which increased its output from 286.6  
million barrels to 561.8 million barrels during the period 1963-69? Bibi 
Hakimeh, where production rose from nil to 134.6 million barrels in the same 
period. However, production from old fields subh as Haft Kel, Masjid-i Sulaiman, 
Lali, and Nafd Safid, has dropped sharply. Haft Kel, for instance,produced 
47 million barrels in 1963, but only 17.8 million in 1969. This situation also 
applies to producing wells, as can be seen in Table 10, and can be related to 
several factors.
The first and most obvious reason is the exhaustion of the reserves 
of o il, and, in fact, an intensive well repair programme was carried out in 1963, 
in order to increase the level of production from the declining fields.
The second reason may be that the company has discovered new fields 
with large reserves, close enough to the shipping points to render it more 
economical to increase production from these than to improve on the old fields, 
and transport the oil long distances. Also present world demand is concentrated 
on two kinds of crude oil -  light and heavy, and although Lali and Masjid-i 
Sulaiman could supply these, two fields situated close to Kharg, the shipping 
point, are more economical, and their relative reserves are much greater.
They are Agha Jari which is well known for its light crude, and Gach Saran 
for its heavy crude, and their positions cut the cost of transporting the o il .
As a result of pressure on Consortium from the Iranian government in 
1966, exploration activity in the concession area was greatly stimulated.
The government was pressing for the entire area to be worked, or handed back, 
and this eventually led to the discovery of four new fields in 1967. Two minor
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fields were Susangerd and Par-e Siah, and two others which were classed as 
significant discoveries were Kilur Karim and Chesmeh Kush. Also in 1967, 
a second phase of development was completed at Bibi Hakimeh, and at the 
end of the year the Binak Field started production.
Maleh Kuh (143 miles north of Ahwaz), Shadegan (38 miles south­
east of Ahwaz), and Lab*e Safid, north-west of Lali Field were discovered in 
101968. (See F ig .2 .) During recent years, however, defining known fields 
has been the main work of the Consortium, and it has shown great success, 
for example, in the discovery that the Marun Field is 70 miles long and its 
reserves are correspondingly large.
At the time of the nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry (1950), 
Iran produced some 37.5% of the Middle East's total production, and her share 
of the world's total was 5 .9% , Thus Iran was leading the rest of the Middle 
East in oil production. After the settlement in 1934, production in Iran began 
to rise again, and in 1956, production levels exceeded those of 1950. The 
increase of 1956 over 1955 was 10 million tons (from 16 to 26 million), which 
was an increase of 62% . This jump in production can be related to the Suez 
Crisis of 1956, when the Arab countries ceased all oil exports to Western 
Europe, causing a shortage. Iran's operations were limited by the closure of 
the Suez Canal, however, as there were insufficient numbers of large tankers 
to move the oil via the Cape and meet European needs.
From then, production rose steadily until 1967, when the outbreak 
of the Arab-lsraeli War, and the subsequent closure of the majority of tho 
Arab petroleum installations led to an increase of more than 23% over the 
preceding year, with production reaching 129,8 million tons, (2 .5  million 
barrels per day).
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Another factor which contributed to Iran's increase in output was 
the NigerianCivM War, which co-incided with the Arab-Israel I War.
Nigerian oil exports were kept down to only 50,000 barrels per day, compared 
to the 500,000 barrels per day which was exported in the first half of 1967.
Thus in 1967, Kuwait's output of 129 million tons* was exceeded by that of 
Iran, and Iran became second only to Saudi Arabia as regards production of oil 
in the Middle East.
In I960, Iran's production increased by 9.1%  to 2,841,000 barrels 
per day, although in 1967 the growth was 23.2% , and even before that, the 
average growth rate between 1962 and 1967 was 14.5% . Iran's biggest single 
producer, Consortium, raised its output to 2,704,000 barrels per day in 1968, 
but the increase was only 9.3%  as compared with the 1967 figure of 22.7% , 
which was, of course, a record. However, if was not expected that the 1968 
figures would equal the 1967 ones for Consortium, as the conditions of 1967 
were exceptional, with the closure of Iraqi pipelines and the Arab producers' 
embargo.
Production outside the Consortium area (offshore joint venture between 
NIO C and various foreign groups) remained around 137,000 barrels a day in 1968, 
but some estimates suggest that Iran may be producing as much as 700,000 barrels 
per day from non-Consortium fields by 1972, as a number of new offshore fields 
should be coming info production in 1971. These new fields include SIR IP's 
Nowruz, Iminoco's Rostam, and IPACs Fereidoon.^
It is obvious that Iran was trying to regain its pre-1951 position as leader 
of the oil producers in the Middle East. There are several reasons for this desire, 
the main two being the development needs of Iran's 26 million people, and the
This figure includes Kuwait's share of oil from the Kuwait/Saudi Neutral Zone.
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revenue requirements of a far-seeing economic development plan for 1960-73.
In 1969, a registered growth of 18.7% confirmed Iran in its place as first 
oil producer in the Middle East. In that year, Saudi Arabia produced 160.25 
million tons of oil (including that from the Neutral Zone), and Iran produced 
168.1 million tons, which was 27.36% of the total Middle East production, 
and 7.83% of the world to ta l, This placed Iran in fourth position in the world 
behind the United States, U.S.S.R . and Venezuela.
k* Saudi Arabia
In 1933, Standard California obtained the concession over the
province of al-Hasa in the eastern section of Saudi Arabia. Late in September
the same year, less than 4 months after the concession agreement was signed, the
company*s geologists arrived at the coast of al-Hasa, and began to survey the
coastal region. The first promising structure was located at Jabal Dhahran
(Dammam Dome), 5 miles inland from the coastal village of Dammam. After
making a preliminary map of the Dammam Dome, geologists began to inspect
12the rest of the concession.
In carrying out their work, however, the geologists faced a number 
of difficulties. The area was vaguely and inaccurately mapped, and the nature 
of the terrain made more accurate work difficult. In the immediate vicinity 
of the Gulf, shifting sand dunes are found, which break off near the shore 
into salt marshes and sandy beaches. From these dunes, extending for hundreds 
of miles inland, stretch rolling, unbroken hardsurfaced plains. The elevation 
of these plains ranges from 1,000 to 2,000 feet. As only about 4" of rain per year 
falls over the entire region, shallow wadis or dry water courses can easily 
accommodate it, and there is little or no vegetation. In summer, temperatures
of 120 F in the shade, and 160°F in the sun are fairly common. However,
13
in winter, temperatures of only 20°F have been recorded. These con­
ditions made working very difficult, because although air-conditioning is common 
nowadays, it was not so in the past.
Pioneer geologists in the area suffered not only from the severe nature 
of the region, but also from the lack of communication and transport, as there 
were no railways, highways, or even proper trails. To start with, prospectors 
depended largely on camel transportation for supplies, and the load limit for 
a good camel is about 400 lbs.
In 1936, well N o .7 at Dhahran was started as a deep test, and large 
q uantities of oil from the Arab Zone (upper Jurassic limestone), were en­
countered after reaching a depth of 4,727 feet
In September 1939, at the outbreak of the second World War, the 8 
completed wells of the Dhahran Field were producing on a small scale -  about
10,000 barrels por day. The effect of the war on ARAMCO's operations was to 
gradually bring them to a halt. The number of American staff was reduced -  
150 from 370 had left by the end of 1940, and another 100 had gone by mid- 
1942.
Apart from this, communication with America became difficult (the 
source of the supply of equipment), shipping was also adversely affected -  there 
was a shortage of tankers, the market became inaccessible, and demand for 
crude oil in the Indian Ocean was negligible* Exporting was limited to Bahrain 
refinery. Exports from al-Khobar and Ras Tanura amounted to 510,000 tons 
in 1939, and this increased to 665,000 tons in 1940, but the next year it 
dropped to 565,000 tons.
All exploring, drilling or field engineering facilities were running
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down by mid-1943, but from then onwards a great change came over the
Saudi scene. The United States government decided to undertake the quick
wartime development of Arabia, as petroleum products were urgently needed,
and there was unease about the extensive use of American oil reserves. Thus
Saudi production, which came entirely from Dhahran (23 wells were producing),
amounted to more than one million tons in 1944, and over 2 ,5  million tons in 
15
1945. By the end of that year, ARAMCO had discovered 4 fields, Dammam, 
Abu Hadriya, Abqaiq, andQ atif.
As a result of intensive development assisted by the United States, 
ARAMCO*s position at the end of the War was very advantageous. It was in a 
position to supply any quantity of petroleum products whenever markets became 
available. However there was also a need for fairly heavy expenditure, and 
markets were limited, so the Caltex group encouraged any approaches to supply 
these. By the end of 1946, agreement in principle had been reached by the 
company and Standard O il of New Jersey, and Socony Vacuum (now Mobil).
In 1947, the latter two companies became partners in ARAMCO. As a result, 
ARAMCO*s production rose from 7 ,9  million tons in 1946, to 26,1 million tons 
in 1950.16
At present ARAMCO has 12 producing fields, of which 3 are the main 
producers. These are Ghawar, which produced 1,519,564 barrels in I960, and 
Abqaiq and Safaniya with outputs of 534,859, and 407,995 barrels respectively. 
The other producers are Abu Hadriya, Abu Sa‘fah, Berri, Dammam, Fadhili, 
Khurais, Khursaniyah, Manifa, andQ atif. (See Fig. 3 .) ARAMCO‘s heavy 
crude comes mainly from Safaniya, Manifa, and Khursaniyah, while light 
crude comes from the rest of the fields, but mostly from Abqaiq, which is 30
A .P .1 .*____________ _________ __________________________________________
* The American Petroleum Institute -  A ,P .1 * -  gravity scale is an
arbitrary method of expressing the specific gravity of o i l . Crude
oil prices are often based on A .P . I .  gravity because, generally -
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The following tables show crude oil production from different fields,
and the number of producing wells, in various years.
Table 11 Average3 crude oil production from individual fields, in barrels
per day -  1964-69
Field 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Abqaiq 376477 409640 482026 515265 534859 633265
Abu Hadriya 24915 44990 60227 65426 81631 56925
Abu Sa'fah* - 32247 40145 60350 65515
Berri - - - 23178 19426 28322
Dammam 33488 25776 26131 23831 22622 22520
Fadhili 22421 19591 30990 40796 50690 31777
Ghawar total 733520 889948 961624 1244010 1519982 1488824
'Ain Dar 329589 343744 372127 387975 441430 442486
Fazran 23326 22408 18492 7569 6981 7122
Haradh 5244 36433 31260 23547 39643 12251
Hawiyah - - 48144 115359 127255 87617
Shedgum 113752 117619 129047 273075 449215 570088
* Uthmaniyah 261609 369743 362554 436485 455040 36c/259
Khurais 618 687 10GO 1460 2387 14564
Khursaniya 106992 129549 130219 89312 31117 101576
Manifa 919 - 50999 54405 44936 40035
Q atif 28274 32467 72019 60496 54405 48551
Safaniya 388481 472222 544375 439239 407995 424776
Total 1716105 2024870 2392737 2597563 2829982 2992658
* Production from this field is shared by Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. 
Source: See source of Table 12,
It is to be noted from the above table that in some fields the increase is 
regular, while in others it is not so. For example, the production of Ghav/ar 
and Abqaiq shows a constant increase, while production from Safaniya and 
Khursaniyah relates to the exhaustion of the fields, and the fluctuating demand 
for the oil from these fields, which both produce heavy crude oil, Safaniya's 
being 27 A ,P . I . ,  and Khursaniyah's being 30.
speaking the lighter the crude ( i .e .  the lighter the A .P . I , gravity) the 
more light products it contains, and hence the higher its price ought to be. 
It is important to remember that the expression a "lower or heavier" gravity 
has opposite meanings in A ,P , I , terms, i .e . ,  as the specific gravity or 
density of an ojl increases, the corresponding numerical A .P . i ,  value de­
creases, and vice versa, i .e . ,  a light A .P . I , figure is 36°, and a heavy 
A.P J , figure is 17°,
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Table 12 Number of producing wells -  1964-69
Field 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Abqaiq 60 64 64 64 64 70
Abu Hadriya 5 5 5 5 5 5
Abu Sa 'fah - - 4 6 6 6
Berri - - - 5 5 5
Dammam 25 21 21 19 19 20
Fadhili 2 2 2 2 2 2
Ghawar total 108 115 132 142 170 174
'Ain Dar 46 51 54 53 57
Fazran 3 3 2 2 2 Not
Haradh 4 5 5 4 8 Avail­
Hawiyah - - 11 11 12
able
Shadgum 15 15 15 24 41
'Uthmaniyah 40 41 45 48 50
Khurais 1 1 1 1 7 10
Khursaniyah 8 11 11 12 11 11
Manifa 5 5 5 5 4 2
Q atif 9 11 17 19 19 20
Safaniya 41 53 82 90 90 89
Total 264 288 344 370 403 423
The sources of the above tobies ares The American Association of Petroleum 
Geologists'Bulletins, Oklahoma, U .S .A .;
Vol ,49, Part I I,  July -  December, 1965, pp, 1314-15
Vol.5Q, Part II, July -  December, 1966, p .1752
Vol .51, Part II, July -  December, 1967, p .1635
Vol .52, August, 1968, p .1560
Vol .53, Part II, July -  December, 1969, pp .1774-76
Vol .54 August, 1970, p . 1535
The Oil and Gas Journal, December 28th, 1970.
O il production in Saudi Arabia, as anywhere else in the Gulf, was
greatly affected by the nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry. Saudi output
increased from 25,9 million tons in 1950, to 36.9 million tons in 1951, and to
41 million tons in 1952. After this, production rose steadily until the Suez crisis
of 1956. Both the embargo on oil shipments to Bahrain, Britain, France and
other areas (November, 1956 -  March, 1957), and the closure of the Suez
Canal (October, 1956 -  April, 1957), had an adverse effect on production of
154.
oil in Saudi Arabia in 1956 and 1957. The average crude oil production for 
October, 1956, was about 1 million b/d , and in January, 1957, it was only
665,000 b /d .
In July, 1957, however, after the canal had been re-opened, production 
rose to 1.2 million b/d, but a world-wide surplus in producing capacity, and a 
temporary recession in some major consuming countries stopped production from 
rising even further then. In 1959, the demand from the Eastern Hemisphere increased 
as the recession ended, and production once again rose. Since then annual in­
creases in crude production have ranged from 6 -8% . In 1965, for the first time,
a daily production reached 2 million barrels, and in 1966 it increased 1$% -
17to 2 .4  million barrels. It was in the latter year that Saudi Arabia's annual
production of 119.4 million tons surpassed that of Kuwait, and it became the
leading producer in the Middle East, and fourth in the world after the United
States, U.S *S «R *, and Venezuela.
In June, 1967, the Suez Canal was again closed due to the outbreak of
war in the Middle East. This forced shipments of oil bound for Europe from
the Gulf to go via the Cape. Transportation charges rose steeply as a shortage
of tankers developed. For 5 days during the crisis, ARAMCO's production,
refining, and terminal facilities were closed, and no tankers were loaded at
Tapline's Sidon terminal for 14 weeks. For the first 5 months of 1967, crude
oil production averaged 2 .8  million b/d, (16%) above the production rate for
1
1966, and in June the daily production decreased to 1 .6  million barrels.
In 1969, Saudi Arabia produced oil at a rate of 2,99 million barrels a 
day, an increase of 5.7%  over that of 1968. This increase was obtained despite 
the closing of tholapline for 110 days following sabotage in the Israeli-occupied 
Gulan Heights on May 30th, ^  Saudi Arabia was leading the Middle East as a
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producer until 1969, when she lost her position to Iran. However, in terms 
of actual oil exports, Saudi Arabia still leads the field since Iran's domestic 
consumption now accounts for something like 200,000 barrels a day.
c . Kuwait
Kuwait O il Company was established in 1934, The next year a geological 
survey which lasted for a year throughout the country was started by the Company. 
This survey was made easy by Kuwait's relief, which is relatively featureless, 
slightly undulating, sandy or gravelly desert, rising gently from the sea shore 
in the east to a height of about 900 feet above sea-level in the south-west 
corner. In 1936, the Company drilled its first exploratory well in the "Bahra" 
area, on the north shore of Kuwait Bay. This well was taken to a depth of 
7,950 feet. Although it did not prove to be a commercial proposition, it was 
sufficiently encouraging for further investigation to be carried out. In 1938, 
another exploratory well was drilled on a promising structure in the "Burgan" 
area, 28 miles south of Kuwait Bay, and 14 miles from the Gulf coast. The 
results of the investigation at depths ranging from 3,672 to 3,692 feet were
encouraging and indicated the presence of oil in commercial quantities. The
20well yielded oil at a rate of 4,343 barrels of 32 .5° A .P . I .  gravity per day.
Subsequently eight more productive wells were drilled in this area between
1938 and 1942. During World War II (1942-1945), operations were suspended
by the Company, and the already completed wells were plugged, mainly due
to the difficulties in transporting the produced oil to the world markets during
hostilities. In addition to this, Kuwait Oil Company faced problems in obtaining
21equipment and manpower. After the war, the Company resumed operations, 
and soon was producing 30,000 barrels per day from the Burgan Field.
Although at present the Kuwait O il Company has seven producing fields (Burgan,
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Magwa, Ahmadi, Roudhatain, Minagish, Sabiriya, and Umm Gudair),
Burgan is still the largest in size and production. Three fields -  Burgan,
Magwa, and Ahmadi -  are all interconnected and are collectively known
as the Greater Burgan Field. Today it produces some 2.2  million barrels a 
99day. However, at the present time, production is distributed in the areas 
shown in Figs. 4  and 5 .
Table 13 Status of producing wells in 1961, 1966, 1969
Fields 1961 % 1966 % 1969 %
Burgan 268 70.0 325 64.63 386 52.38
Magwa 44 11.7 66 13.12
> 189 )
25.64
Ahmadi 35 9 .3 43 8.55 ) )
Raudhatain 25 6.6 35 6.95 58 7.87
Minagish 4 1.1 16 3.18 23 3.12
Sabiriya 1 0.26 14 2.78 42 5.70
Umm Gudair 3 0.78 4 0.19 32 4.35
Bahra 1 0.26 “ - 7 0.94
Total 378 100.00 503 100.00 737 100.00
Sources: Kuwait O il Company, Annual Review of Operations, 1961, 1966,
and O il and Gas Journal, December 28th, 1970, p .120.
The above figures show that Burgan retains its dominant position in the 
productivity of drilling new wells, although the rate of increase in a number 
of producing wells between 1961 and 1969 was lower than other fields. This 
should not detract from the fact that in 1969, 52.4% of the producing weils 
were in Burgan.
Over the years, the Kuwait O il Company's exploration activities were 
not confined to the areas highlighted by the new discoveries described above, 
but extended over the whole area of its concession territories. The Company 
drilled several exploratory wells in different areas, such as Mutriba and Jirfan
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Fig. 5 “ 1 - Burgan, 2 - Raudhatain, 3 — Magwa and Ahmadi, 
4 - Minagish, 5 - Umm Gudair, 6 - Vafra and South 
Fawaris, 7 - Khafji.
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in the south-west comer of the country, and Dibdibah in the west. All 
these tests carried out in the above areas proved unsuccessful and drilling was 
suspended.
Seismic surveys of Kuwait Bay and other offshore territorial waters 
included in the Company's concession rights took place in i960, and the first 
attempt to explore these areas was in 1962. The motivation behind this was that
on May 8th, 1962, the Kuwait Oil Company agreed with the government of
23
Kuwait to relinquish 1,000 sq. km. of its offshore area in five year's time.
It is beyond doubt that the Company wished to establish before that date which 
areas were o il-I ess.
It is to be noted that although the quantity of oil produced in Kuwait 
brought the country up the ranks of world producers, until 1968, only three 
fields (Burgan, Magwa, and Ahmadi), from seven were developed to become 
large producers. The other four have great development potential. Apart from 
the developed area, there still remains a considerable area unexplored, par­
ticularly in the offshore. Thus any conclusion regarding distribution of oil in 
Kuwait must, therefore, be conjectural.
Table 14 Annual oil production by Kuwait Oil Company, and the percentage
of increase or decrease -  1946-1969
Year '000 tons %age Year '000 tons % age
1946 797 - 1958 69,117 22.4
1947 2,105 173.8 1959 63,437. -0 .88
1948 6,291 168.8 1960 80,573 17.7
1949 12,103 93.2 1961 81,408 1.0
1950 17.018 39.8 1962 90,721 11.5
1951 07 7oo 4- /  , /  UvJ 63.0 1963 95,666 5 .4
1952 37,042 33.4 1964 105,033 9 .8
1953 42,603 15.1 1965 107,322 2.2
1954 46,969 10.4 1966 112,548 4 .8
1955 53,894 14.7 1967 113,355 0.74
1956 54,117 0.35 1968 120,162 5.90
1957 56,375 4.04 1969 127,502 6.08
Source: Ministry of Finance and Industry in Kuwait
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The war left the oil industry unscathed, and material and personnel 
became increasingly available, thus Europe’s industrial reconstruction, 
leading to mounting fuel requirements, became the obvious market for Kuwait
o il . Production, which was 797,350 tons in 1946, rose to 2 million tons in 
1947, 6.2 million tons in 1948, 12 million in 1949, and 17 million in 1950.
As in the case of Saudi Arabia, the temporary cessation of Iranian oil 
production between 1951 and 1954 greatly affected the production of oil in 
Kuwait, In a world market which was clamouring for still more o il, the loss of 
30 million tons a year from Iran was of great importance. However, the rapid 
development of other oil fields in the Gulf, especially in Kuwait (the Anglo- 
Iranian O il Company has half of the shares of the concessionary company in 
Kuwait), was inevitable to compensate for the loss. Therefore, production in 
Kuwait increased from 17 million tons in 1950 to 46.9  million in 1954. However, 
this rate of increase did not last very long,, due to the Suez Crisis of 1956 which 
caused a sharp drop in Kuwaiti production, and in fact the rate of increase in 
1956 was only 0.35% over the previous year. Comparatively, the effects were 
worse on Kuwait than on Saudi Arabia, as the latter had an outlet on the 
Mediterranean. The situation caused a shortage of oil in Western Europe. This 
shortage stimulated the Kuwait O il Company and other oil companies in the 
Middle East to increase their production immediately after the crisis in order 
to meet this European demand. Production by Kuwait O il Company then increased 
from 54 million tons in 1956, to 69 million tons in 1958.
However, by 1959 an equilibrium between production and requirement 
of oil in the world market was reached, and this was followed by a consequent 
decrease of oil production in Kuwait in that year (1959) by 0.88% , compared 
with the previous year.
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In 1967, a situation similar to that of Saudi Arabia occurred in 
Kuwait, the percentage increase In production of oil over 1966 was only 0.74% ♦ 
Up to 1966, Kuwait was the leading producer in the Middle East, and fourth in 
the world. Since then the position has changed, and Kuwait is now third in the 
Middle East, and seventh in the world.
Reasons for the changes in the rate of production in Kuwait can be 
found in the type of oil produced there. It is slightly heavy -  the gravity ranges 
from 30^0 32 .fPA.? J , Also, it contains about 2.5%  of sulphur, which is a 
high percentage. Apart from political crises, these reasons make Kuwaiti oil 
less desirable than some others in the world market, thus explaining the difference 
in the rate of production.
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CHAPTER IV
A GEOGRAPHY OF INTERMEDIATE MOVEMENT OF O il  IN THE 
PRODUCING COUNTRIES
1. Inland Transport of oil (from wells to gas separators, from separators to
storage tanks, anc! from storage tanks to terminals)
In considering the economic geography of any commodify, the location 
of supply and demand areas are major factors. In the case of the countries under 
discussion, these areas are widely separated, the prime area of demand being in 
Western Europe. Before oil assumes any value, therefore, it has to be transported. 
Pipelines carry the produced oil through its first stages until If reaches fho 
terminals, where it is loaded info tankers to be carried to world markets. Crude 
oil passes through three stages between oil fields and export shipment: first from 
oil wells to gas separators where the crude oil is degassed, then the pumping to 
storage tanks, and finally to the terminals where if is loaded into oil tankers for 
export. In this chapter, only the main operating companies from these countries 
.w ill be analysed, as production from any others is negligible in comparison.
Kuwait (Kuwait O il Company)
Kuwait enjoys certain outstanding advantages insofar as inland transport 
is concerned, such as the flat and barren land surface, and the convenient placing 
of the oil fields near to the shore, reducing the length of pipeline needed for 
transportation. Further, all the oil tanks in Kuwait are located on one ridge 
which stands about 400 feet above sea-level, making the natural flow of oil 
from the tanks to the shipping points by force of gravity, without the application 
of any pumping methods. The exception to this is the movement of oil to the sea- 
island, where1 only 8,000 tons per hour are available by force of gravity, while 
the amount required is 15,000 tons. The result of this use of the force of gravity
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is the low cost o? inland transport of o il .
Pipelines are one of several methods b / which crude oil can be trans­
ported, and it is the only method used in Kuwait. In general, offshore pipelines 
are very expensive to lay. There are several reasons for this, among which are 
that there are few companies qualified to install offshore lines, a nd the pipe has 
to be imported,* and then coated to withstand corrosion on the sea-bed, During 
installation, provision has to be made for securing the line to the sea-bed, so that 
water movement does not affect it. A ll these considerations can raise the cost of 
a pipeline to as much as %*? million for a line measuring 8" x 30,000 feet. On 
land, however, tho cost of a comparable fine would be only § of the offshore cost, 
because several factors are automatically eliminated, for example, weather con­
ditions, and although the pipe still has to be wrapped and buried, the protection 
is not as essential as that which has to be given against salt water. The pipeline 
system in Kuwait has been enlarged steadily with the continual increase in pro­
duction .
In all Kuwait O il Company wells, oil flows to the surface by natural 
pressure, no pumping equipment is required at the w ell-head.** It is common 
practice to move the oil from the well-head by flowlines to plants which separate 
gas from the crude o il. These flowlines vary in diameter and length according to 
the productivity of the well and its location in relation to the gathering centres. 
(See Fig. 1.)
* Some countries, e .g . Iran, assemble the pipes themselves, but they
still have to import the materials from other countries.
* *  The natural energy that makes Kuwait O il Company wells free-flowing, 
includes both gas dissolved in o il, and water underlying the o il . Gas 
in the oil forces reservoir fluid to the surface, and water moves from 
below into the space vacated by produced gas and o il, which, in 
effect, helps displace the reservoir fluid. This Is not only the case in 
Kuwait, but also in Saudi Arabia and Iran.
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The reservoir fluid that emerges from a well is not crude oil alone, 
but a mixture of oil and gas. This mixture is delivered to gathering centres where 
the oil is degassed. The production of any field or company is governed by the 
number and capacity of the gathering centres. Therefore, in order to increase 
its capacity for production, a company would have to increase the number and 
size of its gathering centres. Up to the end of 1967, Kuwait O il Company had 18 
gathering centres with a total capacity of 2 .4 7  million barrels per day. O f these 
18 gathering centres, 12 (Nos. 1-8 and 11—1-4) are situated in Burgan Field,
2 (Nos. 9 and 10) are near Magwa to serve both the Magwa and Ahmadi Fields. 
There are also 2 (Nos. 17 and 18) in Umm Gudair, one in the north (N o .15) 
to serve the Raudhatain and Sabiriya fields, and another one (N o . 16) at 
Minagish to serve Minagish's output. In 1968, after the construction of the 
sea-island terminal, larger amounts of oil were required, and in order to increase 
productivity new production facilities were installed. Among these were 7 new 
gathering centres. Two of these (Nos. 19 and 20) in north-east Burgan and north 
Ahmadi respectively, were commissioned and completed in the same year. 
Gathering centres No .21 at Burgan, and 22 near Ahmadi were completed in 1969. 
Also at the time gathering centres Nos. 23, 24 and 25 in the north of Kuwait 
were under construction, and were due for completion at the beginning of 1970. 
(See Fig. 2 .)  These will have a nominal total capacity of 400,000 barrels per
i
day. The Table below shows the nominal capacity of each gathering centre 
in the different fields.
1 6 7 .
< • •
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Table 1 The capacity of gathering centres at each field
Field N o. of G ,C . Daily Capacity 
('000 barrels)
S. Field
1 180
2 155
3 145
4 140
5 145
6 140
Burgan 7 140
8 180
11 190
12 190
13 190
14 200
19 100
21 100
Total 14 2,195
Magwa 9 145
10 145
Total 2 290
Ahmadi 20 100
22 100
Total 2 200
Umm Gudair 17 65
18 35
Total 2 100
Minagish 16 85
Total 1 85
N . Fields
Raudhatain 15 380
- 25 100
Total 2 480
Sabiriya 23 150
24 150
Total 2 300
Source: Data received from Kuwait Oil Company in Kuwait, by private 
communication. (April, 1970)
Plate 6 - A general view of Gathering Centre No. 14 in 
Burgan Field, Kuwait.
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O f course, the number of wells connected to centres is variable, and 
data given at a point of time should be regarded in that context. At the same 
time, it must be realised that the capacities of gathering centres are nominal 
figures, being a balance between separators and well capacities. Actual through­
put can and does vary quite considerably.
After passing through the gathering centres, crude oil goes through 
several manifolds, from where if is collected and moved to tank farms. The 
following table and Fig. 2 show the pipeline systems and their lengths in Kuwait.
Table 2 Crude oil pipelines system
G .C ,4 12" -  17,436* to G .C . 3 Manifold
12" -  18,593* 1! I t  II
G .C  .12 20" -  14,142* I I  I I  I I
G .C  ,13 20“ -  12,900* I I  I I  I t
G .C , 5 12“ -  15,816* I I  I I  I I
12" -  161,331* I I  I t  I I
G .C . 21 1 2 " -  3,168* I I  I I  I I
G .C . 7 12" -  9,948* I I  I I  I t
16" -  9,489* to G .C , 8 Manifold
G .C . 6 12" -  8,513* to Burgan Manifold
G .C . 3 2 x 2 0 " -1 9 ,7 7 4 i  H i t
24" -  19,548* i i  i t  t i
G .C . 2 12” -  17,955* i i  i i  i i
12" -  18,292 i i  a  i i
G .C . 8 16" 8; 20" -  14,221* &517* to G .C .1
16" -  14,738* to G .C ,11 Manifold
G .C . l l 16" -  10,200 to Wara Manifold
20" -  10,173* i i  t i  a
Burgan Manifold to V/ara Manifold
3 x 2 0 " -  15,558*
32" -  15,563*
G .C .14 20“ -  11,625* to Wara Manifold
G .C ,19 16" -  5,900* i i  i i  i t
Wara Manifold to Ahmadi Manifold
20“ -  13,459* & 22" -  11,429* 
2 x 20" -  24,888*
30" -  9,260* 8. 34" -  15,633* 
34“ -  19,894* & 3 6 " -5 ,0 5 8 ’
Ahmadi Manifold to Magwa Manifold
2 x 2 0 " - 5 , 1 1 5 *  
1 22" -  5,115*
1 -  34“ -5 ,1 1 5 *
Table 2 (cont'd)
G .C .16 to Magwa Manifold
22" - 54950'
24" - 5125G1
26“ - 51700*
G .C .17 14" - 18500'
G .C  .18 14" - 33500*
Transit Line
G .C . 17 & 18 14"~18 'i-l 35321' to Shuaiba Refinery
North Tank Farm to Magwa Manifo Id
1 x 30' ' -  8546', 1 x 32" -  1102', 1 x 34" -  1
2 x 34' '-2 1 5 7 7 '
G .C  ,10 16“ - 32312' to Magwa Manifold
G .C  .22 12" - 7498* i i  i i  i i
G .C . 9 16“ - 14168' to G .C .10 Manifold
G .C  .20 18" - 19100* to North Tank Farm
G .C ,15 30“ - (303312' *  29594’) 332906* to North
G .C  .23 16“ - 23900* to G .C ,24
G .C .25 201* - 43500* to Tie in Point
G .C  ,24 30" » 34100* i i  i i  M i i
Tie in Point to Magwa Manifold
30“ - 270, 481 j 36"-40100*
South Tank Farm Gravity Lines to Submarine Manifold
N o .l 22" - 28945' K .L .D .
N o .8 30" - 7320', 34" -  2029*
No .2 22" - 27890*
Nos. 3, 4, 5 24" - 27890’
N o .6 30" - 27890*
N o .7 34" - 27890*
N o.9 32" - 27890*
Shore Feeder Lines Between Piers
30" - 8085', 32" « 45121
To D Berth 30" - 4833*
To E Berth 30" - 10058*
To H Berth 30" - 11435*
24” Laterals to Switchgate Manifold -  2427'
North Tank Farm Gravity Lines to North Pier
Nos. 10, 11 & 12 3 x  3 8 " -  8620', 3 x 4 0 "  -  15954'
Source: Data received from Kuwait O il Company in London -  December, 1970.
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As mentioned above, after being degassed in gathering centres, 
crude oil is pumped to South and North Storage Tank Farms, which are 
situated on the Ahmadi Ridge.* Construction of crude oil storage installations 
at the South Tank Farm commenced in 1946, and on the 23rd of June that 
year, Tank N o .l was completed. During that same year, Kuwait started 
shipping out crude oil for export. The increased output of crude oil demanded 
a parallel increase in the capacity and number of tanks in successive years.
The storage capacity was raised from 558,000 barrels in 1946, to 3.357 million 
barrels in 1952, and to 5.383 million barrels in 1958,
An economic study has shewn that a big company with large production 
would find it less economical to build 4 storage tanks of 250,000 barrels, or 
2 tanks of 500,000 barrels, than 1 tank of 1,000,000 barrels. The saving is 
nearly g, as a 1,000,000 barrel tank costs about fA , 100,000 and a 500,000 
barrel tank costs about $750,000.^
Although submarine tanks have only recently come into operation, 
several advantages and disadvantages have come to light already. For 
example, if a field is a long way from the shore, pipeline costs are eliminated. 
Another advantage is that they are unaffected by weather conditions. However, 
problems have arisen regarding dirt and sand,and also water, becoming mixed 
with the o il .
The discovery of new fields in the northern areas of the country 
caused another increase in the output, making it necessary in 1959 to build
* Ahmadi Ridge rises to approximately 400 feet above sea level, and 
separates the Burgan plains from the Gulf, defining the trend of 
the coastline. The top of the ridge is about 6 miles from the sea, 
sloping down gently to the east towards the Gulf, and the west 
towards the Burgan plains.
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a new storage tank farm (North Tank Farm), about 14 miles north of the 
South Farm. The main reason for the construction of the North Farm was to store 
the output of the north fields, and to serve the North Pier, which was commis“ 
sioned in the same year. Although there are more tanks in the South Tank 
Farm than the North one, the total capacity of the northern farm is greater.
This is because the capacity of the tanks at the North Farm ranges from 200,000 
to 600,000 barrels, whereas the ones at the South Farm hold only 100,000 to
200,000 barrels. The farms are linked by pipelines, enabling oil to be 
pumped from the North Farm to the South, or vice versa. However, in 1969, 
the number of crude oil tanks in both South and North Farms totalled 53, of 
which 33 are situated in the South Farm, and the rest in the northern one. The 
capacities of the storage tanks in the North and South Farms are explained in 
the Table below.
Table 3 The number of tanks, their capacities, and the periods in which
they were commissioned
N o. of 
Tanks
Capacity of 
1 tank (bis)
Total
Capacity(bls)
Period in which 
commissioned
South 1 “ 6 (6) 139,500 837,000 23 /6 /46  “ 23/11/47
Tank 9 « 30 (22) 168,000 3,696,000 18/2/49 -  13/3/55
Farm 31 “ 35 (5) 210,000 1,050,000 13/3/55 -5 /3 /5 0
Total 33 5,581,000
North 36 (1) 210,000 210,000 10/5/59
Tank 37 » 47(11) 262,000 2,882,000 17/5/59 -2 4 /1 0 /5 9
Farm 48 » 50(3) 262,000 788,400 25/5 /60  -  1@/6Q
51 >55 (5 ) 600,000 3,000,000 2 1 /1 0 /6 9 -2 1 /1 2 /6 9
Total 20 6,880,400
Source: Data received from Kuwait O il Company in Kuwait, during field
work, April, 1970.
Both tank farms were built on the Ahmadi ridge in order to employ the
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force of gravity in moving the oil to the terminals. Another advantage in 
the positioning o; the farms is that the ridge is not far from the oil fields, 
most of them being within a radius of 1 0 - 2 0  miles, and a third is that tho 
ridge itself is only about 6 miles from the shore. There are, however, two 
exceptions to this, which are nearly 77 miles distant. Normally, tanks are 
situated by the terminals, and at a great distance from the fields, thus necessita­
ting the construction and operation of long pipelines between them. Oil has 
to be pumped along these lines, making the whole operation more costly.
This is evidenced by the Iraqi pipelines from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean, 
which range from 532 -  555 miles in length. From this, it is plain that Kuwaiti 
oil can be transported more conveniently and cheaply than that of other oil 
producing countrios.
From tho Tank Farms to the Terminals:
There is a choice of four routes for crude destined for export, and all 
four can be utilised at one time. One route is via 5 submarine loading lines 
of 12" diameter. These are connected to the South Tank Farm, and are not 
used at present. The South Tank Farm is also connected to the South Pier by 
7 pipelines ranging from 22" -  34" in diameter. A one mile long, 48" diameter 
spur line connects the South Tank lines to the Sea island loading system at the 
crude oil pumphouse. The North Tank Farm is connected to the North ?ier 
by three 38" -  40" diameter pipelines, and to the Sea Island by a 48" pipe­
line. (See Fig. 2 ). The latter is buried in the sea-bed from the shore to tho 
sea island for safety precautions. A powerful crude oil pumping unit is 
situated on shore on the 48" pipeline route to boost transmission.
By virtue of the elevated position of the Tank Farm (about 400 feet
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above sea level), crude oil flows down by gravity, and loading rates may 
reach 7,000 tons per hour at the South Pier, and 12,000 tons per hour at the 
North Pier. The gravity flow rate to the sea-island is in excess of 8,000 tons 
per hour, and by using the crude oil pumping unit, rates of over 15,000 tons per 
hour can be ach icved.
A complex system of manifolds leads to extreme flexibility so that any 
tank at either farm can be available to any berth on either pier and the sea 
island. A ll oil entering the farms can be controlled, and all crude delivered 
to both of the piers, and the sea island can be segregated and controlled from 
the Central Control Room at Ahmadi.3
Saudi Arabia (ARAMCQ)
Inland transportation of oil in Saudi Arabia differs slightly from that in 
Kuwait. Before reaching the terminal, crude oil undergoes various processes.
From wells it is moved to gas separator plants (called gathering centres in Kuwait), 
to stabilizers where the oil is sweetened and sent on to the Tank Farms. Some 
tank farms are located close to the gas separator plants, and some are many miles 
away. O il from ianks near the gas separators is moved to either the terminal 
at Ras Tanura, or to other destinations, such as Bahrain, or Sidon on the 
Mediterranean. On the following pages, the different stages through which crude 
oil passes will be discussed.
Natural gas pressure in the fields forces oil and gas to the surface and 
removes the necessity for any pumping systems at the well-head.
In off-shore fields, if is common practice to move the oil from the 
well-head by flow lines to a plant which separates gas from crude o il. These 
flowlines vary from 4 - 1 0  inches in diameter, depending on the producing
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capacity of the wall, and the longest are about 11 miles long.
In contrast to Kuwait Oil Company, ARAMCO has offshore fields, 
and to bring oil from these, the usual method is to run a large diameter trunk" 
line from an onshore gas-oil separator through the middle of the offshore field, 
where smaller flowlines branch off to individual wells. In 1968, ARAMCQ 
installed its first offshore separator plant in the Safaniya field, about 30 miles 
from land.
As in Kuwait, the reservoir fluid that emerges from a well is not crude 
oil alone, but a mixture of oil and gas. This mixture is delivered to a series 
of vessels, or traps in a gas-oil separator plant, where the two are physically 
separated. In the Abqaiq field, and in Ain Dar and Sbedgum of the Ghawar field, 
gas that comes from the first stage separator vessels is compressed and reinjected 
info the reservoir. The number of gas separator plants in all ARAMCO*s fields 
reached 21 in 1968, and a total of 2,829,000 barrels per day was being obtained 
in the same year.
After being degassed, crude oil is pumped to stabilizers for sweetening, 
a process not used in Kuwait, where if is unnecessary. Crude oil leaving all 
separators with the exception of Safaniya, is sour crude, that is, if contains 
toxic hydrogen sulphide (b^S). Some crude can be moved by pipeline and used 
as refinery feed, but if is undesirable for tanker transport. Because the major 
portion of crude from Saudi Arabia is shipped by tankers to world market's, sour 
crude must be sweetened or stabilized prior to shipment.
The Abqaiq stabilizer plant, which has a capacity of 1,690,000 b/d, 
sweetens the majority of the crude oil produced in the Abqaiq and Ghawar 
fields. Stabilization is accomplished by the relatively simple process of boiling
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off the hydrogen sulphide, which ranges between 300-700 parts per million 
in sour crude. The sweetened crude oil is afterwards delivered to Abqaiq 
Tank Farm N o .2 .
A second stabilizer, with a capacity of 150,000 b /d , is located at 
Abu Hadriya to treat crude oil from the Abu Hadriya and Fadhili gas 
separators, and the sweetened crude is pumped directly into the pipeline to 
be carried to fheQaisumah Tank Farm.
Some crude can also be sent to Ras Tanura for refinery feed stock, or 
for stabilization in the stabilizers in the refinery there. This plant has cj 
capacity of 395,000 b /d . Alternatively, the sour crude can be delivered by 
pipeline to the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCQ).^
The following tables show the dimensions of the crude pipelines and 
capacities of the Tank Farms.
Table 4 The main crude oil pipelines and their dimensions
• I * V  I I IPipeline . ,r  inches
Size in Length in
miles
From gas separators to stabilizer 
and to storage tanks_______ _ _
Ain Dar -  Abqaiq N o .l 20-22-24 28,3
" 11 -  " N o .2 24-26-28 28.4
Uthmaniyah -  " N o .l 1C-20-24-30-31 127.8
-  " N o .2 34-36 32.8
Khurais - A i n  Dar N o .l 16-18 86.2
Fadhili -  Abu Hadriya* 12-14 25.5
From Safaniya to Ras Tanura 
Tank Farm** _________
Safaniya « Ras Tanura N o .l 22 130.6
-  11 ” No ,2 30-32 130.6
-  " " N o . 3 36-38-40-42 130.6
-  n " No .4 40-42 40.3
cont'd
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Pipeline Size in Length In
From Abqaiq Tank Farm Nos. 1 & 2 to inches mi e^
Q a tif Junction and to Dhahran Tank 
Farm_____________________________
Abqaiq -  Q a tif Junction N o .l 30 44.7
-  " 11 N o .2 20-22 43.8
-  " " N o .3 30-32 43.6
■u -  " No .4 40-42 42 .6
" -  Dhahran N o ll 12-14 39.0
“ -  " No .2 14 39,6
From Q atif Junction to Ras Tanura 
and Qaisumah__________________
Q atif Junction -  Ras Tanura N o .l 20-22 17.4
-  " >' N o .3 22 14.4
" -  11 " No .5 34-36 17.1
" -  H " N o .6 40-42 17.1
ii 11 -  Qaisumah 30-31 269,3
From Dhahran Tank Farm N o .2 to 
Bahrain____________ ___________
Arabia -  Bahrain N o .l 12 33,5
" No ,2 12-14 33,4
From Ras Tanura Tank Farm to 
Ras Tanura Terminal ________
Ras Tanura Terminal Line N o .10 20-22 6.1
11 N o .12 30 6.1
" N o .l 6 34-36 5 .6
" N o . 18 40-42 5 .5
Output from Fadhili and Abu Hadriya can take two routes, either 
to Qaisumah Tank Farm or to Q atif Junction.
Apart from Safaniya production, output from Manifa, Khursaniyah 
and Berri fields is transported via these pipelines first to Ras Tanura 
stabilizer plant, and then to Ras Tanura Tank Farm.
Source: See Table 5 .
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Table 5 The main crude oil storage tanks, their working capacities,
and number of fan!ks in each farm
Tank Farm N o . of Tanks Capacity in barrels
Abqaiq Tank Farm N o .l 5 730,000
" M N o . 2 8 1,200,000
Dhahran Tank Farm N o .2 5 864,000
Qaisumah Tank Farm * 7 1,170,000
Ras Tanura Tank Farm 95 16,000,000
Total 120 19,964,000
* The Qaisumah Tank Farm is about 291 miles from Dhahran, and it is 
the most distant of ARAMCO‘s oil installations. From there crude 
oil is fed to the Tapline to be transported to Sidon, the Lebanese port 
at the Adediterranean.
Source: Data given in the above two tables received from ARAMCO in Saudi 
Arabia, March, 1970.
In Kuwait the transportation of oil is a fairly simple process, as crude 
has to travel from the separators to only two Tank Farms, 14 miles apart, and 
the most distant field is about 77 miles. However, in Saudi Arabia, trans“ 
portation is much more of a problem. There are several Tank Farms, and some 
of them are very widely separated, for instance, Qaisumah and Q a tif Junction 
(from where the farm receives some of its oil) are about 269 miles apart. These 
great distances make it necessary for the oil to be pumped to move if, while 
this is not necessary in Kuwait. Thus the cost of moving oil in Saudi Arabia is 
much more than in Kuwait.
From all gas separators the oil goes to stabilizers,* from where if goes by 
pipeline to various tank farms, and then there is a choice of three outlets. The
* This excludes Safaniya's output, which is sweet, and therefore does 
not require stabilizing. It passes straight to the Tank Farm at Ras 
Tanura from the gas-oil separator plant.
Plate 7 - Gas being burned after separation at a production 
unit at Ahwaz, Iran.
first Is to Ras Tanura where the oil is loaded onto tankers. The second is from 
Dhahran Tank Farm to Bahrain, and the third is from Qaisumah Tank Farm via 
the Tapline to Sidon at the Mediterranean. To give an indication of the 
volume of oil which follows these routes, the year 1969 is taken as an example.
In that year 101,794,000 tons of oil passed through Ras Tanura to be loaded 
onto tankers; 7,720,000 tons went through Dhahran to Bahrain; and
16,768,000 tons passed through the Tapline to Sidon.^
Iran (Iranian Oil Operating Companies)
As is the case in both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, oil in Iran comes to 
the surface by natural pressure, and no pumping equipment is needed. The oil 
is moved by pipelines to plants* where gas is separated from the crude o i l .
These pipelines, commonly called flowlines, average from 6-8 inches in diameter, 
although they can vary according to the productivity of the w e ll. An 0 inch 
pipeline can cope with a production of about 40,000 barrels a day.
Pipeline installation in Iran is more expensive than in other oil« 
producing countries around the Gulf, with the possible exception of Iraq. There 
are several reasons for this, the main ones being that the majority of tho oil fields 
are situated in mountainous territory, and good access roads have to be con- 
structed. Also the pipelines have to be built up and down the mountains in these 
areas, which requires a greater length of pipe, and more complicated construct ion.
The following Table shows the situation of the fields with regard to 
their production units, and number of wells connected to each.
These are called production units in Iran, while in Saudi Arabia 
they are gas separator plants, and gathering centres in Kuwait.
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Table 6 The number and capacities of production units and number of 
wells connected to each in December 1969
Fields Production Units Capacity in 
b/d
N o . of wells 
connected
Lali 1 well-head 
separator
2,000 1
M .I.S . 1) W ell-
2) head 26,000 203) separat-
4) ors*
Naft Safid N o .l 33,000 14
Haft Kel N o .l 40.000 .
60.000 }
11No .2
Marun N o .l  
No .2
60,000
265,000
3
9*
N o .3 300,000 12
Agha Jari N o .l 310,000 12
No .2 235,000 o/
N o .3 235,000 12
No ,4 240,000 •J k *
No .5 210,000 £***
Ramshir N o .l 20,000 2
Rag-e Safid N o .l 50,000 3
Pazanan No .1 70,000 2
Gach Saran N o .l 195,000 9
No .2 220,000 8
N o .3 406,000 8
Bibi Hakim«h N o .l 230,000 10
No .2 260,009 6
Binak N o .l 50,000 1
Kharg N o .l 23,000 4
Ahwaz N o . 1 82,000 10
No .2 190,000 11
14 23 3*812,000 190
* The process here is only partial separation,
**  The figure includes one well from Karanj Field, and one well from
Faris Fie! I,
* * *  The figure includes one well from Marun Field.
Source: Data received from Consortium at M . LS „  Iran, December, 1969,
In Iran the system for channeling the oil after degassing it is not the
same as those in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, where crude is moved directly
from all the fields to the tank farms. Degassed crude oil from the
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Iranian fields is divided into two sections and moved accordingly. Oil 
from Lai 1, M .S .S ., ^a ft Safid, Haft Kel, Ahwaz, Rag-e Safid and Marun 
(from production unit N o .l only) is taken to Abadan refinery, while the out- 
put from Marun (production unit Nos. 2 & 3), Agha Jari, Ramshir, Faris,
Karanj, Pazanan, Gach Saran, Bibi Haldmeh, Binak and Kharg fields is 
moved to Kharg Island. (See Fig. 3 .) These arrangements,are however, 
flexible.
Abadan refinery received about 18.2 million tons of crude oil from 
its fields in 1964*, in 1966 the amount was 18.6 million, and in 1968 if 
rose to 20 million tons. Kharg Island received about 61.8 million tons of 
crude oil in 1964, and 79 million in 1966, while in 1968, the figure was 
108.8 million fons.^
2 . Shipping Points
Water depth in the Gulf is of very great importance, particularly in 
view of the ever Increasing size of tankers. Without deep water, the producing 
country faces great difficulty in shipping oil destined for export. An example 
of this is Iraq, the northern oil fields are located a long way from deep wafer, 
thus the produced oil has to be transported a great distance to the Mediterranean.
As a result of the geological character of the Gulf, and particularly 
because of the considerable volume of sedimentation from the Tigris-Euphrates, 
water is not very deep anywhere in the Gulf and it is particularly shallow at 
the head. Elsewhere the water is generally deeper on the eastern side than 
the western.
Depths along the shore of the Gulf vary from one area to another, and 
this is reflected in the position of the 10 fathom submarine contour line (60 feet)
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in relation to the shoreline. It is clear from Fig.4 that the 10 fathom 
submarine contour line follows the coastline fairly closely on the Iranian 
side of the Gulf, and at no time is it very far from the shore, particularly 
at Kharg where the water is very deep. In some places the contour lines 
merge. A t the fop of the Gulf the water is very shallow. There even fho 5 
fathom line lies about 11 nautical miles south of Fa 11 aka Island. However, 
off Mina al-Ahmadi in Kuwait, the 10 fathom lino is about 1 mile from fho 
shore. This situation lasts only for a few miles, though, and all down the 
rest of the coast, the coastal waters are again shallow, even at Ras Tanura in 
Saudi Arabia. Thus for ports situated in shallow water areas dredging is 
necessary to keep them operational. There is a tremendous variation in the cost 
of dredging, depending on whether it is hard or soft material on the .sea-bod.
A large portion of the Gulf, especially towards the south, is underlain by hard 
limestone, which is extremely expensive to dredge. In areas where less difficult 
material underlies the waters of the Gulf, dredging may cost as much as 72 to 
96 cents per cubic yard. The major cost appears to be in getting the equipment 
to the site, as if may have to be brought from Europe. The only way to reduce 
this expense is to time the need for the plant to co-incide with other work 
in the Gulf, thus spreading the costs of transport to the area.
There are three types of loading system in common use today. These 
are, firstly, single-buoy moorings, which represent a very elementary system 
of loading, moro commonly used by companies with small production, which 
does not justify the building of jetties. These buoys are connected to tho sea­
bed by about 8 anchor chains, and the submarine loading line is run along the 
sea-bed to a manifold, from where it is connected to rubber hoses, and then 
to the buoy. When a tanker arrives, it is positioned and then anchored. The
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hose is next picked up by a crane on the tanker, and is connected to the 
ship's manifold, at which juncture a valve is opened, and oil commences to 
flow into the tanker. There are, however, several disadvantages to this 
system, particularly as regards maintenance of the hoses, which are made ov 
soft, flexible material, and can easily collapse or get damaged. In this event 
repairs are not easily effected, as divers with special equipment are required. 
Other disadvantages are the slow rate of loading and the fact that in rough 
weather it becomes impossible to connectand load the tankers. This system is 
farily widespread among smaller companies operating in the G ulf, but a large 
percentage of tankers are still loaded at jetties. Construction of jetties has 
progressed correspondingly with improvements in the development of tankers. 
Before a jetty can be built, several important factors have to be considered, 
among which is wafer depth, both in approaches to the jetty, and at the berths, 
it is necessary to ensure that there is sufficient wafer at each berth to enable 
vessels to remain safely afloat at the lowest tides. Lack of shelter from the 
wind, waves, swell, and currents can make loading difficult and thus reduce 
efficiency. In general, jetties are affected by winds exceeding 25 knots, and 
waves or a swell of over 5 feet in height. Jetties are more efficient and reliable 
than buoy moorings, as they minimise loading time, and several types of oil can 
be handled at one time. Additional advantages of jetties lie in considerably 
shorter pipelines, and the ease with which tankers can be berthed, even at 
night, with artificial lighting. Unfortunately, these jetties are very costly to 
construct, and if is usually necessary to provide tugs to bring tankers alongside. 
However, these costs are minimised by the benefits obtained from their efficiency 
in operation, compared with buoy moorings.
A third system is sea-islands. These are now being built in wafer about
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three times as deep as those built several years ago. The necessity for greater 
depth led to their construction at a great distance from the shore, (10 miles 
in the case of Kuwait, and 26 miles in Iraq). This, of course, means that 
usually they are more exposed to storms than earlier ones. At present, these 
are mainly used by super-tankers.
Mina al Ahmadi (Kuwait) 
i Submarine berths
Although no difficulties were encountered in bringing the produced oil 
to the coast, an obstacle was the loading of the o il . Kuwait has no inlets or 
bays with sufficient depth to enable tankers to berth. The offshore is also 
shallow for not less than a mile in the eastern parts, while it is shallow for 
several miles off the coast in the northern parts of the State. Therefore, in 
order to ship the oil produced in 1946, the company laid a submarine line from 
a point between the villages of Fahahil and Shuaibata a distance of about a mile 
from the shore. The site was named Mina al-Ahmadi (Ahmad's Port) at the end 
of 1949, after the ruler Ahmad al Jabir. In the period 1946-47, the Kuwait 
O il Company completed 5 submarine loading lines of 12" diameter. In addition, 
a hose buoy to which the submarine lines were connected, and two mooring 
buoys at which tankers could make fast, were placed in position.^
Loading by submarine lines meant that vessels were loading in the 
open sea, and consequently at any sign of bad weather the pipeline had to be 
released, and delays were a constant threat. These early loading facilities 
suffered From these severe limitations, which were not overcome until the 
South Pier was completed in 1949.
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Plate 8 - A general view of the South Pier and some of 
the storage tanks at Mina al-Ahmadi, Kuwait.
L.
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it South Pier
As exports increased the submarine lines became inadequate for 
handling the growing quantities of o il . Consequently, the Kuwait O il 
Company began surveying the sea-bed near the location of the submarine 
lines, studying the tides (7 .8 ' spring tides, and 1 *5' neap tides at Mina al 
Ahmadi), in order to find a suitable area for building a pier. In 1947, the 
company began to construct a long "T “-shaped pier, stretching into deep wafer. 
The gently sloping nature of the sea-bed in the vicinity made it necessary for 
the pier to be built one mile long to a depth of wafer ranging between 40 -49 ', 
The pier was in full operation in 1949, and at fho time was the largest of its 
kind in the world, having cost about million .The northern extension of the 
lT "  permits 6 tankers with a maximum tonnage of 100,000 dwt. to berth while 
the southern extension can accommodate only 2 ships. At the South Pier, the 
maximum loading rate is 7,000 tons per hour.®
While comparing the South Pier with those at other oil ports in the 
Gulf, such as Fao in Iraq, and Abadan in Iran, if appears that the South 
Pier is favoured by several factors. Fao and Abadan are both located on the 
Shaft al Arab river. These two ports are greatly influenced by the tide and 
silting, which necessitates regular dredging, a factor which limits the possibility 
of continuous operation, as well as the tonnage of tankers using the ports.
A t Fao, the water is 32' deep beside the four jetties, and the tidal 
rise is between C* and 10'. A 30,000 dv/t. tanker could be handled there, 
although loading would be completed on a rising tide. The loading capacity 
ranged from 3,500 to 4,000 tons per hour. Due mainly to these problems, the 
Basra Petroleum Company discontinued loading from Fao in 1967, and con- 
centrated solely on the new terminal at Khor el-Amaya
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With the completion of the new pier, the company tackled the problem 
of bringing the oil from the shore to the ships, and at the same time took out of 
service 3 of the 5 submarine loading lines, whose position close to the pier 
rendered them no longer operative. The effect of the pier on oil exports v/as to 
permit an increase between 1949 and 1951 of 120.7%.
Hi North Pier
With the increase in the size and number of tankers calling at Mina 
al Ahmadi, and further increases in production due to the discovery of new 
fields in the northern part of the country, the facilities installed could not 
handle the quantity of oil required for export. Thus further loading facilities 
were needed for the second time, and research was undertaken in 1956 in order 
to build a new pier capable of receiving the modern tankers which were shortly 
due to be in operation. The North Pier was constructed some four miles north 
of the South Pier, and was commissioned in June, 1959, at a cost of about 
# 3.8 million. The pier was built in SS'-dO' of wafer to accommodate vessels 
of 200,000 dwt. maximum, because at the time if seemed unlikely that 
there would be tankers bigger than those. The pier is "L" shaped, and stretches 
sea-wards for about one mile from the coast. If has 5 berths, with a maximum 
total loading rate of 12,000 tons per h o u r,^  The largest ship afloat in the 
mid-60‘s, the Idemitsu Maru (210,000 dwt ) v/as loaded with a cargo of 
196,977 tons of crude oil in December, 1966, establishing a new record for 
the largest single cargo loaded in Kuwait. 1^
The Kuwaiti North Pier has many advantages over the terminals used 
by Iraq. The newest Iraqi terminal, Khor Al-Amaya in the Gulf, where the 
oil from the south fields of Iraq is loaded onto tankers, is situated 15 miles
from the shore, and 26 miles from Fao. At Khor Al-Amaya, tankers of 65,000 
dwt are the largest which can be accommodated, and 2 berths only are pro­
vided. The maximum loading capacity is 7,000 tons per hour at one berth, or
4,000 tons per hour at both berths together.
O il from Iraq's north fields is exported from the Syrian ports of 
Tripoli and Banias on the Mediterranean. The largest tankers that Tripoli is 
capable of handling are 140,000 dwt. A t Banias the largest is 120,000 dwt.
The maximum loading rate at Tripoli is 6,000 tons per hour at 3 berths, while 
at Banias the figure is 7,500 tons per hour at 4 berths.
Apart from the advantages previously mentioned, it may be seen from 
the above figures that Kuwait's one terminal can deal with 55,7%  of the amount 
of oil dealt with by Iraq's 3 terminals. Also Kuwait is in a better position regard 
ing its loading and unloading facilities, with the advent of super-tankers.
With the commissioning of the North Pier, the company took cili the 
submarine lines out of service, although they are still capable of being re- 
commissioned when necessary. With the construction of the jetties an excellent 
port was created. Tankers can make the port at any time of the day or night, 
for there are no tidal delays, nor are there offshore dangers. Tides which range 
between 7.8* at spring and 1 .5 ' at neap, and tidal streams which run approxi­
mately north and south with a velocity of 2 to 1  ^ knots have no influence on 
berthing Although adequate tendering along the piers is provided to minimise 
the effect of gales and strong winds, some delays can be expected. The table 
below shows the average days lost at Mina al-Ahmadi in various years.
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Plate 9 - The tanker "Universe Ireland" (326,000 dwt), 
being loaded at the Sea Island Terminal, 
Mina al-Ahmadi, Kuwait.
i
Table 7 Average days lost at Mina al Ahmadi, (1960-69)
Year South Pier 
%age
North Pier 
%age
Sea Island
1960 9.18 9.95 -
1961 9.62 12.23 -
1962 16.79 19.32 -
1963 24.21 24.87 -
1964 17.69 17.29
1965 14.25 14.27 -
1966 15.15 14.29 -
1967 15.63 16.63 -
1968 18.51 18.66 -
1969 18,85 18.78 18.77
Source: Data received from Kuwait O il Company in Ahmadi, Kuwait,
April, 1970.
iv The Sea Island Terminal
The process of improving port facilities by extension of terminals 
even further info the Gulf seems unending. In 1959, when the North Pior 
was commissioned, it was assumed that tankers could not exceed 200,000 dwf, 
but this was disproved in September, 1968, when the first tanker in the 326,000 dwt 
class "Universe Ireland", came info service.
In order to make Kuwaiti oil more competitive in world markets, Kuwait 
O il Company conducted a study in 1966 for further expansion of the loading 
facilities, by constructing a sea island terminal. This was to be capable of 
handling mammoth tankers of 326,000 dwt and over. !n fact, Kuwait was 
suffering from its marketing situation, and this is noticed from the Company's 
daily production in 1965, when it increased by only 2,5%  over the previous 
year. The study became more urgent when Gulf Oil Corporation (holder of 50% 
of Kuwait O il Company's shares) announced its intention in June, 1966, of
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building 6 mammoth tankers, each of around 300,000 dwt, to transport crude 
oil from the Gulf to Western Europe. Always in mind, however, was the need 
to utilize facilities already in place, without rendering them any less effective, 
in particular the ability of the berths to handle smaller vessels.
In order to meet the above requirements, the Company decided 
to construct a new island-type loading terminal. The site of this sea island 
terminal is off the south and north piers and about 9 .6  miles from the shore 
where the water depth is some 95 feet. This water is connected to deeper water 
by a natural channel of similar depths. This channel is about 33 miles in length 
and leads south-eastwards to the deeper waters of the Gulf (see Fig.2 ). The 
channel is essential for the departure of fully loaded mammoth tankers. Because 
of this channel's narrowness in certain areas, it was necessary to provide a 
system of navigational aids, i .e .  21 buoys distributed on either side of the 
channel and two beacons constructed on Taylor Rock and Madera R e e f.^
The Sea Island structure comprises a loading platform with two berths, 
four breasting dolphins and six mooring dolphins, all fixed to the sea bottom 
and inter-connected by catwalks.* Each of the two berths is equipped with 
four 16" crude oil loading arms and two 12" bunkering arms. When the pumping 
system is used each berth is capable of loading at a rate of 15,000 tons per hour, 
whereas by force of gravity only 8,000 tons per hour is possible. The new 
loading facility receives the required amount of crude oil from the North and
* The main feature of the offshore terminal is a central island formed
by a jack-up barge. The legs of the platform barge were lowered 
to the sea bottom in about 95 ft of wafer. They were then 
driven into the sea bed to a depth of 70 feet and the barge was 
jacked and elevated into position. The central platform of the 
island measures 160 f t ,  by 138 ft . The structure of the terminal 
measures 1,620 f t . from end to end.
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South Tank Farms at Ahmadi via a 48" diameter pipeline, the largest sub-
marine line laid to date. Bunker fuel for tankers is transmitted to the sea island
15through a 20" diameter submarine line.
In case of emergency a "crash stop" button is used to shut down opera­
tions completely. If would close emergency valves on the crude and bunker 
lines on the platform, isolating all the arms, Alsoit would shut down pumping 
facilities on shore and start a general alarm.
The sea island and associated facilities were commissioned in September 
1968, costing 42 million do lla rs .^  Two hundred and thirty nine tankers called 
at the sea island between the date of commissioning and the end of 1969; 
also, two hundred and six tankers lifted a total of 31,485,098 tons of crude oil
in 1969. The six mammoth tankers now used on a regular schedule from Mina
17al-Ahmadi to Bantry Bay in Ireland are included in this.
One thing can be remarked about the sea island before this section is 
concluded. The Kuwaiti Sea-lsland is about 10° off line with the prevailing 
currents, and it is believed that it would have been better if if had been 
aligned 10° more to the east of north. However, to align a sea-island terminal 
with the current during construction is not easy. In the case of Kuwait, the 
terminal is about 10 miles out into the sea, where currents are not as predictable 
as near the shore. The effect of currents on berthing a tanker is important.
It is much less difficult to berth a tanker if it is heading straight into the current 
as these conditions render the ship easier to control at slow speeds. Very 
occasionally in Kuwait the current affects ships while berthing and they then
1 g
have to wait while if eases off.
The fable which follows shows clearly that although the number 
of tankers to call at Mina al-Ahmadi has decreased, the amount of oil loaded
has increased, thus illustrating the fact that tanker sizes have also increased.
Table 8 Number of ships which called at Mina al-Ahmadi and the 
amount of oil loaded in million tons. (1960-69)
Year South North Sea Total %age Amount %age
Pier Pier Island of increase loaded of increase
1960 1613 844 - 2457 - 71.5 -
1961 1716' 910 - 2626 6.87 73,0 2.09
1962 1726 . 978 - 2704 4,64 81.3 11.36
1963 1697 1018 - 2115 0,40 85.3 4.92
1964 16 67 1161 - 2828 4.16 94.4 10.55
1965 1514 1054 - 2568 -9 .1 9 96.3 2.01
1966 1604 1024 - 2628 2.33 101.7 5.60
1967 1456 942 2398 -8 .75 102.3 0.58
1968 1351 900 33 2284 -4 .75 107.5 5.08
1969 922 871 206 1999 -12.47 113.3 5.39
Source: Data received from Kuwait O il Company in Kuwait, April, 1970.
There are several differences between Kuwaiti Sea Island terminal 
and Saudi Arabia's at Ras Tanura. The first is that while there are 6 berths 
at Ras Tanura, and 6 tankers can be loaded at one time, the loading rato of 
about 8,000 tons per hour is not very high when compared with Kuwait's rate. 
Secondly, 5 of the 6 berths can accommodate tankers of up to 200,000 dwt, 
while Kuwait can fake tankers up to 500,000 dwt. Another reason for Saudi 
Arabia's inability to accommodate larger tankers is the lack of water depth in 
the approaches to the sea-island, because although the terminal itself is 
located in water about 80 f t ,  deep, the surrounding waters are shallow. To facilitate 
departure, a channel has been dredged, but there is no doubt that dredging
a channel and keeping it open is a costly business .*
* It is difficult to give exact figures for the cost of dredging, but if is
dependent upon the hardness of the sea-bed, and the whereabouts of 
the dredging equipment at the time of requirement, for example, if 
the facilities are being employed by another company in the Gulf, if ”
P l a t e  10 - An aerial view of oil storage tanks at 
Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia,
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Ras Tanura Terminal (Saudi Arabia)
As in tho case of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia did not have a suitable sea
port on the Gulf, which meant that one had to be constructed. During 1934-35
the oil company had begun to take aerial pictures of various sites, which were
evaluated. The need for a depth of water sufficient to allow deep draught
vessels to approach narrowed the choice down to two locations. One was
Ras Tanura, sited about 25 miles from Dhahran, and the other was Dhulaifain
another 26 miles further up the coast. A t the same time engineers located two
deep channels off the coast not far from Ras Tanura, leading in from the sea.
(At present these are marked with permanent beacons over a distance of 20 miles.)
Ras Tanura was selected despite a division of opinion among the Company's
engineers as to the relative merits of Ras Tanura*s potential harbour, and Dhulai-
1°fain's possible advantages as a refinery site.
The peninsula at Ras Tanura is flat, sandy, and roughly kidney shaped.
Crude tankage totalling 177,000 barrels, a 10 inch pipeline from Damman field
to the tank farm, pumps and a submarine pipeline connecting the tank farm
with vessels mooring 9,000 ft. offshore were completed in the spring of 1939,
and oil was shipped from Ras Tanura for the first time on May 1st of the 
20same year.*
-  is cheaper to hire them than if they had to be brought all the way
from Europe. Also, very few companies deal in this sort of work.
* This, however, was not the first amount of oil to be exported from
Saudi Arabia. In September, 1938, ARAMCO built a small storage 
tank and shipping terminal at al-Khobar on the Gulf, and laid a 6
inch pipeline to carry crude oil there from Dhahran, From aNKhobar
oil was movGd into barges and shipped to the refinery of the Bahrain 
Petroleum Company. Bahrain was selected to receive the oil partly 
because of its nearness to al-Khobar, and partly because the two 
Companies (Standard of California and Texaco) operating in Barhain 
owned between them 60% of the Company operating in Saudi Arabia.
In this small way, export of crude oil from Saudi Arabia started.
(ARAMCO Handbook -  O il in the Middle East, Netherlands, 1969, p. 117.)
Shortly afterwards, it became apparent to the Company that the sub­
marine loading line was unable to cope efficiently with the ever-increasing number 
of'tankers calling at the terminal. Therefore, in 1943, ARAMCO built a "T" 
shaped pier (the South Pier) on the eastern side of the peninsula. This pier is 
connected to land by a 2,300 ft . causeway, and the pier itself runs parallel 
to the shore for 1,200 ft. It is 105 ft. wide and the water depth alongside is 
32-33 ft. On completion of the initial construction, the pier had two berths and 
was capable of docking two small tankers, but this was later increased to four. 
These four berths could accommodate tankers of about 35,000 dwt. which was 
then considered to bestandard size. In the same year a pipeline was built from 
Saudi Arabia to Bahrain in order to increase export potential.^
Saudi Arabia's production increased with the discovery of new reserves 
at the end of World War I I . It rose from 21,000 barrels per day in 1944 to
164,000 in 1946, and to over 476,000 in 1949* Similarly, world demand in­
creased after tho end of the war, and Saudi Arabia found it necessary to 
construct another pier.
The second pier (the North Pier) was built § of a mile north of the 
first pier and out into the sea, so that a depth of 42-48 ft. of water could be 
made available for tankers of about 100,000 dwt. However, tanker size continued 
to increase and the facilities were again becoming inadequate, so in 1959 an 
800 ft. extension was made to the pier,giving if a total length of 2,160 ft.
The extension added another two berths to the four already in use and increased 
the total number of berths at the terminal to ten. The cost was estimated at the 
time to be 4,100,000 dollars. More improvements were made in 1964 to the 
North Pier where a southern extension added 200 ft. of berthing space to 
accommodate larger tankers. Pumps, pipelines, sforate facilities and loading
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arms were continually being added to both piers in order to shorten the time 
ships spent in port or turning round, and to serve more vessels in the same 
amount of time.^~
However, tanker sizes continued to increase greatly and soon 
reached the position where ARAMCO had to schedule the loading of certain 
tankers carefully so that completion coincided with high tide, or the wator depth 
would not have been adequate to keep the vessels afloat It became apparent 
that the North Pior would not be able to handle the even larger tankers already 
being built.
In order to solve this problem, ARAMCO employed a New York firm 
of engineering consultants to prepare a plan for the expansion of the port.
Three development proposals were suggested. One method which was considered 
was buoy berths, which are inexpensive to install but are costly to run because 
of the number needed, the length of pipeline required to connect them to the 
shore, and the amount of time lost through berthing problems in bad weather and 
darkness. This expense led to the eventual rejection of the plan. A second 
idea was the construction of finger, "T“ and *’L11 shaped,piers, but again, be­
cause of the expense, this was rejected. To reach deep water, coStly long
trestles would have been required. The last idea was to build a sea-island 
terminal with two or more berths, and this seemed to be the most practical pro­
position
Thus on February 5th, 1964, ARAMCO decided to construct a sea
island big enougli to accommodate super tankers. The new Sea Island*
* The central loading platform of the island is 80 ft. by 120 ft. with
four breasting dolphins at each of its two berths to protect it from 
mooring stresses, and two mooring dolphins at either end. At mean 
low tido the platform stands 28 f t . above the water on four 6 ft . dia­
meter sicei piles protected from corrosion and driven 10 ft. into the 
sea bed. The central platform and the 12 dolphins are interconnected by
1000 f t .  of 6 ft. wide steel walkways, making a total length of
1,250 ft. (Petroleum Times, April 15th, 1966, p .480).
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Plate 11 - A general view of Ras Tanura, showing a
section of the Sea Island, the North Pier, 
and the storage tanks.
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is positioned about one mile from the North Pier (2 miles from the shore) in 
about 85 ft. of water. Sea Island One, which was put into service in 1966, 
cost 9.15 million dollars and consists of an operating platform constructed on 
piles, at which two tankers may berth simultaneously.^ Each berth is 
equipped with three loading arms of 16 inches which deliver up to 38,500 
barrels per hour of crude to each super tanker, and two of 10 inches for the 
delivery of bunkers. Four submarine lines supply the deep water terminal.
Three 30/32 inch crude lines and one 20 inch bunker line provide facilities for 
both loading and refuelling tankers. Two pumps with a capacity of 2,875 h .p . 
each move crude oil from the shore to the lodding platform. These new 
facilities were expected to boost ARAMCO's exports from Ras Tanura by 500,000 
barrels a d a y .^
The design of this new offshore loading facility allowed for the 
building of extra pairs of offshore berths in line with its axis, for further ex­
pansion. In 1966 two jack-up barges which constituted the main platform 
of tanker berths Nos. 3 and 4 (Sea Island Two) and berths Nos. 5 and 6 (Sea 
Island Three) arrived at Ras Tanura from Athens where they were constructed.
The two new platforms are more or less identical with Sea Island One, and are
27expected to raise the export capacity by a further 1,000,000 barrels a day.
In 1967, Sea Island Two (berths 3 and 4) came into operation, at an estimated
cost of 7,000,000 dollars and in the same year the sea bed at the North and
South Piers, which was partially silted up, was dredged and restored to its
28former maximum depth. During 1968 the Company continued to expand
the facilities at Ras Tanura marine terminal by opening berth N o .5 at Sea
Island Three. Sea Island Berth N o .6 was scheduled for completion early in 
291969,
Two channels connect the Sea Islands to the deep waters of the Gulf,
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but although somo parts of these are deep, there are sections which are as 
shallow as 5 fathoms. (See Fig. 5 ). Thus, to accommodate super tankers of
200,000 and 300,000 dw t., dredging of these shallow parts was necessary.
By November 1970 the northern channel had been dredged to a depth of 69 ft.
(at low tide) for this purpose. This channel can now accommodate fully loaded 
tankers of up to 300,000 dwt., although the biggest tanker accommodated to 
date was 280,000 dwt. with a draught of 72 ft
In Kuwait there is no similar problem, for although the channel there 
is also natural, it is very deep,and consistently so without necessity for dredging. 
Ships arriving at Ras Tanura via either of the channels do not have to 
take a pilot on board. Both the north and south channel approaches are well 
marked with buoys in order to guide the vessels. If a loading berth is not im­
mediately available vessels drop anchor in the anchorage area. Pilots guide the 
tankers to available berths. Approaching ships are faced with strong and 
irregular currents in the anchorage area and in thick weather, especially
during sand storms, they are advised to anchor and ride them out, as visibility
31is often much less than desirable.
Table 9 below shows the number of ships loaded at Ras Tanura between
1964-68, while Table 10 shows the amount of crude oil shipped from Ras Tanura,
compared with the amount despatched from other outlets, again between 1964- 68. 
Table 9 Ships loaded at Ras Tanura, 1964-68
Year N o . of ships s%age 
of increase
Crude and Products 
loaded, in tons
%age 
of increase
1964 2,154 - 54,149,750
1965 2,309 10.90 69,481,736 28.31
1966 2,677 12.05 86,686,356 24.76
1967 2,694 0.64 100,946,117 16.44
1968 2,703 2.93 107,836,094 6.82
1969 2,873 121,837,892
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Table 10 Quantities of crude oil dispatched from Ras Tanura, in 
comparison with other outlets, 1964-68
Outlets Year Dispatched amount 
in tons
%age 
of increase
To Tapline 1964 21,305,000
facilities at 1965 21,951,000 2.84
Qaisumah 1966 22,976,000 4 .66
1967 16,579,000 -27.84
1968 23,527,000 41.90
1969 16,768,000 -28.72 *
To Bahrain 1964 7,518,000 -
via pipeline 1965 6,466,000 -0 .6 9
1966 6,550,000 1.29
1967 8,302,000 26.74
1968 7,415,000 -10.80
1969 7,728,000 4.22
To tankers for 1964 42,010,000 -
export at 1965 55,796,000 32.81
^as Tanura 19 66 72,934,000 30.70
1967 85,849,000 17.70
1968 88,561,000 3.15
1969 101,794,000 14.94
Source: ARAMCO, A Review of Operations, 1968 and 1969
It is seen from Table 9 that the number of ships which called at Pvas 
Tanura increased from 2,154 in 1964, to 2,677 in 1966. This illustrates the 
effect of the new Sea Island terminal on ships coming to Ras Tanura. Before 1966, 
ships calling at Ras Tanura were limited to those of low tonnage, while now ships 
of 200/000 dwt. or over can be accommodated at the port.
Table IQ shows the importance of Ras Tanura as an outlet, in comparison 
with others. If can be seen from the table that the amount of oil shipped from 
Ras Tanura was increasing steadily, while from the other outlets the amount 
fluctuated. The amount of oil shipped from Ras Tanura Increased from 42 million 
tons in 1964, to 72.9  million in 1966, and 101.7 million in 1969, while crude 
oil to Tapline facilities atQaisumah only increased from 2 1 .3 million tons in
Plate 12 - A section of one of the 30" submarine pipelines 
linking Kharg Island to the mainland, emerging 
from the sea at Kharg Island, Iran.
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1964, to 22.9  million in 1966, and decreased to 16.7 million in 1969.* The 
quantities of oil moved to Bahrain show a slight increase between 1964 and 1969, 
from 7 .5  million tons, to 7 .7  million. This clearly illustrates the fact that Ras 
Tanura has now become the main outlet for Saudi o il, and it is believed that 
improvements and development generally will be centred on Ras Tanura, rather 
than the alternative outlets.
Iranian O il Terminals: Abadan, Mah Shahr and Kharg Island 
Today, Iran ranks among the fop half dozen oil producing nations in 
the world and is the world's second largest oil exporter. To handle the huge 
volume of Iranian oil exported by the Consortium, terminals have been built 
both offshore and on, or near, the Iranian coast of the G ulf. The terminals 
are Abadan, Bandar Mah Shahr and Kharg Island. The first two were designed 
for the export of products, while the third, the largest, was designed for export 
of crude o i l . A t present only two, Mah Shahr and Kharg Island, are operational 
while use of Abadan has been suspended. The following pages deal generally 
with each terminal.
Abadan:
Abadan, with its giant refinery,has been one of the major export terminals
of the Iranian oil industry for more than half a century. From Abadan, the first
oil products from the Middle Fast were shipped to world markets. The oil was
moved 42 miles from the river Shaft al-Arab to the mouth of the G ulf. Over the
years, tankers of increasing size and speed, reflecting the rapid growth and
* The decrease was mainly due to a disruption in the flow of o il . On 
the night of May 3Gth~31st, 1969, a section of the pipeline in the 
Israeli-occupied Gulan Heights was damaged by a group of Palestinian 
commandos. This act brought the flow of 475,000 b/d to a standstill. 
Repair work began on July 17th of the same year. (MEFS Vol .X II,
N o .38, 18th July, 1969.)
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development’ of Hie oil industry, shuttled the river to Abadan, drawing oil in 
millions of tons.
Up to World War II, Abadan was the Iranian oil terminal for both
products and crude o il . During the war, because of the increase in the size of
crude oil carriers and the growth of crude oil exports from Iran, the export of
crude was diverted to Mah Shahr and Abadan was used as a product terminal.
Once again in 1964, it was decided to divert the export of products from Abadan
to Mah Shahr. Two reasons could be given for the last changes, the first being
political in that Iran was having bad relations with its neighbour Iraq, and
that the Shatt al-Arab was maintained by the Iraqi government.* The second
reason was that the river port which had served Abadan refinery well for many
years had come to face an uncertain future. A t a time of increase in tanker size
and speed, the narrow river upon which Abadan is located was nearing the end of
its usefulness. If could not accommodate tankers any bigger than 16,000 dwt. and
tidal conditions led to routine delays at the bar (the entrance to the Shaft a l-
Arab). Also, loading and sailing schedules had to be carefully co-ordinated
because of the varying water levels. Eventually the situation was such that the
running of the port was controlled by the moods of the river instead of being
39determined by the volume and class of traffic.
Thus Abadan had become an expensive port, open to economic pressures,
and eventually limited in the size of tankers if could accommodate. Attempts to
* Although if is customary in cases where a river is also a boundary to
divide the river equally up the deepest part, the 17th century agreement 
between Iran and Iraq was an exception to the rule. Authority over the 
Shatt al-Arab was given to Iraq, who therefore demanded dues from any 
cargo ship or tankers entering the river, and also from those berthing 
at the jetties at Abadan or Khuramshahr. In 1937, this agreement was 
altered somewhat, so that although dues still had to be paid to the Iraqi 
government on entering the river, no payment was made for berthing at 
Iranian ports.
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obtain better modern loading rates and tanker turn-round times were frustrated 
by adverse tidal conditions,
Mah Shahr:
Thei terminal was constructed during World War II on the Khor Musa, a 
tidal inlet at the head of the Gulf for the export of crude o il . Khor Musa is 
some 67 miles overland, directly to the east of Abadan. The inlet covers an 
area of approximately 520 sq. miles at low tide, if consists of a triangular 
shaped entrance 35 miles wide and 22 miles long followed by a channel, 
approximately 14 rniles long with an average width of about 1,000 ft. ending 
at the port of Mah Shahr. The Khor Musa is entered by a deep water approach 
channel 25 miles long and 0 .8  miles wide. At tho end of the approach channel 
(near buoy N o . 12) the depths are restricted, and the channel's width extends 
for a distance of G miles in the vicinity of Khor Musa Bar. (See Fig, 6 .) Then 
there is a deep wafer channel ranging in depth from 40 to 60 f t . ,  up to the 
Iranian commercial port of Shahpur, and to the oil company port of Mah Shahr. 
Despite shoals, sand banks and a low lying shoreline, the shipping channels in 
the Khor Musa are not difficult to navigate in clear weather, because they are 
well marked with buoys and beacons.33
At the time when Mah Shahr was constructed for the purpose of crude 
oil export, crude carriers were small in size -  about 30,000 dwt. The port was 
extremely efficient and could deal easily with the size of vessel which was 
common at the time. At present, after dredging, Mah Shahr can accommodate 
tankers of 50,000 dwt.
Like Abadan, Mah Shahr also presented difficulties with regard to the 
loading of crude oil because of the increase in the size of tankers and tho growth 
of the amount of crude oil exported from Iran. In 1964, the decision was taken
21 1 .
Mah Shahr
I R A NKhurramshahr
Shahnur
Abadan
I R A Q
\  *
\  Khor Musa 
'  Bar 
V B u o y  No. 
••>.12
N.30
r » \
>. **. .<
\  0  '• V \
*..{,01---------
Khor Musa 
light f loat
O Vv
. \  .
r u t  • • \  G U L t
V
V \ \ •/’
J
. • - V
Jor r >
C  > ^
l /  L  - \ iI . , r - * '
N.29
  Approach C hannel
_  Government Pi lotage
+. O i l  Company Pi lotage
20
i
40
—L_
60 
_i
M i le s
APPROACH TO M A H  SHAHR
I °_______________________ |E.49
F i g ,  6
to convert Mah Shahr into a product terminal and to divert all the crude lines 
to Kharg Island.
Mah Shahr is not a very convenient terminal, because if is on an inlet
in which the wafer depth varies considerably, and is in places very shallow, 
necessitating dredging. Also tankers have limited room to manoeuvre in the 
narrow channel and pilots have to be provided. Therefore it appears that the 
main reason for the selection of Mah Shahr as a products terminal were that in­
stallations were already in place and the operating companies did not wish to 
expend money on the construction of new facilities. Also it is not very far from 
Abadan.
Now Abadan's 32 products for export are moved by pipelines to Mah 
Shahr 67 miles away. Three 12 inch pipelines transport the refined white pro­
ducts and one 26 inch heated line transports the black oil products (fuel oIS and 
diesel o il). A t Mah Shahr, both tankage and loading facilities were improved 
upon, by the addition of 32 tanks making a total of 82, with a total capcify of 
8 million barrels, and if became possible to export 350,000 barrels per day from 
the 6 jetties. Tho above modifications cost $50.4 million and the terminal.was 
officially opened as a product terminal on December 4th, 1967.^"
The table below shows the loading facilities at Bandar Mah Shahr.
Table 11 Jetty berths data
Berth Least Water 
Depth (feet)
Maximum Capacity 
(dw t.)
Loading or 
Bunker Arms
1 44.0 35,000* 6 x 12"
1 X 10“
2 38.5 45,000 1 X 12"
1 X 10"
3 39.0 50,000 3 x 12"
1 X 10"
4 37.0 40,000 3 x 12"
1 X 10"
5 39.0 55,000* 5 x 12"
1 X 10"
6 43.5 60,000* 4 x 12"
1 X 10"
* Subject to overall length not exceeding 780 f t . ,  and the rise of the tide 
on tne Khor Musa Bar.
Source: Iranian O il Refining Company publication, Port information -  Mah Shahr 
Terminal, Tehran, December, 1968.
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Kharg Island Terminal:
i .  The first-phase development
As mentioned previously, Bandar Mah Shahr proved to be inadequate 
with regard to loading and accommodating tankers, because of the rise in world 
demand for crude oil and the increase in the size or tankers. Therefore a deep 
water port with facilities to berth the supertankers, and for rapid loading was 
required.
Thus attention turned still further south, as the water becomes deeper 
in that direction. In 1958, the Iranian O il Companies began to develop an 
oil terminal on Kharg Island, some 25 miles off the Iranian mainland. (The 
distance from the mainland is equal to the width of the English Channel at the 
Straits of Dover.) The terminal was Initially designed for the export of heavy 
crude oil from Gachsaran,* an oilfield about 100 miles east of Bandar Mah 
Shahr, high in the foothills of the Zagros mountains. Kharg island proved to 
be more convenient than Mah Shahr for the export of Gachsaran crude o il, be­
cause of its proximity to the field (about 100 miles), and its, possession of deep 
water capable of accommodating the largest tanker afloat at the time.
Kharg Terminal was linked to Gachsaran by a pipeline 100 miles long, 
of which some 75 miles of 26 -  28 inch pipe were Said over the mountains and 
plains to the coast near the little port of Ghanaveh. The line started from a 
maximum elevation of about 2,000 ft. above sea level. Then it descended to 
lower plains between the sea and the mountains and ended at Ghanaveh 
escarpment 35 ft . above sea level. The final 25 miles was made up of a 30 inch
* The field was discovered in 1936 and had a daily production capacity of
25,000 barrels. After World War II, the field was connected to Abadan 
Refinery to process the output by a 12 inch pipeline, but if was not until 
1956 that Gachsaran was selected for intensive development.
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submarine pipeline from Ghanaveh to Kharg I s l a n d . 35 On Kharg Island 
itself, a tank farm was constructed. This is located on an elevation of 
about 200 f t .  about one milo from the shore, which means loading of oil by 
force of gravity. It consisted of 12 crude oil tanks, 8 of which have a 
capacity of 140,000 barrels. In addition 3 tanks were built for products. O f 
these, 2 tanks have a combined capacity of 280,000 barrels of bunker fuel
36oil, and the remaining tank with a capacity of 59,000 barrels for diesel o i l .
Also an L-shaped jetty* was built in a water depth of between 64 and 67 ft. with
four berths (see Fig. 7 ). The jetty, which is situated on the west side of the
Island, is protected from the violence of the north westerly winds by a central
plateau of some 250 ft. The loading rate was about 10,000 tons per hour, with
°7 ~a total throughput capacity of approximately 800,900 barrels per day.0 The
38terminal was commissioned in I960, costing about^89.6 million. With the 
construction of the above facilities, Kharg Island crude oil terminal compared 
favourably with any terminal in the international oil industry.
i i .  Second-phase development
The Kharg Island Terminal has been developed and expanded over the
years since the initial construction work was commissioned in I960 . Tho develof -
ment was carried out in different stages, where new facilities were added to
enable the terminal to cope with the increasing world demand for o il .
After some years of careful study, construction on a new phase of Kharg
development was commenced towards the end of 1964, at a cost of $?2f 750f 090.
With the completion of this project in 1966, Kharg Island became one of the
largest crude oil export terminals in the world. This was due to the construction
of extensive facilities in the new phase, such as enormous submarine and overland
* The jetty, which is situated 4,000 feet from the shore, is approached by 
a rock filled causeway some 1,500 ft. long and 140 ft . wide extended 
by an approach trestle of some 2,500 ft. long and 60 ft. wide.
2 1 5 .
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pipelines. The constructions carried out were as follows:
Land lines:
Two pipeline systems now move the produced oil from Gachsaran and 
Agha Jari fields to a location close to the small port of Ghanaveh. The 
Gachsaran lines are to transport the heavy crude oil and the Agha Jari line 
for the light crude. The two fields, Gachsaran and Agha Jari are widely 
separated.
Gachsaran:
As mentioned when discussing the first phase of Kharg development, the 
first Gachsaran line was commissioned in i960, in 1965, due to increasing 
production, a second 26/30 inch land line was laid parallel to the first, doubling 
the through-put capacity from the Gachsaran field and tying in to the Gachsaran 
trunk-line system the recently discovered Bibi Hakimeh field. The overland 
portion of this line is some 75 miles long, starting at production Unit N o .2 and 
ending at Ghanavoh. About 40 miles of the line passes over mountains. The 
estimated cost of building this was / 7 , 560,0(30*^
Agha Jari:
The land line for light crude from Agha Jari to Ghanaveh was built in 
1965 at an estimated cost of $22,960,000. St is the largest crude oil delivery 
line in the world and has an initial throughput capacity of almost a million 
barrels per day without boosting. The line has a total length of 133 miles from 
Agha Jari to Kharg Island. The land portion of this is 106 miles long and 42 
inches in diameter. The choice of 42 inches was due to the huge off-take from 
Agha Jari and tho rising output from the adjacent fields. Starting at Ummideyeh, 
the line collects oil from Agha Jari, Karanj, Paris, Pazanan and Marun (production
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Units Nos. 2 and 3) fields. It took about 5 months to build the line, 
from mid-July 1965 to November of the same y e a r .^  The line started at 
an elevation of 100 ft. above mean sea level, then crossed River Zeydun 
after 28 miles. The line reached its maximum elevation of 810 ft . at 52 .8 miles 
(almost in the centre), from where if descended to the lower levels of the main­
land and terminated at Ghanaveh.
When filled, the line contains approximately 957,000 barrels of oil 
taking a little loss than one day to travel the length of the land line, moving 
at the rate of about 4 .5  miles per hour.
The initial push given to the oil flow is from the production Units at 
Agha Jari from which eight pipelines tie -in . Tho tie-ins include'three 12 inch 
lines from production Unit N o .1 , a 16 inch and a 12 inch line from Unit N o .2, 
a 20 inch and a 16 inch from Unit N o .3, and 20 inch from Unit N o .4 . ^
Submarine lines:
Altogether four 30 inch submarine lines have been laid between Ghanaveh 
and Kharg Island. The maximum depth to the sea floor between the island and 
the mainland is 150 ft. The first was laid in the winter of 1959-60. Since then, 
three additional submarine lines have been laid. The second was laid In 1964, 
the third and fourth were laid in the summer of 1965, parallel and to the west of 
the first two.
The construction cost of the second, third and fourth lines was estimated 
at /14„560,0G0?2
Tank farms:
With the construction of the above pipelines to Kharg, the storage 
capacity on Kharg became inadequate to store the amount of oil moved there. 
Thus construction of new tanks was inevitable. Since the products storage 
capacity was too small to meet the enlarged requirement of Kharg, it was
218
Plate 13 - A section of the jetty and the four 30" diameter 
loading lines at Kharg Island, Tran.
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decided to transfer 4 tanks of 140,000 barrels used for the existing crude oil, 
over to products. This diversion added some 560,000 barrels to the products 
storage capacity and almost tripled it .  With regard to crude o il, 11 tanks 
of 500,000 barrels were added to the remaining 8 tanks (total capacity
2,176,000 barrels) making a total capacity of 7,676,000 barrels. The cost 
of constructing the new tanks was estimated at ^ m illio n .
Apart from the above changes, the submarine lines coming from the 
mainland were also extended to the Flow Control Station, using a 30 inch pipe. 
From this point a new 48 inch buried line was added to the existing 38 inch line 
to the tank farm. From the tank farm 4 x 58 inch loading lines were added to 
the existing 2 x 36 inch lines to increase the loading capacity.
With these accomplished, two different types of crude o il, the 
light crude from Agha Jari and the heavier from Gachsaran were routed directly 
from the mainland fields under the sea to the appropriate tanks and dispatched 
without mixing from the tanks to loading facilities by gravity f lo w /^
The jetty:
The expansions were not confined only to the construction of pipelines 
and tanks, but also covered the loading facilities. The four berth L-shaped 
jetty was expanded to a ten berth T-shaped jetty with a frontage of 6,000 ft.
This was accomplished by addition of 1,200 ft. to the south of the “L" and 
2,800 ft . to the north. Apart from the above extensions, the approach trestle 
was widened from 60 to 87 ft. to accommodate additional loading lines. In 
extending the jetty and widening the trestle, some 25,000 tons of structural 
steel were required. The construction work of the jetty was completed by about 
mid-1966, and the estimated cost was $40 .6  million. At present, the jetty with 
its 10 berths is able to load 5 tankers of 100,000 dwt. and over, plus 2 in the
2 2 0 .
Plate 1h - Two of the five, one million barrel storage tanks 
at Kharg Island, Iran.
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65.000 dwt. rcmgo and 3 in the range between 35,000 and 45,000 dwt A"'
These major improvements led to time saving when loading, increased
capacity and flexibi lity  in delivering either light or heavy crude o il. With 
these achievements, Kharg crude oil terminal possessed a leading position in 
the oil trade.
i i i .  Third-phase development
One of the results of the closure of the Suez Canal was the increased 
size of tankers which in turn necessitated the modification and enlargement 
of crude handling facilities, in 1968, the planning for Kharg third phase 
development was commenced. In this phase, the storage capacity was enlarged 
by the addition of 3 x 1,000,000 barrel tanks and one of 500,000 barrels. The 
3 x 1,000,000 barrel tanks are the largest storage tanks ever built in tho world.
By May 1971, the number of these tanks had risen to 5, in order to be ablo to 
supply oil to the sea-island terminal at Kharg which is at present under con­
struction.* Another reason behind building such tanks appears to be that if is 
more economical for a big oil company with a large output to construct a storage 
tank of one million barrels than to build 4 x 25,000 barrels or 2 x 500,000 barrels. 
A one million barrel tank costs about $1.1 million as against $750,000 for one of
500.000 barrels.
Also the plar. included some modification in the loading systems. As a 
result, the terminal at present is capable of handling oil at a maximum rate 
of 60,000 tons per hour. In order to cope with tankers in the range of 200,000 
dwt, and 250,000 dwt., the tendering systems at berths Nos. 1, 3 and 5 were 
strengthened and the area at these berths as well as their approaches has been
dredged to a depth of 70 ft. The cost of dredging was estimated a t$720,000.
* The base of a one million barrel tank covers an area of 488 feet square 
at a height of 249 feet above sea level. The diameter is 375 feet, and 
the height of the walls is 56 feet. After the foundations are laid, the 
area is covored with steel platesi inch thick, while the walls are con­
structed of plates 8 feet wide and 1 .5 to 0.375 inches thick.
(the dredge area was small and the sea-bed was soft.)
tv. Fourth-phase development
The Sea Island terminal:
Kharg terminal was built in 1950, and it was not built with 200,000 
tonners in mind, as they had not been thought of at that time. The biggest 
tankers then were about 60,000 dwt. and tankers of 100,000 dwt. had been 
planned. With the advent of 200,000 tonners, 3 berths'at the terminal were 
dredged to accommodate them. In 196B, the Iranian oil companies realised 
that in a year or two they would be unable to accommodate the tankers which 
were being planned, and obviously, if the demand is to take oil out in bigger 
tankers, it has to be met as long as if is practical and reasonably economical. 
Occasionally, bigger facilities are required because ships have got bigger 
before the production actually demands more facilities, but more frequently 
the two requirements come together. The present installation at Kharg is in 
the second category, it is running to capacity, and the demand for oil is 
going up 8 -  9% per year.
Q uite obviously, if a lot of money is going to be invested in a now 
terminal, as at Kharg, provision must be made for future developments, especial I 
for increasing sizes of tankers. Thus a basic requirement was that the new 
facility should be built in 100 feet of water, as the exact draught of the very 
big tankers cannot be guessed a t. A 500,000 former could have anything 
from 801 -  95’ draught, and there is the possibility that an even bigger ship 
might be built. Another point to be considered while selecting a site is tho 
fact that the deeper info the sea it is, the more expensive it gets, as longer 
pipelines are needed,and the pressure drop is greater. Thus, under force 
of gravity, the flow rates reduce the further out the pipelines have to go.
Also, the structure itself becomes more costly, as longer piles are needed. In \
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fact it was originally planned to construct the island further out, but the 
cost became prohibitive, and the increased flexibility was not worth the 
extra money. The site which was finally decided upon is on the exposed 
western side of Kharg Island. The prevailing winds come from the north-west, 
and from that point of view if is not the ideal site, as there will be a lot of weather 
interference. Unfortunately, the other, more sheltered side of the island has 
shallower water, and the only places with the required depth of wafer between 
Kharg and the mainland are some 3 - 4  miles from the island. Building there 
would again incur extra expense through longer pipelines, and pressure loss would 
be so great that pumping would be necessary. Thus the extra cost is so much more 
that it does not justify doing if. It is cheaper to build on the exposed side, 
close to the island, and accept the fact that in some weather conditions if will 
be unusable.
The pipelines to serve the new terminal will be gravity loading, at a rate 
of about 30,000 tons per hour. There will be 2 crude loading lines, one each
for light and heavy o il, and one bunker line. Tho crude lines from the tanks
\
to the shore will bo 78" in diameter, and from the shore to the terminal they 
will be 56". These pipelines will be the largest in the world when they aro 
completed. The bunker line will be 20" in diameter. When these pipelines
were being planned, future expansion was taken into consideration,
48which accounts for their vast sizes.
Also, the new Kharg terminal will be only about 4,500 ft . from tho 
shore, and if is therefore economical to install bigger pipelines, and provide 
a better loading rate than anywhere else. For instance, in Kuwait, with very 
high horsepower pumps and a 48" pipeline, a pumping rate of 15,000 tons per 
hour can be achieved along the 10 mile line, but although if would now be
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economical to increase this rate,it would mean building another pipeline, 
which is very expensive.
O f course Iran has learned from watching the operation of Kuwait's 
terminal, and in the design much emphasis has been placed on possible future 
expansion. It will be possible to install pumps ashore, and increase the flow 
rate to 60,000 tons per hour, without altering tho pipeline system. This Is 
in anticipation of tankers of 700,000 tons in perhaps 5 or 6 years time. These 
would be able to load at about 40/000 tons per hour, leaving the other 20,000 
tons for loading smaller ships.
The estimated cost of the terminal is X38,009,000, and if is programmed
A O
for completion in 1972.
The length of the new sea-island will be 1,000 feet, and it will have 
two berths capable of handling tankers of 500,000 dwt. If it is loading to 
capacity ,i.e . a tanker of 300,000 tons on one side, and another of 500,000 
tons on the other side,between them the two tankers will be taking on moro oil 
than any single oilfield in the country can produce in 24 hours at present rates 
of production. Thus, when the new super-tankers have been built and arc* in use, 
the new sea-island will double the export capacity of the Kharg Island Marine 
Terminal.
In discussing the main terminals of the Gulf with regard to their geo­
graphical inhibitions on flexibility for future expansions, they have beon 
arranged in ascending order of merit as follows:-
1. Iraq:
Iraq has a very short coastline on the Gulf, and the approaches to this 
at any point are shallow, thus limiting chances for expansion. Iraq established 
Fao as an oil terminal on the Shatt al-Arab, but this soon proved to be unable
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to accommodate tho larger tankers, and these wore Further increasing in 
size. In order to increase exports, in 1962, the Iraqis built the Gulf's first 
Sea Island terminal (Khor Al-Amaya) about 20 milos from the shore. This 
terminal is situated towards the south-east of the mouth of the Shatt a I “Arab,
26 miles from Fao, and is further out into the Guif than the others. While the 
Iraqis went as far as possible into the Gulf to build their terminal, they did 
not overcome all the problems of loading, as the biggest tanker that can approach 
the terminal is under 100,000 dw t., and with increases in tanker sizes today, 
this is not adequate to compete with other countries. Also the distance from 
the shore has created another problem, as the levels of the tides change, and the 
current tends to go round in a circle. If a tanker encountered such a current 
while berthing, it would be liable to strike the terminal with a heavy impact. 
Therefore at certain conditions of tide and current, it is not possible to berth.
Another disadvantage of Khor Ai-Amayaas a terminal is political. In 
June, 1969, N IO C  produced a map (TR 3637) which locates the terminal in 
Area 1 of District 1 of the Iranian Continental Sholf (see Fig. 8) .  A verbal 
agreement between Kuwait and Iran (see Chapter One -  Offshore Boundaries) 
regarding the division of the offshore boundary was opposed by Iraq, probably 
because Iraq was hoping for about 3 times the area which was left to her, and 
also from fear of losing Khor Ai-Amaya, and being without a deep water terminal.
2 , Saudi Arabia:
Saudi Arabia was able to improve on Ras Tanura by building three new 
sea-island terminals, where it is now possible to accommodate super-tankers.
To enable this kind of vessel to approach the terminal, the approach channel 
had to be dredged and this was a costly business.
2 2 6 .
Fig. 8
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3 . Kuwait:
Kuwait improved upon its loading system by building its sea-island 
about 10 miles from the shore where it was lucky to find a naturally deep 
channel leading to the deep waters of the G ulf. Here in contrast to Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait went further into the sea to avoid having to dredge. If 
Kuwait had built its terminal closer to the shore dredging would have been 
necessary.
4 . Iran:
Iran is the most fortunate country in the Gulf with regard to the 
expansion of terminals, because the deepest part of the Gulf is to the east. 
Although moving terminals is a costly job, Iran was able to move its terminals 
from Abadan, when it became unsuitable for loading crude o il, to Mah Shahr 
and then to Kharg. Other countries in the Gulf cannot do this because of the 
lack of wafer depth. The on iy thing they can do is to go further into the sea 
in order to reach deep water. The future Iranian sea-island at Kharg finds 
water about 105 ft. deep only 4,500 ft. from the shore which is better than 
both Iraq and Kuwait, as it is less far out to sea and therefore less expensive 
to construct.
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CHAPTER V
GEOGRAPHY OF TRANSPORT
When oil production was in small quantities, it was stored and 
transported in cans and barrels. The rapid expansion of oil production involved 
the invention o f new, more efficient, speedy, and economical methods. Tankers, 
large storage tanks, pipelines, rail tanks, and motor tankers were developed 
for carrying and storing crude oil and refined products.
When a country participates in both production and consumption, the 
location of the refining facilities depends on local conditions. They may be 
constructed near the oilfield, with products being transported to where they 
are needed, or they may be built near the consuming centre, in which caso the 
main transport movement is of crude o il . Apart from North America and the 
U.S.S.R there are no important areas where production matches consumption. 
Thus it becomes necessary to move the produced oil from one area to another.
The movement of oil from the oilfields to the ultimate consumer is complex.
The simplest chain consists of three links -  oilfield to loading port, sea transport 
to seaboard refining, and delivery of products by road to the consumers.
1. Tankers
Development
During the 1920‘s, oil production which exceeded local demand was 
developed in Central America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and the Far 
East (mainly in the Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia). The surplus was needed 
to supply other parts of the world, particularly Western Europe. Owing to the 
limited quantities of oil involved in transportation, the size of tankers was 
small (about 10,000 tons dead-weight -  dw t.). During the Second World War
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tanker size slowiy grew, and reached over 16,000 tons dwt.
In the years immediately after the War, demand for oil rose
rapidly, mainly clue to the damage done to coal mines which until then
had been the main source of fuel, The total world demand for energy between
1
1938 and 1947 increased by 26%, and this increase was met by o il . The
increased demand had a great effect on tanker tonnage. In 1948, the first of
many 30,000 fonncrs was built, and in late 1954 the first vessel of a little
over 50,000 tons was ordered. A t that time these vessels were referred to as
"giant tankers". Less than two years later, the first of a series of 80,000 tonners
was launched, followed towards the end of 1950 by the first of the 100,000
tonners. There was then a pause until the first half of 1962, when a ship of
about 130,000 clwt. was launched by a Japanese oil company. In 1966, tonnage
2rxsse* to  A o ^ o o o d w t. ,  and in 1968 it reached 300,000 tons. However,
there would be no technical problems in building tankers of 500,000 tons dwt. or 
3
even of one million.
St may bo noted from Ftg.l that the world’s total tanker tonnage was 
increasing steadily between 1945 and 1956, during which time it increased from 
24 to 44.5  million tons. The period 1964-68 showed a sharp increase from 81 to 
134 million tons. This enormous growth was related to technological advances in 
the design of vessels, the emergence of new oil companies into the business, and 
the two closures of the Suez Canal, which resulted in small tankers becoming 
very costly to operate. (The route was changed to go via the Cape of Good Hope.)
In the first half of 1970, new tanker deliveries amounted to about 
8.5 million tons. This represents an increase of 1 .5 million tons over the 
corresponding period of the previous year, but is below the record amount 
delivered during the second half of 1969.
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Although orders for the 200/000 dwt. class have already been 
outnumbered by those for larger ships, there will be only 10 European ports 
able to accommodate ships of 200,000 dwt. fully laden. In 1969, 131 vessels 
of 200-250,000 dwt. were on order, and this decreased to 111! at the end ov 
June 1970. However, over the same period, the number of 250 -  300,000 dwf. 
tankers on order went up from 56 to 95, and the number of 300,000 dwf. and 
over rose from 5 to 9 . The following tables show tanker sizes, and tankers 
scheduled for delivery in the future.
Table 1 Summary of Tanker Sizes (end June, 1970)
Size Group dwf. Existing Fleet* Vessels on OrderN o. '000 dv/f. N o . ‘000 dwf.
10,000 49,000 2,182 55,023 135 3,448
5 0 ,0 0 0 - 99,000 644 44,736 21 1,676
100 ,000 - 149,000 102 11,792 29 3,702
150 ,000- 199,000 31 5,501 9 1,589
200,000 -  249,000 82 17,509 111 24,632
250,000 -  299,000 2 507 95 24,855
300,000 and over 6 1,960 9 3,121
3,049 137,823 409 63,022
O il companies and independent owners only. Government-owned 
tankers account for a further 128 vessels totalling 2 .4  million dwt, 
and eight miscellaneous vessels for 0.1 million dwt.
Table 2 Scheduleddeliveries of new buildings (end June, 1970)
Tankers Combined Carriers
W o. 'OOOdwt. No" -O00 dwt.
2nd half 1970 94 13,136 16 1,875
1971 156 21,614 43 5,926
1972 87 13,137 40 5,779
1973 57 11,477 18 3,122
1974 13 3,145
1975 2 513
409 63,022 117 16,702
A t present, the largest ship under construction is a 477,000 dwt. class 
tanker, which is over 100,000 tons bigger than the previous record holder at
372,000 dwt. The following table sets out the dimensions for this 477,000 
tonner compared with some smaller giants.
Table 3 Tanker dimensions
*
477,000 372,400 326,600 210,000
dwt. dwf. dwt. dwf.
Overall length 1,243 ft. 1,133 ft. 1,133 ft. 1,065 ft.
Breadth 203 ft. 177 ft. 175 ft. 155 ft.
Draught 92 ft. 89 ft. 81 ft. 62 ft.
As the world tanker fleet is so vast, the flags under which it operates
are many and varied. Liberia leads the world in terms of tanker registrations, 
and now almosti of the world's tanker fleet trades under its flag. In second 
place is Britain, whose tonnage has increased greatly since the end of 1969. 
Close behind are Norway, Japan, and the U .S .A . Two-thirds of the world's 
tanker tonnage are accounted for by these five countries. Another country of 
importance is Greece, whose registrations have more than doubled between 
1969 and 1970, and although Greek tankers fly various flags, the total tonnage 
controlled by Gteece is 23*6 million tons, or 17S9 of the world fleet.
Table 4 Tanker Fleet Registrations*
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December 1969 
'000 dwf. % of total
June 
'000 dwf.
1970
% of total
Liberia 30,784 23 43,461 25
U .K . 10,690 14 20,402 14.5
Norway 15,607 12 15,296 11
Japan 13,304 10 13,554 10
U .S .A . 8,901 7 9,213 7
Greece 5,744 4 6,528 5
France 5,087 4 5,549 4
Panama 5,210 4 5,424 4
U .S .S .R . 3,671 3 4,118 3
Italy 3,927 3 3,995 3
Netherlands 2,591 2 3,064 2
Sweden 3,120 2 2,489 2
Denmark 2,251 2 2,369 2
West Germany 2,531 2 2,307 2
Spain 1,996 1.5 2,099 1.5
Fin land 806 0 .6 1,017 0.8
Other 7,917 6 8,348 3
Total 132,137 100 140,323 100
* 10,000 dwf. and over, including government-owned and miscellaneous
tonnage,
The source of the last four tables is Petroleum Press Service, October, 1970, 
pp.363-364.
The prevailing tendency in building tankers is to construct them 
with a capacity of not less than 100,000 tons. The motives behind con­
structing very large carriers are set out simply in the following.
Increased demand for oil:
It is believed that the European demand for oil will rise at a rcttp of 
5about 8.5% per annum. Various assumptions indicate that the expansion in
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the number and size of the European refineries would lead to increased 
import of crude o il . If is expected to rise from 367 million tons in 1966 
to 511 million tons in 1970, and to 679 million in 1975. This would result 
in an increase in Middle Eastern and North African oil exports. Middle 
East exports, whether from the Gulf or the Eastern Mediterranean, are 
expected to rise by 68% between 1966 and 1975, while the figure for the 
same period in North Africa is 155%.^
The economic side of building large tankers?
As far as building a tanker is concerned, the cost of construction is
not directly proportional to its size. The building cost per ton of the largo tankers
is attractive. A 200,000 tonner costs approximately $70 per ton, while a 100,000
tonner costs $92.4  per ton. For example, a tanker with 57,000 tons capacity
would cost about $7  million, while the cost of building a tanker with 100,000
tons capacity would not exceed $14,700,000, i .e .  for a ship three times as
large, the cost is little  more than double. Also, shipyards provide subsidies
for builders by charging them only 20% of the total cost in cash before the
delivery of the vessel. The remaining 80% can be paid over 8 years at a current
interest rate of 5.5  or 6% In 1965, the European Economic Community
followed this example in its shipyards in order to enable it to meet Japanese 
9competition.
In spito of rapidly rising costs of construction, tanker prices do not 
seem to be increasing greatly. A 200,000 dwf. tanker ordered today for 
delivery in 1973-74 could cost a basic of $100 per ton.
Cost of operation:
Apart from costing comparatively less to construct, reduction in 
operating costs is another of the main arguments in favour of large tankers.
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Running expenses do not rise in proportion to increase in size. Automation 
and technical advances in the engine room, and in loading/unloading have 
led to savings in the manning of very large tankers. For example, a carrier 
of 300,000 dwf. may require a total crew of 52 officers and men. A 75,000 dwf. 
tanker worked on the traditional methods may have as many as 56 crew members.^
Comparative cost of transporting oil by super-tankers 
For the purpose of making a comparison between the different sizes of 
tankers and their costs, calculations made by M r. W . Ashford, a London ship- 
broker, who based his cost figures on the tanker market situation before the 
closure of the Suez Canal and the devaluation of the £ sterling, were relied 
upon. To make the calculations, tankers of 80,000, 100,000, 200,000 and
300,000 dwf. v/ere chosen. A vessel as small as 80,000 dwt. was included 
in order to be able to make a comparison of costs on the all-important G u lf/
North Europe route in both directions, via the Suez Canal. The calculations 
concerning the larger tankers were based on journeys either loaded via the 
Cape of Good Hope and returning ballast via the Suez Canal, or in both directions 
via the Cape. It was also attempted to estimate freighting costs for the 500,000 
dwt. vessels. <
The first route taken was Mina al Ahrnadi/Vokkaichi in Japan, one 
on which a straight comparison can be made for vessels of greatest beam without 
any artificial influence such as those which arise when the Suez Canal becomes 
the limiting factor.
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Table 5 Cost of transport between Mina ai-Ahmadi and
Yokkaichi In Japan
Tanker dwf. Cost
ft
per ton 
cents
100,000 2 34
200,000 1 54
300,000 1 37
500,000 *■* 98
Source: Petroleum Press Service, A/by, 1967, p. 108.
The above figures demonstrate that although transport costs decrease 
rapidly to 200,000 tons (a difference of 74 cents) the rate of decrease diminishes 
as tanker size increases above that size of tonnage (a difference of 49 cents 
between the 200,000 and 500,000 tonners).
Between the Gulf and Western Europe, the all-important route on 
which the Suez Canal has so much influence, the calculations have been based 
on Mina al-Ahmadi/kotterdam in Holland. The first five figures in Table 6 
are based upon what may be described as the present normal or anticipated 
routing, via the Suez Canal both ways for 80,000 tonners, or via the Cape 
loaded and the Canal ballast for the 100,000 and 200,000 tonners, and via the 
Cape both ways for the 300,000 and 500,000 tonners. In addition, the 100,000 
and 200,000 tonners have been calculated proceeding both ways via the Canal 
to show the difference it would make if the plans for deepening the Canal 
were carried out. (See Suez Canal.)
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Table 6 Comparative costs of transporting crude oil from Mina al-Ahmadi 
to Rotterdam by various sizes of tankers and routes
Tanker
dwf. Routes
Cost per ton 
cents
80,000 Suez Canal both ways 3 83
100,000 Cape loaded -  Suez ballast 3 50
200,000 >i ii ii M 2 53
200,000 Cape both ways 2 70
300,000 H it ii 2 33
500,000 ii ii ii 1 85
100,000 Suez Canal both ways 3 39
200, 000* n ii it ii 2 82
* Assuming the Canal is deepened to take vessels up to 200,000 dwt. 
Source: Petroleum Press Service, May 1967, p.lOC.
It can be seen from the table that the first five figures show a pro-
gressive reduction in the cost per ton. It also appears that using the 100,000
tonner via Suez both ways is slightly more economical than via the Capo
loaded and Suez ballast. The reverse is true in the case of a 200,000 tonner.
The reason is clearly the enormous figure for the Canal dues on the basis of
current charges. (The Suez Authority charges about 88 cents per ton of crude
o il.) This leads to the conclusion that there will need to be a major adjustment
in the charges, to make the Canal route more attractive for large tankers.
In 1965, the Gulf O il Corporation announced its intention of building
six tankers of over 300,000 dwt.* to transport the crude oil from Kuwait via the
11Cape to Western Europe. The primary factor in deciding Gulf to place orders 
for such giant, tankers lay in the belief that the company could only compote 
with other companies if it was able to reduce the cost of transport. Reduction
* The deadweight capacity ranging between 312,000 and 326,000 dwf. 
The latter is mentioned by Kuwatit O il Co.
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in the cost of transport could only be achieved by building larger tankers.
On October 29th, 1968, the first of these giants -  Universe Ireland ™
made her maiden voyage from Kuwait to Gulf's now trans-shipment terminal at
Bantry Bay in Southern Ireland.* Two days lator, Universe Kuwait followed her
sister ship to the same terminal .* *  These two vessols are the largest to elate, each
having a carrying capacity of 2,250,000 barrels. This amount is enough to run a
12refinery of 60,000 barrels per day for more than a month. The cost of building
each tanker was estimated at about $23.38 million, ^  If is believed that oven 
with the capital investment in the Bantry Bay terminal and the additional cost 
of trans-shipment, these tankers would enable Gulf to transport oil around the 
Cape economically To illustrate the cost of transport from Mina al-Ahmadi 
to Bantry Bay via the Cape both ways, using the largest tankers, and then in 
smaller tankers to [lotterdam, the estimates are given in the following table.
Table 7 The breakdown of the cost of transporting oil from Mina
ai-Ahmadi to Bantry Boy, and then to Rotterdam, in 
tankers of varying sizes
Tanker
dwf.
Cost
X
per ton
cents
Mina al-Ahmadi/Bantry Bay
300,000 2 21
500,000 1 75
Bantry Bay/Rotterdam
80,000 - 52
100,000 - 57
Storage and trans-shipment to Bantry Bay - 35
Mina al-Ahmadi/Uotterdam 
via Bantry Bay
300,000 + 00,000 3 09
300,000 + 100,000 3 04
500,000 + 00,000 2 62
500,000+ 100,000 2 57
Source: Petroleum Press Service, May, 1967, p .108, and December, i960, p .451.
* See the receiving points.
* *  Both vessels were built in Japan: the Universe Ireland at Ishikawajjima
Harima's Yokohama yard, and the Universe Kuwait at the Nagasaki yard 
of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The two shipyards are also sharing equally 
in the building of the other four vessels. Each vessel has a length of 
1,135 feet, and needs a water depth of 79 feet.
Comparing the above figures with those in Table 6, it may be seen 
that the above costs are lower than those incurred when shipping direct from 
Mina al-Ahmadi to Rotterdam in 100,000 tonners, and more costly than doing 
so in 200,000 tonners. This means that advantages can be obtained only where 
ports are unable to handle ships larger than 100,000 tons.
However, companies have differing opinions on the cost of trans­
porting oil from the Gulf to Rotterdam. To give an example, Esso, which has 
14 vessels of around 250,000 dwt. under construction, estimated the costs per
ton at about$2.95 or 24/6d . Shell puts the rate for a 200,000 tonner using
15the cape both ways at approximately $3 .36 .
It would appear that Gulf O il Corporation is making substantial profits 
from using the mammoth tankers (326,000 dwf.) and the Bantry Bay trans-shipment 
terminal. This may be noted from the words of Mr. P.B. Binstead, President of 
Gulf O il Transportation. He said, "Although, clearly, it will be some time 
before we are able to chronicle the precise economics, we certainly are 
confident that cost per barrel of bringing oil from Kuwait by the mammoth tankers 
is roughly one half as much as Gulf's cost of moving the oil through the Sues 
Canal in the largest vessels that could transit the Canal prior to its closure,
The economics of using the big ships are attractive, and it is true that 
operating costs in general decrease as tankers increase in size. But at tho same 
time Bley bring with them some disadvantages which are summed up in tho 
following points.
1. The limitation of the water depth at the loading and unloading points,
as well as en route. Greater draught might necessitate longer shipping routes 
and trans-shipment, which immediately raises tho question of the cost of 
secondary distribution.
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2 . Sufficient' facilitlos at terminals: the larger the tonnage delivered
in one ship the larger the storage fan!<s must be, tho greater the capacity of
17
the pipelines, and the larger and stronger the piers.
3. Lack of repair facilities along the route to Europe. There are plans for
large new dry docks in South Africa and Iran, but so far there is no confirmation 
that these will bo able to handle a tanker of over 300,000 tons.
4 . The concern about the large amount of crude oil at risk in a giant
1 O
tanker such as a 500,000 tonner if it failed to arrive for any reason. u
5 . Although reductions are obtained in the cost of transportation by
employing largo tankers, the insurance rates havo moved rapidly in the 
opposite direction. Insurance for the big tankers has proved to be proportionately 
dearer than for the smaller ones, and the annual premiums are anything from 
three to four times as much as those of a few years ago. To illustrate this, a 
tanker of 200,000 tons, valued at $2Q mill ion, would have cost less than 
$500,000 a year to insure at the end of 1969, and by the middle of 1970 if 
could costas much as $700,000 (about 3?% of the insured value), and the owner 
is liable for the first $25,000 of any c la im .^
2 , Receiving Points
A major problem of employing large tankers concerns the facilities 
at ports and terminals where they load or discharge the o il . In the wholo of 
Western Europe fhore is only one port which can accommodate tankers of over
300,000 tons, and a very few which are capable of taking vessels in tho 200,000 
to 250,000 dwf. class without difficulty. Therefore deeper terminals is 
not the only problem, another is lack of land and storage facilities sufficient 
to take the cargo of giant tankers. Thus the development of ports suitable 
for these tankers is extremely costly.
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The need for improvementof port facilities is greatest near the 
vast refining centres of Western Europe and Japan, in 1969, Europe and 
Japan received more than % of all crude oil shipped from the G ulf.
The pressure for urgent development was urged by the amount of
money lost by tho inability of the mammoth tankers to operate to their maximum
efficiency. From a study carried out on tanker voyages from the Gulf to
Western Europe, it is revealed that of 107 voyages, only 31% were made on
the basis of one loading port and one discharge port, and 23% on the basis of
two loading ports and discharge ports (or one port after a ship-to-ship transfer).
The average voyage time was 5 days longer in the latter case than that spent
on one-to-one port movements. According to the study, if all of these
voyages were performed on the one-to-one port basis, the total time saved would
have been some 250 days. The cost of these extra days would have been $62,440
•  20per day, which amounts to a total of about $ 16424. foil lion.
The serious limitation in employing the super-tankers to their maximum 
efficiency appears to be water depth. A fully loaded 100,000 dwt. tanker needs 
about 47 ft. of wafer. This rises to an average of 55 ft. for 150,000 dwf.,
61 ft. for 200,000 dw t., 66 ft. for 250,000 dwf., 73 ft. for 300,000 dw t., and 
about 90 ft. for 367,000 dwt. Apart from this, a further 10-20% of the 
ship's draught must be added to provide safe navigation at all times.
In order to utilise the capacity of a mammoth tanker on its voyage 
from the Gulf to Europe, the oil companies have two alternative methods, i .e .  
trans-shipment or partial unloading. The Bantry Bay terminal which was built 
especially to receive G ulf’s 326,000 dwt. tankers is an example of the first 
method. Gulf transport oil from Kuwait to Bantry Bay, from where it is re­
distributed to other ports in smaller tankers. (At present, Bantry Bay is tho only
terminal which is not linked directly to a major refining centre). Partial
unloading permits the giant tankers to use ports of limited water depth. For
example, a fully loaded tanker of 210,000 dwf. with a maximum draught of
63 ft. needs a wafer depth of 54 ft. if its cargo is lightened to 175,000 tons
and 52 ft. for 170,000 tons. Similarly a 253,000 dwf. vessel when fully loaded
has a draught of 66 f t . ,  but will draw only 57 ft. of water when carrying 210,000
tons of crude o il. Shell pioneered the use of lightening operations. However,
it is simpler for a mammoth to offload partially at a deep-water terminal and then
21proceed to a secondary port with the remainder of its cargo. Although this 
can be done safoly with no leakage of o il, there cire disadvantages, tho greatest 
being the necessity of timing tanker meetings at sea under appropriate weather 
conditions, which is comparatively difficult against the straightforward docking 
of a crude carrier in port. However, the economic advantages of using mammoth 
tankers are obviously limited by these systems, and can only be regarded as 
temporary measures while the gap between tanker and terminal sizes is boing 
closed.
With regard to this problem, nearly every port in Europe is in tho 
throes of providing or planning harbour work to give access to the big tankers.
In some cases, all that is required are bigger, stronger berths, increased 
storage and handling facilities on shore, and possibly the dredging of a short 
approach channel for the mammoths. This is only where there is a natural 
deep-water harbour, however, and in the absence of this, there are two 
alternatives. One is dredging, which is expensive and impermanent, and the 
other is to construct an offshore mooring point, linked to the coast by a 
submarine pipeline. The latter is often a more attractive proposition. The 
table below shows European ports with regard to mammoth tankers, and the 
year each became capable of receiving such vessels, (See also Fig. 2 .)
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Table 8 Poris in Western Europe which can accommodate mammoth
tankers
Ports dwt. of individual 
tankers
Year of port 
modification
Rotterdam (Holland) 250,000 1970
Bantry Bay (Ireland) 500,000 1968
Gothenburg (Sweden) 250,000 1969
Slagentangen (Norway) 250,000 1968
Milford Haven (Wales, U .K .) 250,000 1970
Finnart (Scotland, U .K .) 200,000 1969
Fos (France) 250,000 1969
Le Havre* (Franco) 300,000 1970
* The authorities at this port have already planned an artificial
island off the port's entrance to accommodate 500,000 tonners.
Source: Petroleum Press Service, December, I960, p .452 and October
1969, p .371.
From the above table It is plain that only one port was suitably equipped 
to receive tankers of 250,000 tons in 1968, although tankers of 300,000 tons dwt. 
were in operation at that time. Therefore tankers of 200,000 dwf. had to enter 
these ports only partly loaded, which defeated tho point of building large tankers 
in the first place. Most of the development of those ports has taken plcico 
between 1969 and 1970.
Two examples will be analysed here,one being Rotterdam, because 
of its geographical position in Europe and also because of the many refineries 
there. The other, Bantry Bay trans-shipment terminal, which has been taken 
because it is the first of its kind in the world.
Rotterdam
Although if is anticipated that the Europorf will be handling 
more than 196.8 million tons of general bulk cargo yearly by 1972, at present
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over 177 million ions are handled on their way to serve the continually 
expanding markets of Holland and Landbound Europe. O f this, about 98.4  
million tons is crude o il . Many of Europe's major industrial areas are within 
300 miles of Rotterdam, as are the population centres including London, 
Amsterdam, Antwerp, Bremen, Hamburg, the cities of the Ruhr, and Frankfurt. 
These cities have about 160 million people, and a wide range of industries. 
Apart from refineries and storage facilities, the Europoort has shipyards 
capable of building and repairing ships of 250,000 tons dwt.
In the harbour area at Rotterdam, which is Europe's largest oil refin­
ing and petrochemical centre, and one of the world’s largest, there arc five 
major refining complexes. These belong to Shell, Caltex, Esso, British 
Petroleum, and Gulf, and have a combined crude capacity of 65 million tons 
per year. B.P.'s Europoort refinery was finished in 1967 and has a capacity 
of 5 million tons per year. However, by 1971, the capacity will rise to 14 
million tons a year, which would make if the largest refinery owned entirely 
by B .P ,, having cost about $121.6 million. O f the products, about? is 
exported over the refining jetties, another i  is piped about 9 .3  miles to the 
B.P. terminal in Germany at Bottlek for distribution by road, rail, and barge. 
The remaining i  is pumped info terminals at Dormagen, Karlsruhr, Offenbach, 
Stuttgart, and Ludwigshaven, through the 350 mile long Rhine-Main-Ruhr 
(RMR) p ip e lin e .^
Another Rotterdam/Rhine pipeline is owned jointly by Shell, Caltex, 
and Mobi I/G e l senberg interests and was completed in 1960, Its ultimate 
carrying capacity is 20 million tons per annum. A third pipeline is planned 
to commence operations between the Europoort and Antwerp late in 1971.
In 1968, at nearby Amsterdam, Mobil finished a 4 million ton plant, but as
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there are no facilities there to accommodate the largest of the super-tan leers, 
it has been decided that a new 28 inch pipeline from Rotterdam harbour will 
supply both this and any future refineries in Amsterdam.23
Until recently, it was considered that the Europoort offered the best
tanker facilities in Europe, but doubts about its future have now been expressed.
Before dredging, the port was able, in 1967, to accommodate tankers of up
to 165,000 dwf. After dredging and deepening the channel, it can now fake
tankers of 250,000 d w t .^  Although in the past the dredging of channels was
expensive, difficult, and largely based on guesswork, in recent years, because
of experiments carried out on models, it has become possible to situate channels
where less maintenance and dredging are needed. However, it still cannot
be regarded as a cheap process. For example, the cost of dredging a deep water
channel, 12 km. long off the Hook of Holland has been estimated at 0 ] 9 .6  to 
^ 8  million.25
Bantry Bay
The inauguration of Gulf's transhipment terminal at Bantry Bay in 
Southern Ireland in 1968, came at a- time when various European ports were 
preparing to accommodate the very large tankers of about 200,000 dwt. Gantry 
Bay is one of the only two terminals in the world at present capable of handling 
tankers of over 300,000 dwf fully loaded. The other is Mina al-Ahmadi in 
Kuwait as mentioned previously. The motives behind constructing such a 
terminal were firstly, that at the time, G ulf was facing severe competition 
from other oil companies in Western Europe. Secondly, because of the geo­
graphical spread of G ulf’s refineries in Western Europe, i .e .  at Europoort, 
Holland; Stignaos, Denmark; Milford Haven, U .K .; and Huelva, Spain.
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Thirdly, the relative smallness of these refineries made the use of very large 
2 6tankers uneconomic. Gulf's answer to these problems was to build a huge 
trans-shipment storage terminal as near as possible to the Company's European 
refineries, and able to accommodate large tankers* As put by a Company 
spokesman "to create a giant man-made oil field close to the Company's 
market. 1
In order to find a suitable location for the proposed terminal, during 
1965 and early 1966, Gulf examined numerous deep-water locations around 
the coast of Western Europe. A site was finally chosen on Whiddy Island, in 
Bantry Bay, south-west Ireland. (See Fig. 3 .)  This site had all the requirements 
for which the Company was looking. It had access to deep wafer (100 ft. at a 
distance of 1,200 ft. from the shore). It was also capable of receiving, un­
loading, and dispatching tankers in any weather at any time of the year. As
well as the above factors which recommended if, the site was conveniently
27placed for G ulf’s European refineries. The only difficulty with which the
Company was faced in building the Bantry Bay terminal was the sea-bed. The
terminal’s sea-bed covers folded strata of slate and grey-green sandstone. These
strata strike from east to west and dip vertically. Cracks in the rocks have been
caused by erosion cind on top of these there is a layer of boulder clay left
behind by the Ice Age. The depth of this clay varies from 5 ft. at the western
end, to 40 f t . at the eastern end of the island. These conditions necessitated
28the use of floating equipment rather than jack-up barges.
On Whiddy Island, which is almost three miles long and one mile 
wide at its widest point, work started in December, 1966. * On the Island
* About one-third of Whiddy Island is owned by Gulf and the terminal 
occupies less than one-quarter of if.
11
)1
Fig* 3 - A sketch showing the water depth contours at
Bantry Bay terminal, (Depths in feet)
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there are 12 x 600,000 barrel, storage tanks, giving a total storage capacity 
of 7.2 million barrels, or approximately one million tons’. In addition 
there are 2 x 100,000 barrel tanks for the storage of bunker fuel, and 2 x
500.000 barrel dirty ballast tanks. Two 42“ submarine crude oil lines link the 
tank farm on tho Island and the offshore jetty at which all the tankers berth.* 
Both of these lines are used for unloading the over 300,000 ton tankers and for 
loading smaller "shuttle11 tankers. In addition there is 1 x 30" dirty ballast line, 
1 x 18" bunker line, 1 x 8" firewater line, and 2 x 10" diesel lines.
On the unloading berth there are four unloading arms of 16" diameter, 
which enable the terminal to receive crude oil at a rate of up to 100,000 barrels 
per hour. On the loading berth there are four loading arms each of 12" diameter 
which allow for the maximum loading rate of 80,000 barrels per hour. All these 
loading/unloading arms are connected to the two 42" diameter submarine pipe- 
lines.
The terminal can accommodate only two tankers at one time. Tho 
outer, or North berth, where the minimum depth of 100 ft. of wafer is available, 
is used by the 326,000 dwf tankers. The inner berth which has a water dopfh 
of over 90 f t . is used by the smaller shuttle tankers (ranging in size between
80.000 and 100,000 dwf). See Fig. 3.
Tidal streams and currents at the terminal are virtually non-existent, 
and rarely cause berthing problems. Surface currents can of course be generated 
by the prevailing winds which are predominately from the south-west to west.
* The offshore terminal is located 1,200 ft. from the Island, with 
simultaneous mooring for mammoth tankers on the north side, and 
shuttle tankers on the south side. The berthing facilities on each of 
the two berths consist of four breasting dolphins and four mooring 
dolphins.
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The force of the wind, wave height and swell conditions are the limiting 
weather criteria for berthing vessels, and although some delays are envisaged, 
particularly in the winter months because of weather, it is not anticipated
29
that these will bo of long duration or unduly affect the operation of the terminal.
It appears that Gulf has pioneered a useful idea with this scheme, as in 
November 1968 Shell signed a contract with them for the use of Bantry‘Bay's 
trans-shipment facilities by Shell's 200,000 class ships, if and when trans-shipment 
there is required. When fully loaded, these 200,000 tonners cannot enter the 
ports serving Shell's refineries, and so they have to offload some of their 
cargos into 70,000 tonners at sea.
The latest addition to the list of mammoth tanker ports in Europe is 
Bilbao, where Gulf-Petronor Group is to build a refinery with a capacity of 5
million tons a year. A t this terminal the Group will provide facilities for
3fi
vessels of up to 500,000 dwf.
The methods used to safeguard competitiveness in Europe apply else­
where. At Okinawa, Gulf is building a trans-shipment terminal similar to
Bantry Bay, which will be supplied by cnammoth tankers, and which will feed
31the Company's Far Eastern markets.
Gulf also has a project in Nova Scotia -  "Point Tupper" -  where it 
is intended to build a terminal for ships of 300,000 dwf. and over, as well as a 
refinery. This project will give the Company the benefit of not having to 
trans-ship all the cheaply freighted crude o i l .
in conclusion, it is to be said that the use of trans-shipment terminals 
offers many advantages. It means that even refineries whose port facilities 
cannot cope with the giant tankers will reap their operating advantages.
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3. Suez Canal*
Since the major markets for Middle Eastern petroleum are located 
west of Suez, the greater part of exports to those markets moved through the 
Canal until its closure in June, 1967.
The Suez Canal (See Fig. 4) was completed in 1869, with a depth of 
26 f t . ,  but projects for deepening and widening the Canal have been in 
operation in recent years. Until 1956, the Canal could only take ships with 
a draught of 35 f t . ,  but this was increased to 38 ft . in 1966. The increasing 
volume of exports of petroleum to countries west of Suez raised the question of 
the Canal's capacity to handle an additional number of tankers together with 
tankers of largo size; 200,000 ton.fankers for example, noed’a water depth of 
60 ft. in this connection, plans to deepen and widen the Canaiwere made 
by the Suez Canal Authority. These provided for the draught to be increased 
from 38 f t .  to 40 f t .  by the end of 1967, This was to be followed by two 
ambitious projects to increase the draught to 48 f t .  by the end of 1972, and 
to 57-58 ft. by the end of 1975. In the second project, consideration was 
also given to plans to permit tankers of 62 ft. draught fully loaded except for 
the 326,000 tonners which have a draught of 72 ft. The draught of a 500,000 
tonner, if built, would probably be about 85 f t . °  The first of these plans 
was approved by the Egyptian Government.
Naturally the cost of all this work would have been immense. Deepen­
ing the Canal by one foot would cost more than %42 million, as the Canal is
* A concession to build a canal linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas 
was granted to Ferdinand De Lesseps in November, 1854, Work began 
on the Canal in April, 1859, and it was officially opened in November, 
1869. In 1888, the Suez Canal Convehfion wa§ signed at Constantinople 
by all tho great powers. It provided for free and open passage in time 
of war and in times of peace, for all vessels. This right was denied to 
Spanish vessels in the Spanish-American War of 1898, to German vessels 
in the two World Wars, and to Israeli vessels by the Egyptians since 1948. 
In July 1956, the Egyptian Government nationalised the Canal, although 
the Suez Canal Company's concession did not expire until 1968,
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107 miles long (including approach fairways) and has a maximum width
of 660 ft. (minimum 600 f t .)
The journey from the Gulf to the United Kingdom through the Cana!
takes about 17 days, compared with 30 days by the Cape route (round A frica),
The route from Kuwait to the United Kingdom round the cape is 11,636
nautical miles. Thus the Canal route, which reduces the distance to 6,700
3 5
nautical miles, is considerably shorter, both in time and in distance.
The Suez Canal dues in 1956 stood at 96 cents per short ton in cargo, 
and 44 cents per short ton in ballast. In 1964, the Canal Authority increased 
the dues by imposing a general surcharge of 1% over the existing rate. Also 
they demanded an additional 2% surcharge for every foot or fraction of a foot 
in excess of 37 feet from vessels whose draught exceeded this. Since then, the 
Canal dues have been increased twice, first on 1st July, 1965, and second on 
1st July, 1966. in early 1967, Canal dues stood at $1 per short ton in cargo, 
and 45 cents per short ton in ballast. The increase and the surcharges were 
justified by the Canal Authority on the grounds that wages and prices were 
rising, and that some rise in gross revenues became essential if the Canal v/as 
to be enlarged. This increase in dues only slightly raised the cost of using the 
Canal, (n iNTASCALE (The International Tanker Nominal Freight Scale), 87 
cents per ton of oil carried was the payment allowed for in the cost of using the 
Canal in a round trip. This comprised 59 cents for the South/North Journey 
loaded, and 28 cents for the return journey in ballast, and even after the 
increases had taken place, this figure was not altered.36
In the varied history of the Canal there have been two crises. Tho 
first was in 1956, and was resolved. The second took place in 1967, and has 
not yet been settled.
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The Suez Crisis of 1956
It is not proposed to deal here with the reasons for the Suez Crisis,
or to apportion blame to one side or another. It is intended to discuss tho
effects of this crisis on the oil industry.
The Anglo-E:rsnch invasion of Egypt led to the blocking of the Suez
Canal by the Egyptians on October 31st, 1956. Although Egypt's action did
not aim specifically at oil enterprise, if was bound to affect the oil traffic which
constituted a large part of the total tonnage passing through the Canal. In
fact, oil amounted to 65% of this tonnage. It should be borne in mind that the
blocking of the Canal was accompanied by another act of sabotage in the Arab
world. This was directly aimed at the oil industry, and if affected the economy
and security of Western Europe very badly. On November 2nd, 1956, all three
pumping stations of SPC's pipeline in Syria were blown up, and the flow of oil
from Iraq to the /Mediterranean terminals at Banias and Tripoli was stopped.*
The following passage elaborates on the effect of the blockade and sabotage
on the oil industry in Western Europe.
In actual figures, the position was that 102 million tons of oil passed
through either the Canal (77 million tons) or Syrian pipelines (25 million tons)
every year, and this traffic was halted entirely. O f this yearly total of 102 million
tons (2.04 million barrels per day), 87.5 million (1 .75 million barrels per day)
were destined for Europe, which was importing oil at a rate of 125 million tons
yearly (2 .5  million barrels per day) in 1956. Therefore, in the period after
the invasion, Europe was 70% short of its usual total oil supplies.
However, the oil which would normally have gone via the Canal could
be shipped around the Cape, although the delay of roughly 2 weeks meant that
* On December 20th, 1956, Syria allowed IPC's engineering team
to inspect the pipelines, and on March 6th, 1957, (four months after 
the stations were blown up), official permission to start repairs was 
given.
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supplies amounted to barely 60% of the usual Suez oil traffic. Thus Europe 
was bound to be short of at least 45% of its normal supplies, and even this 
figure is based on the assumption that all the oil being directed via the Cape 
was to be delivered to Europe, whereas before the blocking of the Canal, 20% 
had been destined for the Western Hemisphere, and only 80% for Europe.
As the European countries were highly industrialized it is plain to 
see that the damage done to their economies was substantial. Their governments 
turned to other sources of supply, mainly in the Western Hemisphere. However, 
this was not easily accomplished, as supplies were demanded at very short 
notice, making them difficult to obtain. Also, the amount of tanker space 
available for transportation was limited. The governments found too, that 
obtaining oil this way was proving a drain on their hard currency resources
It could bo said that the Suez Crisis of 1956 gave the countries of 
Western Europe rood for thought regarding oil transportation. For many years 
before the Suez Crisis, the oil industry had recognised both the technical and 
economic advantages of employing large tankers, but not many were built 
for the Middle East/Europe oil trade. This could be related to several factors, 
among which aro:
(a) • A lack of sufficient ports, terminals, and docks at which large 
tankers could be handled.
(b) Importing large quantities of oil necessitated alterations in the 
size of the refineries and storage tanks as they had limited capacities. This 
entailed the engagement for long periods of largo amounts of capital, in stock­
piling o i l .
(c) Tho Canal also presented an obstacle of its own in its limited
depth.
257.
The closure of the Canal obviously changed the situation, and then if 
was realised that small tankers, or even those of medium size were proving 
disadvantageous when used on the Cape route. Accordingly, the number and 
sizes of terminals, ports, and repair docks were increased to accommodate 
larger tankers. Also, large sums of capital were spent on enlarging the capacity 
of refineries at home.
Apart from the above factors, the Canal became undesirable as 
an oil route to both European consumers and the Western O il companies 
engaged in oil operations in the Middle East, The European countries also 
adopted a policy or reducing their dependence on Middle Eastern o il, by 
obtaining oil from other parts of the world, such as North Africa, Nigeria, 
Alaska, and other places.
The Second Closure of the Canal -  June 1967
In the first week of June 1967, the Canal was closed for the second time 
as a result of a war between Egypt and Israel. The Egyptian Government then 
declared that navigation through the Canal would be resumed only when the 
Israelis withdrew from the Eastern bank of the Canal which they occupied 
during the war. As a result, the Cana! has remained entirely shut, since then, 
with 15 vessels trapped inside. Since the cease-fire, negotiations regarding a 
settlement in the Middle East have taken place between the Four Powers (U .S .A ,, 
U .K ., U.S.S ,,  and France), but unfortunately nothing has yet been revealed.
In contrast to that of 1956, the second closure of the Canal did not 
have much effect on world oil supplies. In 1956, the production of oil in 
the Middle East was also considerably hindered by an insufficient number of 
tankers to move the produced oil to Western markets via the Cape, while in 
196?  ^ a tanker capacity of 3.5 million tons was engaged in grain trade or laid
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up due to lack of employment when the Canal was closed. Apart from tho
existing tanker tonnage (which amounted to 99.4 million dwf. in 1966) now
delivery of 3.065 million dwt. was made in the first half of 1967, and an
estimated 6 million dwt. was to be added to world tanker tonnage in the
38second half of the same year. Thus, the freeing of tankers from the grain 
trade, together with the available tanker tonnage, prevented a shortage of 
oil supplies to Western Europe,
Like the first crisis, the second had various results, among which 
was that demands for tanker tonnage were increased .* This increase was accom­
panied by higher freight rates not only on the Gulf/Europe route, but also on 
all other oil routes in the world. During the first month of the closure of the 
Canal, single voyage rates for the Mina al-Ahmadi to U .K . run had increased 
from $3.27 per ton of oil carried via Suez and including dues at the end of 
May, to $20.2 per ton carried via the Cape at tho end of June. Similarly,
single voyage rafos rose in the Caribbean from $1.75 per ton of oil before the
39Crisis, to $7.81 in June.  ^ The re-routing of oil traffic from the Cana! to the 
Cape during June-September was not the only cause for the rise in tankor rates, 
another was the noed to ship extra amounts of oil from the Gulf to Europe in 
order to compensate for the loss of the oil which was normally available at 
Mediterranean terminals. It is also to be mentioned that after the June war, oil 
supply from Libya was completely stopped until the first week of July, and the 
supply from Saudi Arabia's Tapline was not resumed until the third week of
* B.P. was the first major oil company to charter tankers after the crisis. 
On 10th June, 1967, B.P. chartered tankers totalling 800 ,000 tons for 
up to two consecutive voyages round the Cape at $8.40 a ton, or nearly 
double pre-crisis rates. On the 17th of the same month, B.P. chartered 
another H' million tons, again for two consecutive voyages around the 
Cape, lasting about three months in a l l . A t the same time, a tanker 
was booked for a single voyage from the Gulf to Portugal at $26.88 per 
ton. (The Economist, June 24th, 1967.)
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September. The governments of both Libya and Saudi Arabia had demanded 
an increase in tho posted prices at Mediterranean terminals from their res­
pective companies. This was because the relative advantages of freight savings 
had increased duo to the Canal closure and the resultant rerouting of Gulf oil
A j
around the Cape.
In conclusion, the Canal's closure lengthened the trad© routes from 
the Gulf to Europe, increased freight rates and presented higher prices of 
petroleum products in many countries. Also, tho Canal is now no longer 
regarded as a safe route by the shipping industry.
4 . a . O il transportation by pipelines
Decisions in building pipelines are dictated by sheer necessity. Apart 
from a short distance gathering system which is essential in all oil fields, if is 
also possible to build long distance pipelines to transport oil in large quantities 
from inland oil fields to shipping points, refineries and other distribution 
centres.
From the map (Fig. 5) if becomes obvious that the most sensible way 
to move Gulf oil is direct to the Mediterranean, from where it is not far to 
the markets. The only disadvantage of this routo is that the pipeline has to 
pass through several countries. This is alright as long as politics do not enter 
into the situation.
Both Iraq Petroleum Pipelines (IPC) and the Trans Arabian Pipeline 
(Tapline) are regarded as being among the largest crude oil pipelines in tho 
world. IPCs pipelines transit crude oil from the Iraqi oilfields in the north, 
to the Mediterranean at Tripoli and Banias. As is shown in the table below, 
several lines of different sizes move the produced o i l . In the case of tho Tapline, 
the oil is transported from the eastern section of Saudi Arabia (Gulf Region) to 
Sidon, the Lebanese port on the Mediterranean.
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Table 9 The existing and projected pipelines in the Middle East
Origin Transit Terminal
Countries
Length Diameter Throughput
in in 1968
Miles____ inches_______ b/d ;
Notes
Existing
Northern
Iraq
Syria-
Lebanon
Tripoli 532 12
Syria -  
Lebanon
Tripoli 532 30/32
Syria Ban ias 555 30/32
Eastern Jordan- Sidon 750 30/31
1,079,800
System in­
cludes 111 
miles 16" 
from Moms to 
Tripoli, and 
40 miles 26" 
and 24" 
from Homs to 
Ban ias.
Saudi
Arabia
Syria* 
Lebanon
470,900 Length 1,070 
mil GS including 
section from 
main fields to 
Qaisumah 
Capacity 
70,000 ty d .
Southern 
Israel 
(Eilat -  
Gulf of 
Aqaba)
Haifa 256 16 110,000
est.
Southern
Israel
Ashkelon 160 42 Capacity
300.000 I/d  
Ultimate 
capacity
1.200.000  
fc/d,
Projected
Egypt 
(G ulf of 
Suez)
Alexandria 210 42 Capacity 
1,000,000 
b/d.
Southern
Iran
T urlcey Iskan-
derun
950 /ln Under
study
Source: Petroleum Press Service, June, 1969, p .216.
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IPC Pipelines
The capacity of IPC's pipeline was increased from 26 million tons a 
year to about 40 million tons a year as a result of technical improvements and 
by completion of another parallel line from Kirkuk to Tripoli, the Syrian port 
on the Mediterranean in August 1961 .^  In i960, the IPC pipelines moved 
about 73.5% of Iraq's total exports, and 16,2 million tons were shipped from 
Khor ai-Amaya, the Iraqi port on the G ulf, in recent years special preference 
has been given to the southern fields because of the troubles which IPC 
faced in operating the northern lines via Syria. The latest of these troubles 
occurred on December 8th, 1966, when the Syrian Government shut down the IPC 
pipelines completely, pending a raise in transit dues from 56 cents to 81 cents 
per ton of crude o il, and loading fees at the Banias terminal from 15 cents to 
28 cents. Over and above this the Government demanded that these increases 
should be applied with effect from January 1st, 1966. After about three months 
of deadlock, IPC agreed to the Syrian demands in the first week of March,
1967, and accordingly oil flowed again through SPC’s pipelines across Syria 
to the Mediterranean. Total dues then worked out at / I  .09 per ton (14.6 cents 
per barrel) compared with 71 cents per ton (9 .5  cents per barrel) at the old rate, 
an increase of nearly 50%. On the signing of the agreement, the Syrian Govern­
ment received an amount of / 1 3 .7  million from IPC representing the increase 
in payments for the previous year (January 1st -  December 1966) on the basis of 
the new rates. Cased on the pre-stoppage rate of 43 million tons of crude oil a
year, Syrian revenues would have been about $42 million instead of under 
. . 42p2B million. While the Syrians got a fairly substantial increase in their income,
the Iraqis lost about /6 5 .8  million during the shut-down p erio d .^
Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline)
Tapline is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ARAMCO. The pipeline has 
a length of 750 miles and a diameter of 30"/31", and the purpose behind
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constructing It was to eliminate the tanker voyage around the Arabian Peninsula 
and through the Canal, a round trip of over 6,000 miles when exporting oil to 
Western Europe. The conditions and climate in the mid-Arabian desert made 
working very difficult. To overcome the lack of water, 50 or more wells were 
drilled in the desert, and water was transported from Ras Tanura and Januf by 
lorries. The difficult surface of the land -  sand-dunes, flat and arid plains, hard 
or disintegrated limestone, and lava strewn desert -  was tackled with many 
specially designed vehicles and the building of roads. However, the line was 
completed in 1950 using 265,000 tons of steel, and at a cost of $224 million. If 
Is operated by four major stations (Qaisumah, Rafha, Badamah, and Turaif) and
four minor ones (Shu'-bah, Uwaigilah, Jaiamid, in Saudi Arabia, and G.aryatain 
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in Jordan). (See Fig. 5 .)  The capacity of the line was increased from 16 million 
tons a year to 22 million tons a year by the end of 1958 and to about 25 million 
tons a year in 1 9 6 6 .^
Likewise, Tapline faced difficulties with regard to both transit dues 
and the operation of the line. The latest incident took place on May 3rd, 1970, 
in Syrian territory near the town of Derra.* It was claimed by the Syrian Govern­
ment that a bulldozer accidentally damaged the pipeline while engaged in 
cable-laying work for the Syrian telephone department. (At the point the line 
is buried 6 f t ,  deep.) O il spillage which caused some pollution to the surrounding, 
agricultural land was estimated at 20,000 barrels, but no fire broke out. After 
the damage, a Tapline repair team was going to Syria to investigate the damage, 
but they were prevented by the Syrians on the grounds that there was a fire 
hazard Although at the beginning the Syrians did not speil out their terms
for the repair of the line, in June it was fairly certain that they wanted higher
* Since the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, but before this incident,
several things happened to the Tapline. In 1967, following the War, 
the line was shut for over three months. Later, in 1969, the line was 
closed once again for 112 days, when a group of Palestinian Commandos 
sabotaged the line in the Israeli occupied Gulan Heights. Also 
several minor accidents have occurred to the line in Lebanese territory.
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transit payments.* After 7 weeks of the shut-down and the refusal of the
Syrians to give Tapline crews the necessary clearance for the repair of the
line which was estimated to fake about 24 hours, the Saudi Government decided
48to abandon the line altogether. However,in November, 1970, there was 
a coup in Syria, and the government was changed. Negotiations for tho re­
opening of the Tapline were recommenced, and on 29th January, 1971, the
„ 49
Tapline was reopened.
Although Saudi Arabia was greatly affected by the closure of the
line, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria suffered too. Before May 3rd, Taplino
transited about 473,000 barrels/day, or roughly 14% of ARAMCOls total
production in Saudi Arabia, which amounted to 3 ,4  million barrels/day
during the first quarter of 1970* The Saudi income from oil exported from
Sidon was about $1 per barrel (or 15 cents more than the equivalent grade of
oil exported from Ras Tanura on the G ulf). The extent of Saudi losses through
the Tapline closure was governed by the amount of oil shipped from Ras Tanura,
If Saudi Arabia had been able to put through Ras Tanura the same quantify of
oil that was passed through the Tapline, then her losses would have amounted to
$70,000 per day. This would have been the difference in prices between Ras
Tanura and Sidon. On the other hand,if Saudi Arabia had not been able to
replace what used to go through the Tapline by Ras Tanura, then its losses would
have amounted to $500,000 per day. The three transit countries, Lebanon,
Jordan, and Syria itself would have lost about $10,000 a day each, Tho effect
on the operating company was bad, partly due to the increase in the costs of
transporting and lifting supplies of oil from other sources, and partly duo to the
* Syria started negotiations with Tapline for an increase in oil
transit dues in May, 1967. However, because of the June War, 
negotiations between the two parties wore suspended and never 
resumed.
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50disruption of their offtake and delivery schedules. Also the shutdown of 
the Tapline, as well as the disruption of oil supplies from North Africa and 
the Middle East greatly influenced freight rates to rise. There is also a 
shortage of oil supplies to Western Europe from the Mediterranean, with the 
possible result of a price increase.*
When one compares the bargaining position of the Tapline Company 
with that of IPC with its pipelines, one can see that the Tapline Company is 
the stronger with regard to dues payable to countries through which it passes, 
or the transit of o il, because Saudi oil can easily be re-routed to the Gulf 
ports if pipeline dues were increased over the limit which the Company can 
bear.
Although some improvements were made to the Tapline in order to 
increase its transit capacity, the capacity of the terminal at Ras Tanura after 
its improvements remained greater. A t Ras Tanura the improvements included 
an increase in the total capacity of the storage tanks and shipping facilities 
by the building of a new sea-island terminal. In 1969, Saudi exports to the 
Western Hemisphere amounted to 67.8 million tons of crude o il, while the 
Tapline's share of that was only 34%.
If is to be noted that in the case of Saudi Arabia, the Tapline seems 
of little importance with regard to export. That is clear from the amount of 
oil exported via the Tapline compared with Ras Tanura. The case of Iraq is 
a different matter, it seems impossible for Iraq to manage without the 
implementation of the northern lines.
* The host governments in the Middle East and North Africa have been
asking for higher posted prices and increased taxation. Also, the 
Libyan G'-overnment has decided to cut back its production from certain 
oil fields for protection. It is reported that the government has ordered 
Occidental to cut back production from its Intisar field from 320,000 
barrels/day (April 1970 level) to around 200,000 barrels/day. This, 
together with the stoppage of the Tapline, created a shortage of oil in 
the Mediterranean.
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b. Pipelines (newly constructed and in planning stage)
The consequences of the Suez Crisis of 1956, which were the
closure of the Canal and the sabotage of the IPC pipelines in Syria, led to
the oil companies concerned looking for an alternative route. The alternatives
were the building of large tankers as mentioned previously (see Tankers), and the
construction of new pipelines with larger diameters through countries with
more political stability. Two conferences were held in London with regard
to the problem. The first (mid-March, 1957) involved 8 oil companies, and
the expansion and improvement of pipelines in the Middle East was discussed.
The second conference (May 13-16 1957) comprised 17 oil corporations and
studied a project to link Iraqi oil fields with Turkish ports on the Mediterranean,
51thus avoiding Syria and Egypt, which were less politically stable. In 
general, as a result of the Suez Crisis, several projects were taken into con­
sideration. Amongst these were:
Eilat -  Ashkclon pipeline -  Israel.
(b) Suez “ Alexandria pipeline -  Egypt.
(c) Ahwaz -  Iskaderun pipeline -  from Iran to Turkey.
Eilat -  Askhelon Pipeline
Israel also has a 42 inch pipeline, which was brought into operation
in February, 1970, and runs from E ilat on the Gulf of Aqaba, 160 miles to
Ashkelon on the Mediterranean. (See Fig. 5 .)  With the installation of a new
pumping unit in the Negev, in May, 1970, the capacity of the line was
raised from 400,000 to 800,000 barrels a day, and it is expected to reach its
maximum capacity (1,2 million barrels a day) early in 1971 .* The cost of
the line (before expansion) including terminal and storage facilities at Eilat
* No reliable information is available as to the actual current
throughput.
267.
and Ashkelon was estimated at $1 13 million. Transit dues charged by tho 
Israeli Government are reported to be $1 .00 per ton, or roughly 13.5 cents
CO
per barrel. The facilities at Ashkelon are composed of storage tanks with a 
capacity of 1 .5 million tons, and two 30 inch loading lines connected to a 
floating tanker terminal.
At present, tankers of between 35,000 dwt. and 75,000 dwt. 
can be handled there. In future, the terminal will be handling tankers of
125.000 d w t.^  Tankers initially served at Eilat ranged from 40,000 to
125.000 dwt. With the completion of a new 750 metre-long oil pier, Eilat 
became capable of accommodating two tankers of 300,000 dwt. simultaneously. 
This pier was built at a cost of $7.5  million The facilities at the pier can 
handle 23,000 tons of crude oil per hour compared with 15,000 tons per hour
55at the sea-island terminal in Kuwait, and less than 15,000 tons at Bantry Day. 
The older pier, which is located to the north of the new one, can handle
another 17,000 tons per hour, making a total of 40,000 tons per hour for the
* 56 two.
The Israeli pipeline faces a number of difficulties which may become 
worse with the passage of time. Amongst them are firstly security problems. 
The Israeli pipe will remain an obvious target for Arab guerrillas as long as the 
Arab-lsraeli conflict continues. In fact, in recent months, Egyptian frogmen 
have launched two successful attacks on Israeli ships in the port of Eilat. 
Secondly, there is the fact that if an oil company dependent on Arab oil used 
the pipeline directly or indirectly, if would run the risk of a boycott by the 
Arab states.
* The new pier was built by the Genoa-based Italian firm, Adriafica,
and if was reported that the firm received a bonus of $500,0QG for 
completing the pier ahead of schedule. (M .E .E ,S , N o .45 , 4th 
September, 1970).
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Despite all these obstacles, the Israeli pipeline has been enlarged
to an extent which leads one to believe that they may have other sources
of oil to utilise these facilities. It seems that the main source of the East of
Suez oil passing through Israel is Iran, and the main user of the Israeli pipeline
is the National Iranian O il Company, which appears to value its trade more
R7
than Arab feelings on the matter. There is also speculation about whether 
the Israeli facilities will be employed by foreign oil companies operating in 
Iran. It is, however, unlikely that any of the companies connected with the 
Consortium would become involved for three reasons, namely: (1) they are 
committed to the mammoth tankers which seem to be the safest and most 
economic way of transporting oil from the Gulf to Europe, even allowing 
for the length of the route via the Cape. (2) They would not wish to endanger 
their enormous oil-producing interests in the Arab countries. (3) In the majority 
of cases, they already have enough oil sources on the Mediterranean .
If is most probable that material considerations are foremost in the 
reasoning of the Iranians, as they have been at a considerable disadvantage 
regarding competition since the Canal was closed. Obviously they need a way 
to reduce the costs of transporting their oil to Europe and the Israeli pipeline 
probably offers this. However, if another, more secure method became 
available, the Iranians would probably use that in preference, for instance, 
their own pipeline to the Mediterranean which has already been planned or 
participation in the Egyptian SUMED line. In these circumstances one 
cannot regard the Iranians as permanent users of the Israeli facilities.
The main reason for the flourishing nature of this trade is Eastern 
Europe *s desperate need for oil, due in part to the inadequacy of the Russian 
supply network. Russia appears to have given the Eastern bloc sanction to 
import oil from any other sources, and Rumania and Yugoslavia among others have
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made barter deals with Iran. The world tanker shortage, however, left 
Rumania especially short in its oil supplies as Iran got progressively further 
behind in deliveries. The Israeli pipeline was the only solution, albeit a 
risky one. Another reason is the Shah of Iran's desire to establish Iran as 
a major oil seller through N IO C  instead of relying on the marketing
rp
facilities of the Western oil companies drilling in Iran.
N IO C  receives its oil from various oil companies operating in Iran. 
Firstly, over a period of 5 years, N IO C is to receive from Consortium an 
amount of 20 million tons of oil for use in barter trade with the Comecon 
states of Eastern Europe. In addition tothis, N IO C is getting 50% of the oil 
produced by the companies which signed agreements with her on the basis of 
a joint venture (50/50 partnership).* Total output by the companies averaged 
some 275,000 barrels per day in 1969. It was expected to reach 450,000 
barrels a day in 1970, and probably more than 300,000 barrels in 1971. If 
is to be noted that from this amount, 150,000 barrels a day will go to NIOC's  
markets to the East of Suez (India,, Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Africa, e fc .)^  
A shonage in the quantity of oil at the Mediterranean was created 
by the reduction in Libya's production and the shutdown of the Tapline* Tanker 
freight rates were also affected adversely by the situation, and rose rapidly. 
Under these circumstances, the Israeli pipeline could be doing w ell. In fact, 
it seems as if this is the case, since the Israelis have already expanded the 
capacity of the pipeline from 400,000 barrels a day to 800,000, and if is 
expected that if will soon reach 1 .2 million. Also, $7.5  million has been 
spent on building a pier at Eilat, capable of receiving mammoth tankers, and 
the contractor, who finished the job ahead of schedule, was given a $500,000
These companies are SIR IP, IPAC, LAPCO, and IM IN O C O .
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bonus, which seems to imply that the facilities were urgently required. One
could speculate that all this planning was not done on a short term basis,
but with something in mind for the future. Another point in favour of this
argument is the calculation based on the reported pipeline tariff of $1.00
per ton (13.5 cents per barrel), that the line needs a minimum amount of 25
million tons per year (500,000 barrels per day) of oil passing through if, to
60allow for only 6% returns on the investment.
Suez -  Alexandria Pipeline
The idea of stretching a pipeline from the Gulf of Suez to 
Alexandria on the Mediterranean could be related to various factors, among 
which are the emergence of huge tankers even before the closure of the Canal, 
which rendered the Canal less necessary for the oil industry, and also that 
this pipeline was believed to be a compensation to Egypt for what she had 
lost from the oil transit dues through the Suez Canal.
The projected line would have a diameter of 42 inches and a length 
of 206.2 mil es, If is believed that the line will require 100,250 tons of steel. 
It would run from a point south of the port of Suez to a point 13.1 miles west 
of Alexandria, where if is suitable for the building of the terminal. On its 
route, the line would reach a maximum altitude of 15,240 feet above sea level 
between the River N ile  and the starting point. If would cross the river south 
of Cairo at a point where the river width is 16,764 feet. The line would not 
face any difficulty on the route, except when crossing the swamp area,
6lsouth-west of Alexandria, which extends to a distance of about 18.8 miles. 
(See Fig. 5 .)  As a safety measure, it is understood that the line would start 
from a point whero it will be as far as 40 miles from the Israeli positions
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on the eastern bank of the Cana!, If would have two pumping stations, each 
with a capacity of 41,000 h .p .,  which would give the line an initial through­
put of 50 million tons a year (about 1 million barrels a day). A t each end 
of the line a storage capacity of 863,000 tons would be available. The marine 
facilities at Suez would be capable of handling tankers of over 300,000 dwt., 
while at Alexandria, tankers ranging between 50,000 dwt. and 250,000 dwf. 
would be accommodated. Loading capacity at Alexandria would be 15,000 
tons per hou r.^
The Egyptians seem to be very optimistic about their line. If is expected 
that when it is opened, it will transport 36% of the amount of oil moved through 
the Canal in 1966, the last full year of operation. They also believe that even 
should the canal re-open, the line would be profitable, moving petroleum 
between supertankers which cannot use the Canal, and cutting by half the 
time taken by tankers to travel round the Cape.
The projected pipeline is at present facing difficulty with regard 
to its finances. If is estimated that the line would cost about $130 million. 
Political unrest in the Middle East has also resulted in the interest rates
rising from a hopefully anticipated 7-8% to roughly 11-12%. In spite of this,
63the Egyptians believe that the project could still pay for itself in 7 years.
This pipeline, if it is built, is more likely tobe used than that of the 
Israelis, because most of the oil produced is from Arab countries, whose 
sympathies lie mainly with Egypt.
Ahwaz-Iskanderun Pipeline
There are several possible reasons for the Iranian's obvious anxiofy 
to build the Ahwaz-Iskanderun pipeline. These include the desire to reduce 
the degree of monopoly of the oil companies in producing and marketing the oil,
and to have a part in if themselves and make some money from if. A less 
obvious reason may be that the Iranians wish to soil oil to the countries of 
Eastern Europe, as well as boosting their Western European sales. To secure 
these markets they must sell as cheaply as possible, the least expensive method 
of transporting oil being via the pipeline. A third reason could be that tho 
Iranians wish to make a profit from the difference between the posted prices at 
the Gulf and tho Mediterranean. Although at present there are some dif­
ferences between these prices, they may become loss in the near future with 
the employment of supertankers. A case in point is Libya. Despite tho con­
venience of Libyan o il, the demand for it may roduce because of the increased 
taxation and political unrest there. Another example of the influence of 
political unrest on the oil industry is the Tapline, which passes from Saudi 
Arabia through Jordan, Syria, and the Lebanon, to the Mediterranean. The 
lino was damaged in Syria, and after much argument between the Syrians 
and the Saudis, the latter finally decided to discontinue use of the line until 
a fortuitous change in political conditions permitted a re-opening of the line. 
Thus if may bo seen how Western Europe is being driven to depend more upon 
supertankers, and loss upon pipelines to the Mediterranean.
Another point in the argument against the pipeline is that the 
Mediterranean will become less important after the advent of the supertankers 
and the use of terminals such as Banfry Bay and Cofferdam. To use a pipeline 
and a small tanker costs more than to use a supertanker alone. (See Comparative 
costs of using pipelines and tankers.)
The reasons given by the Iranians themsolves are that they have 
wanted a pipeline outlet to the Mediterranean since the 1950's, and after the 
Canal closure in 1967 the plan became even more important to them in order to
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restore Iran's ability to compete for Western European markets, and to 
possibly open up new markets in Eastern Europe and West of Suez, it is believed 
that N IO C  itself can provide 30% (3“400>000 b/d), of the pipeline's 
capacity with its planned sales to Turkey and Eastern and Western Europe,
At first the Consortium participants did not wish to become involved 
with the pipeline, as they felt that if was not a good proposition, either finan­
cially or as regards security. If was, and in some cases still is, thought that
the line could not compete economically with the supertankers on the Cape
64route, and that it would be subject to political pressures.
On the 24th September, 1970, the Turkish and Iranian Governments, 
and members of Consortium, were represented at talks in London regarding the new 
pipeline, where if was attempted to ensure a sufficient throughput of oil to make 
the project economical. Since then, some of the companies have been reported 
as changing their opinions to be slightly less against the pipeline, although if 
is still doubted that the amount of oil required can be guaranteed.
The projected line will be 1,700 km. long, with a diameter of 3u",
42" and 48", and an initial capacity of 800,000 barrels per day, capable of 
being raised to 1 .4 million barrels per day. This will be the most difficult line 
to construct, and there are several reasons for this. The first and main one is 
the mountains through which the pipeline will travel more or less all tho way.
The climate changes from hot weather at the Gulf to snow on the mountains, 
ending with the Mediterranean climate of Iskanderun. This may lead to the 
pipeline having to be heated in cold areas to keep the oil flowing. Tho 
isolation and bad climate of the sites makes obtaining labour very difficult, 
and also getting materials to the sites to work with is a problem. As a result 
of these conditions, the whole operation will be vory expensive. The cost
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of the initial stage of the project was estimated at $480 million. It was 
expected that this would reach a final cost of $550 million. However, these 
estimates have been revised once again, and it is understood that the cost now 
stands between $700 million and$1,000 m illio n .^  On 16th May, 1970, 
the Iranian and Turkish Governments signed a preliminary agreement with two 
international construction firms, Bechtel Corporation of the U .S .A . and 
Entrepose of France, for the construction of the line and 10 years1 operation 
management of it on completion. The two companies also undertook to arrange 
the necessary finance for the project, provided that adequate throughput of oil
67was guaranteed by the operating companies in Iran. It has been reported 
that the authorities would ask 35 cents a barrel in transit fees, which is almost 
3 times as much as that charged by the Israelis, and 2 cents a barrel as port 
dues at Iskandcrun for the use of facilities.
5 . Comparative costs of using pipelines and tankers
During tho past 10 years, the oil industry has concentrated mainly on 
finding a way to reduce the cost of moving oil to refineries which are placed 
near the markets. This reduction is of great importance to the companies, as 
transport is the most expensive item in the operating costs. As a result of the 
increase in tankor and pipeline sizes, the cost of transporting crude oil has 
been reduced. These changes were made possible by advances in technology 
prompted by competition within the industry.
Firstly, if can be seen from Figure 6* that reduction in the cost 
of transport can be achieved by increasing the capacity of both means of 
transport. Secondly, as far as pipelines are concerned, after the cost reaches 
a minimum, if remains constant irrespective of distance, whereas tanker costs
It is regretted that the figures used are based on the situation bofore
the closure of the Suez Canal. No later figures are at present available.
decrease as thG distance increases. This is because a tanker spends a 
smaller percentage of the total voyage time in port, thanks to better facilities 
at the ports for loading and unloading.
The cost of using a pipeline today (excluding profit, transit fees 
and taxes), varies according to the size of the pipeline. A barrel of oi! 
could travel 1,000 miles along a 30" pipeline for a cost of roughly 14 cents, 
and as the diameter increases, so the cost decreases, i .e . 12 cents for a 36" 
pipe, 11 cents for a 42" line . The cost of using the alternative, ocean tankers, 
shows similar fronds. On a 6,000 mile journey in a tanker of 50,000 dw t., the 
cost of moving one barrel 1,000 miles could be 7-0 cents, this decreases to 
5 -6  cents in a tanker of 100,000 dw t., to ^ - 4  cents in a 200,000 tanner, and 
to 2 i -3  cents in a 300,000 tanner.
Special costs are also included on the normal Gulf to Eastern Mediter­
ranean routes by both pipelines and tankers. Those comprise (a) pipeline transit 
fees and other special fees which amount to about 20 cents for one barrel to 
travel 1,000 miles, and (b) Suez Canal fees of roughly 12 cents per barrel on 
a tanker round trip. From this it can be reckoned that to carry crude oil
1,000 miles by pipeline from the Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean would cost 
34 cents per barrel in a 30“ pipeline, 32 cents in a 36“ pipeline, and 31 cents 
in a 42" line. Alternatively, by tankers over the 3,000 miles sea route from 
the Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean, it would cost about 372 cents per 
barrel in a 50,000 dwt. tanker, 31^ cents in a 100,000 dwt. tanker, and 25 j 
cents in a 200,000 tanner. When calculating the last tv/o figures, it has been 
assumed that the Canal was sufficiently deepened, and the tolls unaltered. 
However, it should be remembered that there is an oxtra journey of 1,500 miles 
by water between the Eastern Mediterranean and South Central Europe, and from
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the Eastern Mediterranean to North Central Europe is 3,000 miles. This 
costs roughly an extra 15 cents per barrel to Southern Europe, and 25 cents 
per barrel to Northern Europe in a tanker of 50,000 dwt. In a 100/000 dwt. 
tanker, the cost would be 11 cents to the South and 20 cents to the North. 
The Table below shows the cost of transport from the Gulf to South and North 
Europe.
Table 10 Transport costs from the Gulf to Europe
Means of Transport South 
(in cents)
North 
(in cents)
30“ pipeline + 50,000 dwt. tanker 49 59
via Suez in a 50,000 dwt. tanker 40 60
42" pipeline + 100,000 dwt. tanker 42 50
via Suez in a 100,000 dwt. tanker 39 48
Source: Petroleum Press Service, February, I960, p .59.
The route via the Cape is a third possibility for oil travelling from the 
Gulf to Europe, Again, costs of transport seem to decrease as the tanker 
tonnage increases, i .e .  71 cents per barrel for a 50,000 dwt. tanker, 60 cents 
for 100,000 dw t., 39 cents for 200,000 dw t., 32 cents for 300,000 dw t., and 
28 cents for 500,000 dwt. These are the approximate costs per barrel, of trans­
porting oil to either North or South Europe. However, as few ports in Europe 
have facilities to deal with tankers over 200,000 dw t., the larger ones aro 
penalised by the extra cost of transhipment to the destination, which amounts to 
4 -6  cents per barrel. This brings these costs to roughly the same as those of the
200,000 dwt. tankers going d ire c t.^
From those figures if can be concluded that if is not probable that any 
more pipelines w ill be constructed between the Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean,
and that most of the tankers to be built will be in the 200,000 dwt. class, or even 
larger.
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CHAPTER VI
THE EXPORT OF OIL
The o?S which has such a great impact on the economies of Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, and Kuwait, is nearly all exported, since home consumption accounts 
for only a tiny fraction of production. Iran's local consumption amounted to 8.97%  
of its total production in 1968, while Kuwait consumed 4.78% , and Saudi Arabia's 
figure was 4 .59% . Export figures have risen spectacularly since 1945, cind while 
most of the exported oil has been destined for the highly developed countries 
of Western Europe, the pattern of trade has changed due to the interplay of 
competition from rival exporting producers, especially North African countries, 
and increasing demand from countries in different parts of the world. In recent 
years an increasing proportion of refined products has been exported as well as 
crude o il. In any one year over 90% of production has been exported to indus- 
trialised and othor countries to be used in transport, electricity generation, petro­
chemical industries and for other purposes,
The volume of oil exported depends on a variety of factors, including 
levels of supply and demand, the location of tho consuming markets, as we!! as 
the internal and international political situations.
Future demand for oil is linked to many factors, among which arc
population increase, the ability of oil to take the place of, or compete with,
other sources of energy, such as coal, natural gas, water-power, and atomic
energy, and tho degree of development achieved in any area or country. If
is such development, measured by the intensify of industrialisation, including
transport facilities, which are to a great extent dependent on oil J  The
quantity and percentage of each source of energy consumed from 1929 to 1966 is 
given in Table 1.
Source: 
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If can bo noted from the above table that in 1966, despite tho 
increasing use of crude oil and natural gas, (which rose from 19.2% in 1929, 
to 56.1% in 1966), the ratio of solid energy to total energy dropped from 
79.7% in 1929, to 41,6%  in 1966.. This can be attributed to the growing pre­
ference for the use of oil rather than coal, because it »s so much easier to 
transport, occupies less space, and is clean and easy to manage, if also requires 
less manpower for its use. Thus it can be assumed that the increasing leaning 
towards the use of oil instead of coal, will assert itself in the future demand for 
o il .
The increase in the use of natural gas from 4.4%  in 1929 to 1C.4% in 
1966 indicates that natural gas will be an important rival as a source of on orgy 
in the future.
Due to the rapid economic development of West European countries, 
and therefore the increase in the consumption of energy, the use of water power 
and atomic energy in the operation process has risen recently. Also, European 
countries are endeavouring to find new sources of energy since the stoppage of oil flow 
through the pipelines to the Mediterranean, and the nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal?
Although coal has for many years bean one of Western Europe's most 
vital sources of Gnorgy, the world is now rapidly becoming dependent on oil .3 
From Table 1 it is clear that the percentage of coal with regard to total onorgy 
has declined, (from 79.7% in 1929, to 52% in 1960, and to 41.6%  in 1966), and 
it is expected to roach 31.9% by 1975. This dociino is expected to continue for 
some time thereafter.
The decline in coal consumption can be attributed partly to technological
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factors, and partly to the difficulty in lowering prices to rates competitive 
with other sources of energy. f
Gas production has increased, hut while many consumers changed 
over from coal to gas, industry turned to oil for raw materials for gas making.
All the Gas Council s planned plants are based on oil and natural gas conversions, 
because the cost is abouti of that of conventional coal carbonisation, Tho 
Council also purchases oil refining gas, natural gas, and liquified petroleum 
gas. Also thoro has been a change-over from the use of coal to oil in 
transport, especially on the railways of the United Kingdom, where coal con­
sumption declined from 14.9 million tons in 1945, to only 7 .7  million tons in 1961. 
During the same period, oil consumption increased from practically nothing, to
290,000 tons. Tho reasons for the switch to oil were the economies in tho running 
rate, and becauso the public accepted diesel and electric motor power vory 
readily .6
Consumers naturally prefer convenience,and this is the reason far 
the growing dependence on petroleum. In the first fen years after the second 
World War, the case with which oil and natural gas could be obtained and 
developed led to their being more and more widely used. This was not the case 
with coal. Although the same amount of capital was invested in both coal and 
petroleum, coal showed no returns, while oil resources were being steadily 
developed, and pipelines, tankers, and refineries were constructed to facilitate 
the supply to tho consumer. The lack of coal to moot demand thus led to many 
markets being opened to oil and natural gas.^
 _______ Another of oil *s competitors as a fuel in Europe is natural gas, which
This IS not only the economies in fuel, b u t  is from the higher
Ul’’. ° btainocJ from electric and diesel locomotives. Tho
ratio - j :G:5 states the proportion of time spent off-line by steam, 
diesel and electric locomotives respectively.
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is being increasingly explored for in the North Sea. More than 130 
exploration wells were drilled in the North Sea by the end of 1968, and of 
these 1 6 resulted in field discoveries. In this U .K . there were 13, in the 
Netherlands 2 , and in Norway 1. One year later there were 18 rigs operating 
in the area (U .K . 9, Netherlands 6, Norway 2, Denmark 1). It is indicated 
that there are adequate reserves in the North Sea to support gas as a main source 
of energy. Holland's Groningen field, which was discovered in 1959 has 
estimated reserves of 70 trillion cubic feet,^ Tho first market which was penetrated
by gas was the household one, and depending on the ultimate proven reserves,
<•
itjnay penetrate into commercial uses of light and middle oil distillates, and
even into the bulk industrial market, where lower prices overall can be ensured
o
through larger total initial markets, where sales can be built up fa s t /  Gas has 
advantages over oil in that it does not require storage, is clean, and is easy to 
control. It is reckoned that gas will have 15% of European and U .K . markets by 
1980, although this is again dependent on the proven reserves, and realistic 
pricing. It is oven possible that this figure could be as much as 20-25% . In 5 
years time, Holland's fields could be supplying 11% of continental Europe's 
energy requirements. In 1960, this was only about 3% . 11% equals about 2 .5
million barrels per day of o il . Under present estimates, gas should supply more 
energy to Europe by 1980, than oil did in 1960, when Europe used roughly 3.5  
million barrels of oil per d a y .^
It is estimated that in 10 years time, the British gas industry could 
have 20% of the U .K . fuel market. In 1969, 10% of these needs were accounted 
for by manufactured gas and methane. It is believed that North Sea Gas v/ill 
satisfy demand more economically than North African sources by 1980 .^
The discovery of large reserves of natural gas would adversely affect
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the demand for coal as a source of energy. It could also, however, affect 
oil sales, as they are competitors for the markets, i .e .  industry, and central 
heating, which provide the largest single market for oil products, and could
19be served equally well by gas. While the demand for coal is decreasing, and
no new plants are being built for gas-making from coal, demand for natural gas 
13is on the increase.
The third main rival to oil as a source of energy is nuclear power,
which constitutes a very great threat to the supremacy of oil in world fuel
markets. It is possible that the equivalent of about 3 million barrels per day
of oil could be supplied by nuclear reactors to Europe by 1980. Demand for
electrical energy doubled between 1959-1969, and it is expected to increase its
share of total energy consumption in Europe from J to 3 by 1 9 8 0 .^
Today (1970), the European Economic Community imports just over
55% of its energy requirements. This figure may reach 62% in another 10 years.
In the European Atomic Energy Community, there were only 16 nuclear power
stations planned or under construction in October, 1968. By 1980, a minimum
of 40,000 megawatts will be needed to supply 25% of the electrical production,
while these 1 6 stations represent only 6,500 megawatts. Although 15% of the
U .K .'s  electricity is already from nuclear sources, less than 3% of Europe's
electricity was supplied by nuclear energy in 1969, and it is reckoned that
by 1980, nuclear energy will supply 8% of overall energy requirements in
15Europe, and 25% of electrical energy production. From this it is evident 
that nuclear power as a source of energy cannot keep up with the swift expansion 
of Europe's energy consumption, and that at least until 1980, oil will bo 
increasingly in demand.
Traditionally, the Middle East supplies over 50% of Europe's oil
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needs, and there is no reason to suppose that, barring untoward events, this 
state of affairs should not continue, and even expand.
In the world's largest oil market, the U .S .A ., the cost of con- 
ventional energy is less than in Europe, yet almost 2 of the power plants 
ordered during 1966 and 1967, were equipped with nuclear reactors. By 
1968, 87 units were under plan or in construction, representing 70,000 
megawatts. After 1971, probably 80% of the U .S .A .'s  generating facilities 
will be nuclear. Thus it is obvious that the delivered cost of oil products is an
1 a
element in the race for the supplying of power plants. However, possibility 
of the increased use of nuclear power as a source of energy in the future depends 
on several factors. It is clear from available evidence that nuclear energy 
will not be really able to compete as a source until 1980, but from then on large 
power stations will have been installed, and giving serious competition.
However, it is difficult to predict with accuracy tho effect of tho degree of 
nuclear development on the oil trade, as there are so many variables involved.
These mostly concern costs, i .e .  cost of Middle Eastern oil at the time, and 
the cost of producing nuclear power. Another point to be taken into consideration 
is whether atomic energy is capable of replacing oil in transportation.
1. Geographical factors influencing international trade in oil
Apart from the rival sources of energy to oil in world markets, there 
are other factors which influence the international oil trade to a certain degree, 
and among these are the following:
i internal stability of the producting country.
The internal stability of a producing country is essential to tho A
continuous flow of o il, as any instability has an adverse effect on the oil 
industry. To give an example, the nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry
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in 1951 resulted hi the complete cessation of oil oxports from Iran. The
effect of this was not only the loss of revenue to the Iranian government, but
also to create a shortage of oil in world markets. Another example is Nigeria,
where the civil war of 1967 brought the Nigerian oil industry more or less
to a standstill. Also, an internq/lly stable country is more attractive to foreign 
investors.
ii.Tho political stability of the countries through whose territory 
iho pipeline crosses, and where the loading terminals are situated
Examples of this are the pipelines which transport oil from tho fields 
of north Iraq, ancl the Tapline from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean. The 
Iraqi pipelines wore diverted from their terminal at Haifa in Palestine, to Baniyas 
and Tripoli in Syria, because of the Israeli capture of Haifa. These pipelines 
have been faced with many political obstacles in various years, the latest of 
which was in 1966, when pumping stopped through the pipelines for several weeks 
because Syria demanded an increase in transit duos. The situation is tho same 
with regard to the political stability of the countries through which Taplino 
passes. For more details of political crises concerning both the Tapline and 
the Iraqi pipelines, see Transportation by Pipelines.
l i i .  The limitations of existing facilities within a country or a 
producing company
Usually, within a company, the output, or the amount of oil 
required for export is limited to the capacity of lis t in g  facilities within the 
producing oil company. To increase the amount of oil destined for export, 
it is necessary to increase the capacity of the production and loading facilities 
to cope. As an example, when Kuwait O il Company wished to increase its 
export of crude o il, it increased its loading facilities by building a new sea 
island terminal, and then, to supply the required amount of oil to this tormina!,
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the company was obliged to construct several now production units, and lay 
new pipelines to increase its production capacity. Another example is IPC's 
pipelines, which move oil from the northern fields of Iraq to the Mediterranean.
If IPC intended to increase her exports beyond tho limits of the capacity of the 
existing pipelines, it would have to either increase the number of pipelines, or 
construct lines with larger diameters, and bigger pumping units, 
iv Political crises 
International political problems of varying dimensions often affect 
oil exports from the Middle Eastern countries; for instance, the Suez Canal 
crisis of 1956. Tho supply of oil from the Middle East to Western Europe was 
then cut off by tho closure of the Suez Canal, and sabotage to the Iraqi pipe­
lines crossing Syrian territory. Also, the crisis of May 5th, 1967, between the 
Arabs and the Israelis, is still affecting oil exports from the Middle East, as 
the Suez Canal is again closed.
During the Arab-lsraeli War of 1967, not only the Suez link was cut, 
but also theTrans^Arabian pipeline carrying oil from Saudi Arabia, and the 
pipeline system from the fields in the north of Iraq, (both to the eastern Mediter­
ranean), were shut down. Production facilities were dislocated in a number of 
Arab countries in the Gulf area, and in North Africa. A new dimension was 
added to the crisis by the Arab States' ban on oil shipments to the United States, 
Britain, and West Germany.* Due to the crisis, cm additional 12 million tons 
of tanker capacity was required to be in continuous service round the longer
17Cape route, as about 40% of Western Europe's usual oil supplies was affected.
* During the 1967 crisis, oil shipments from the Arab countries to
the U -K . and the U .S . were banned because the Arabs believed that 
American and British aircraft helped tho Israelis in the War. (Tho Times, 
July 8th, 1967). With regard to West Germany, the embargo was 
carried out by Iraq and Libya after the German Government had 
authorised the sale of gas-masks to Israel. (Christopher Tugendhat,
O il is tho biggest business, London, i960, p .285.)
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A t a time when production was decreasing in the Arab countries be­
cause of the June War, output was increasing tremendously' in other areas, such 
as the United States and Venezuela in the Western Hemisphere, and Iran in the 
Gulf, to compensate for the loss of Arab o il. The United States stepped up its 
production by about 3 .5  million tons between bay and August of 1967. In 
addition to meeting its own import deficit1 of 27 million barrels of Middle eastern 
oil, the United States shipped about 1 .3 million tons of crude and partially refined 
oil to Britain ovor the same period. British imports of crude oil and refined 
products from tho United States averaged just over 36,000 tons per month during 
the first half of 1967. In the months between May and August, 1967, /production 
in Venezuela rose by 1.5 million tons. Iran, which is a non-Arab state, and 
therefore unaffected by the situation, despite its position on the Gulf, increased 
its production by nearly 1.8 million tons in the same period .^
To further elucidate the situation, the following table shov/s Britain's 
imports of crude oil and refined products during 1967.
Table 2 British imports of crude oil and refined products from various countries, 
monthly through 1967 (in thousand tons per month)
Month United
States
Venezuela Iran Saudi
Arabia
Kuwait
January 46 1,458 833 3,158 2,619
February 23 1,984 1,007 2,310 3,146
March f? O* '\j 986 576 3,041 3,499
April 20 1,223 703 2,336 3,463
May 41 1,330 756 1,950 3,328
June 30 1,461 249 1,673 2,961
July 620 2,265 2,260 464 679
August 2,073 1,618 6,607 - -
September 1,658 1,068 7,006 409 520
October 473 1,029 6,680 2,164 992
November 25 775 3,852. 1,344 1,949
December 49 1,230 3,447 1,770 1,241
Source: Board of Trade, Overseas Trade Accounts of United Kingdom, 41B
Set 1, London, 1967, January-March, April-June, july-Sepfember, 
and October-December, p .51 in each.
Many consumer countries began to diversify their sources of oil supply 
after the first Suez closure, and the second closure in 1967 accelerated the 
process, thus greatly boosting exploration for petroleum in other parts of the 
world. The closures have also led to the construction of larger tankers 
capable of by-passing the Canal, as they exploit the economies of scale. (As 
the size of a tanker increases, the cost per ton-mile of moving a given quantity 
of oil decreases sharply). The changeover to larger tankers was inevitable, 
but was doubtless speeded up by the Suez crises and the subsequent uncertainty 
about that route. ^
Western Europe is very vulnerable to any closure of the Suez Canal, and 
therefore maximum diversification of oil supplies took place there. Roughly 
80% of Europe's crude oil requirements came from the Middle East in 1955, but 
only 51% was supplied in 1966, despite the fact that of Western Europe’s rapidly 
expanding energy market, oil's share rose from 15% in the early 1950's, to roughly 
56% in 1967.20
Th is shift from Middle East supplies was made possible by the emergence 
of vast oil resources in the North African Arab countries of Algeria and Libya, 
and to tho West of Africa in N igeria . These countries emerged as major oil 
producers and exporters during the period between the two Suez crises.
Table 3 illustrates the extent of the swing away from the Gulf to Africa.
In 1970, Europe's imports of crude oil for the first time surpassed 10 million 
barrels per day. A total of 10,082,500 barrels a day was imported info Europe 
during the first half of 1970, and of this, 4,299,300 b/d came from African 
fields, and 5,005,100 b/d came from the Middle East, which therefore pro­
vided less than half of Europe's crude oil supplies for the first time in recent 
history. Meanwhile the African share of Europe's market is steadily increasing,
and may soon pass the 50% mark. In 1967, the Middle East's share of Europe's 
market was 55.5% , but after the 6-day war of that year, it fell to 54.3%  
in 1968, and 53.3%  in 1969. However, Africa's share has increased over the 
same period, from 31,3% in 1967, to 35.7% in 1968, 38.1% in 1969, and to 
42.6%  in the first half of 1970. The diversification of European imports is 
not only affecting the countries in the Gulf area, but also those in the Caribbean, 
and the U *S .S .R. The Caribbean share of the market dropped from 6.7% t 
in 1967, to a mero 3.8% during the first half of 1970, and the U.S • share 
fell from 4.5%  in 1967, to 2 <6% in 1970.
Table 3 Comparative increases in the amount of African crude oil
imported by Western Europe
Western Europe -  crude imports (1,000 b/d)
M , East Africa Caribbean U .S .S .R . Other Total
1967 4,174 2,354 504 336 156 7,524
% of total 55.5 31 .3 6.7 4 .5 2 .0 100
1968 4,606 3,028 452 336 56 8,478
% of total 54 .3 35.7 5 .3 4 .0 0 .7 100
1969 5,116 3,658 426 302 104 9,606
% of total 53.3 38.1 4 .4 3.1 3.1 100
1st 5 of 1970 5,005.1 4 ,299 .3 379.1 258 141 10,082.5
% of total 49 .6 42 .6 3.8 2 .6 1.4 100
Source: The O il and Gas Journal, January 11th, 1971, p . 2 1 .
The main feature of Figure 1 is a steady increase in imports from the two 
North African countries, Algeria and Libya, imports from West Africa show both 
upward and downward trends, especially in 1967, when decline was tho main 
feature. This was because of the sharp drop in Nigerian output, caused by the 
Civil War, during which oil exports dropped from 500,000 barrels per day, to 
only 50,000 barrels. Contrary to those of North and West Africa, the picture
2 9 3 .
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for imports from the Gulf area shows a slight increase.
To derive a clearer picture of the extent of the swing from the Gulf 
towards other parts of the world, the imports of 4 major European consuming 
countries (the U .K ., France, Italy, and West Germany), are shown in Fig .1 .
West Germany showed a tremendous increase in its imports of Libyan
o il. They rose from 6.5 million tons in 1963, to 35.7 million tons vin I960, an 
increase of 449%. This was accounted to 43% of total German oil imports in
1968. The second country in Western Europe to import Libyan oil in large 
quantities was Ita ly, Italy's imports from Libya increased'by 707% in tho 
same period. The United Kingdom also greatly increased its imports of Libyan 
crude oil, the amount being increased from 5 .8  million tons in 1963, to 21.2  
million tons in 1960, an increase of 265%. Unlike the other three countries, 
France increased its imports from Algeria from 15.4 million tons in 1963, to 24.1 
million tons in 1968, an increase of 56%. A reason for these increased oil imports 
from the North African countries is that the Canal route is not used by tankers 
carrying oil from there to Europe, and the short Mediterranean crossing to Southern 
Europe is used to the advantage of the two North African countries.
At the end of 1967, the closure of the Suez Canal seemed no nearer to 
a solution, and B.P. planned to start using Libyan oil instead of Gulf o il . The 
company commenced a crash programme to increase Libyan production. Until 
June, 1967, 5 million tons a year were delivered to the Tobruk terminal by the 
B. P. operated pipeline. As B.P. worldwide handled 120 million tons a year, this 
was just a small drop in the ocean. However, by the end of 1967, 16 million tons 
a year was being sent through the pipeline, and the facilities at the terminal were 
expanded to accommodate two tankers at one time. Thus it would appear that 
B.P, may have made a policy decision to reduce the considerable dependence of
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the company on Middle Eastern oil by expanding Libyan oil fields, which
21are conveniently situated for Western Europe.
In contrast to those of the North African countries, imports from the 
Gulf showed very slight increases, and in some cases, even decreases. For 
example, the United Kingdom’s imports from Kuwait decreased from 2'i .1 
million tons in 1963, to 11 .3 million tons in 1967, a drop of 46% in 4 years.
Iran's exports to West Germany dropped from 9 .5  million tons in 1963, to 6 .3  
million tons in 1968, a decrease of 33%.
Apart from the diversification of supply to Western Europe, the search 
for fuel has been intensified in Europe itself. Over 20 million cubic feet of
22natural gas reserves have been discovered in the British sector of the North Sea, 
and there has even been some oil, bringing closer the possibility of good strikes. 
Thus natural gas has begun to replace oil in Western Europe's fuel markets.
Japan and Australia drew 90% and 70% respectively of their supplies 
of crude oil from tho Middle East, and although they do not suffer any direct 
effects from the Canal closure, the general uncertainty is shared by them both.
In conclusion, several main points can be raised from the Middle East 
crises, with special regard to the 1967 crisis. The effect of these upon the con- 
suming countries of Western Europe varied considerably. No country suffered 
from a serious shortage of o il, and the crisis was evidently not of available 
supplies, but of tanker tonnage. However, at greatly increased freight rates, 
adequate tonnage became available in time to get supplies of oil to Western Europe 
without large drawings upon oil stocks.
The Arab oil-producing countries of the Gulf put themselves in some 
danger with regard to the marketing of their produced o i l , In fact, oil is of 
no value to a producing country unless if can be used, or sold to other countries.
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As described above, the danger exists in the diversification of oil supply 
to Western Europe -  the main consumer of Middle Eastern o il, and the in­
tense search for oil and gas in other parts of the world.
Despite all the inconveniences caused to Middle Eastern oil in world 
markets by the Suez Crises, it w ill, with or without the use of the Suez Canal, 
continue to play an important role in the future, (at least for the next 10 years).
In 1970, the region was not only famed for its oil production, which accounted 
for 30.5% of the world total, it also held more than 56% of the world's proven 
reserves of crude o i l . The entire area is described as a huge reservoir of oil 
and some parts of it have not yet been thoroughly explored. The reason for 
the region's importance arises mainly from the low cost of production, in fact 
the lowest in the world. This low cost gives the Middle East a strong foot-hold 
in world markets, and enables it to compete favourably with its rivals.
Towards the end of the 1940's, physical and economic conditions 
favoured Kuwait's rapid expansion more than the other two countries under study. 
The most striking factors were lower royalty, large reserves, and lov/er unit 
costs. Thus, in spite of the fact that they had producing subsidiaries in neighbour­
ing countries, companies like Shell, Jersey and Socony were interested in 
acquiring rights for long-term supplies of oil from K u w ait.^
The future of the development of Middle Eastern reserves looks as 
good as the past has been, with the financial and technical resources of the
international oil companies, and their ready access to world markets available 
25for this development.
2 . Areas of Demand and quantities exported
Although Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait export oil to any place where 
markets can be found, their markets are largely concentrated in three major
297.
areas -  Western Europe, Eastern and South-eastern Asia. A t present in 
Western Europe, the main customers for the oil of the three countries are the 
United Kingdom, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and West 
Germany. From Table 4 it can be seen that exports from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran to these countries have fluctuated greatly during the period 1962“
1968. These fluctuations can be related either to the political crises, which 
led to the diversification of oil imports from the Gulf area, to North and West 
Africa, or to changes In demand for the various A ,P .1, gravities, in particular 
that of Kuwait. As atmospheric pollution is of great concern in Europe, high
n  /
sulphur content in oil renders it less acceptable than oil with a lower content.
Table 4 Western Europe*s imports of oil from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and 
Iran -  1962-1968 (1,000 tons)
c To: From Belgium France WestGermany
Italy Nether­
lands
U .K . Others
Kuwait
1962 1,142 7,960 1,655 11,534 5,625 23,139 1,243
1963 3,390 7,673 1,602 12,043 5,396 21,104 1,307
1964 1,954 9,489 2,708 20,341 5,591 18,094 2,435
1965 3,153 8,809 1,780 26,198 5,340 14,119 1,062
1966 3,339 8,202 1,635 26,191 5,884 15,, 766 3,236
1967 2,667 8,720 3,443 22,153 8,079 11,348 4,759
1968 3,022 7,666 2,642 16,553 10,436 20,329 5,232
Saudi Arabia
1962 353 2,077 2,619 6,854 4,122 3,333 5,591
1963 94 1,731 4,380 7,841 3,877 3,610 5,792
1964 739 2,028 7,457 9,515 4,163 2,562 7,494
1965 882 2,460 7,974 12,139 2,955 5,017 3,766
1966 1,477 2,997 8,928 18,153 6,358 6,370 11,637
1967 946 3,994 11,566 14,458 4,860 9,660 13,505
1968 3,077 4,301 13,223 12,091 3,956 8,797 16,411
Iran
1962 1,762 1,598 11,024 875 589 3,213 4,263
1963 3,046 1,999 9,554 1,041 999 3,002 4,440
1964 5,328 3,413 7,266 1,072 2,079 3,684 2,729
1965 5,412 5,805 6,019 3,747 4,361 4,208 2,051
1966 4,775 3,964 7,159 5,393 1,983 4,182 1,546
1967 3,420 2,864 6,332 4,434 2,116 16,337 2,467
1968 4,404 2,979 6,430 3,662 5,201 9,199 4,887
Source: Supply and disposal of oil -  Statistics* •* Paris, 1962-68.
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It can bo seen from the quantities of oil exported (Table 4), by the 
three major operating companies in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, that 
Western Europe as an area is the largest importer of Saudi and Kuwaiti o i l .
Exports from Iran to Western Europe followed the same pattern until 1968, 
when Japanese imports of Iranian oil surpassed those of Europe by 11.67%. The 
gap was further increased in 1969, when it reached 46.85% . While Saudi 
exports to Japan showed an increase of 22.47% in 1968 over the 1967 figures, 
Kuwait's figures decreased by 15.67% between 1968 and 1967, and by 22.43%  
in 1969.
Again, tho most obvious reason for the increase in exports of Iranian
oil to Japan is the Suez Crisis of 1967. However, there is also the effect of
Japan‘s changeover from coal to oil to be considered, along with the rapid growth
of the Japanese economy, and the removal of the government's currency controls »
controls which had the effect of limiting imports to Japan in order to conserve
27supplies of foreign exchange.
Table 5 Destination of oil exported by Consortium, ARAMCO, and Kuwait
O il Company (million tons)
Destination 
by area
1966 % of 
total
1967 % of 
total
1968 % of 
total
1969 % of 
total
Iran
Western Europe 33.3 42.2 40.8 41 .0 33.1 30.4 31.7 25 .2
Japan 24 .6 31 .1 37.2 37.4 45.8 42.1 58.9 46.9
Asia (excl. Japan) 7 .3 9.2 9 .2 9 2 15.4 14.2 16.8 13.4
North America 5 .9 7.5 3 .6 3 .6 4.1 3.8 3.8 3.0
Africa 5 .4 6.8 6.5 6.5 8 .6 7 .9 13.7 10.9
Australia 2 .0 2 .5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 0.8 0 .6
South America 0.5 0 .6 0.5 0.5 - - -
Total 79.0 99.5 108.8 125.7
cont’d
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Table 5 (cont’d)
Destination 
by area
1966 % of 
total
1967 % of 
total
1968 % of 
total
1969 % of 
total
Saudi Arabia
Western Europe 54.5 47.8 59.2 61.0 62,6 52.3
Japan 14.6 12.8 17.8 18.3 21.8 18.2
Asia (excl. Japan) 23.2 20.4 7.9 8.1 IS .8 15.7
North America 8 .6 7 .5 5 .3 5 .5 4.1 3 .4
Africa 3.3 2 .9 - - 3.8 3.2 N .A .
Austra 1 ia 4 .5 3 .9 1.0 1.0 3.7 3.1
South America 5 .3 4 .6 5 .9 6.1 4 .8 4 .0
Total 114.0 97,1 119.6
Kuwait
Western Europe 63.6 63.0 61.4 60.0 67.8 63.1 72.8 64.4
Japan 16.7 16.5 18.5 18.1 15.6 14.5 12.1 10.7
Asia (exc l. Japan) 11 .4 11.3 14.8 14.5 14.8 13.8 18.4 16.3
North America 1.8 1.8 1.3 1.3 2 .8 2 .6 2 .8 2 .5
Africa 2 .9 2 .9 1.4 1.4 0.3 0 .3 0 .4 0.4
Australia 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.4 4 .8 4 .5 3.7 3.3
South America 1.9 1 .9 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.2 2 .8 2 .5
Total 101.5 102.4 107.4 113.0
Sources: Iranian O il Operating Companies Annual Review, 1969
Ministry of Finance and Petroleum in Kuwait, 1970.
The Arab Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Kuwait,
1970.
These countries also export oil.to North and South America, Africa, 
Asia, and Australia, as can be seen from the table.
The above discussion emphatically demonstrates that oil exports from 
the three countrios concerned have been increasing at a remarkably fast rate 
since the first oil discoveries in those countries, except during times of hostility 
like the Second World War, and the political crises of 1956and 1967. Based on 
the known reserves of oil in the countries and tho existing trends of world 
consumption, if can be predicted that Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait will be 
able to continue to export their oil at the present rate for a long time to come.
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The marketing situation, however, is not the only factor in deter*- 
mining the amount of oil a country exports. As was maintained in Chapter IV, 
physical conditions have great effect on the movement of oil in the individual 
producing countries. The effects of physical limitations are clearly reflected 
in the amounts of oil exported from the various countries of the Gulf, and 
this is particularly true In the case of Iraq. Fao was built as an oil terminal on 
the Gulf when Iraq started producing oil from its southern fields. However, It 
proved to be inadequate as an oil terminal, failing to meet the amount of oil 
required for export because of its position in the shallow waters of the Gulf, which 
prevents it from accommodating large tankers. Thus, in order to increase its 
exports from the southern fields, Iraq had to construct a new terminal in the 
deeper waters of the Gulf, 26 miles from Fao. This new terminal, Khor Al-Amaya, 
although located in deeper water than Fao, is still unable to accommodate the 
super-tankers which can be received in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Table 
6 below shows the movement of oil from the main terminals of the G ulf.
Table 6 Comparative amounts of oil exported from the main terminals of the
Gulf (In million tons of crude o il)
Year Fao and Khor 
Al-Amaya
Ras Tanura Kharg Mina al-Ahmadi
1965 17.8 55.8 68.2 96.3
1966 22.7 72.9 79.0 101.7
1967 19.9 85.8 99.5 102.3
1968 16.2 88.6 100.8 107.5
1969 16.4 101.8 125.7 113.3
Sources:- Data received from Kuwait Oil Company, April, 1970 
ARAMCO, A Review of Operations, 1969 
Iranian Oil Operating Companies, Annual Reviews, 1968 
and 1969
Iraq, Basra, and Mosul Petroleum Companies, Reviews,
1968 and 1969
301.
It is clear from the above table that the Iraqi exports from its 
terminals in the Gulf decreased by 7.8% between 1965 and 1969, while 
those of Saudi Arabia and Iran rose by 82.4% and 17.6% respectively.
From early 1962 to 1967, both Fao and Khor Al-Amaya were operating as oil 
terminals in Iraq. The amount of oil exported from Fao ranged from 190,000 tons 
in 1965, to 1 .7 million tons in 1967. Since then, oil exports from Fao have 
ceased, and the oil has been diverted through KhorAI-Amaya. The main 
reason for the cessation in the use of Fao is the shallowness of the water there, 
which prevents large tankers from approaching the terminal, and as the main 
market for Gulf oil is in Western Europe, it is uneconomical for the smaller 
tankers which can approach Fao to be used on such a long route. This indicates 
clearly that Iraq will be unable to expand its exports from its Gulf terminals at 
the same rate as those of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, mainly because of 
the physical limitation of the lack of water depth in the Iraqi part of the G ulf.
Thus if can be deduced that oil exploitation around the Gulf is 
affected by several factors, the main ones being political and geographical.
Political factors have led to oil companies abandoning parts of their 
concessions, and oven, in some extreme cases, to halting operations completely 
while waiting for agreement to be reached. This is the case in both onshore and 
offshore concessions in the G ulf.
O il exploitation is also greatly affected by the geography of an area. 
Onshore, the difference in costs of production between oil from a flat area and 
oil from a mountainous area is considerable. Pipelines, pumping stations, 
manpower, and various other considerations are less necessary in the former 
than the latter. Also, the distance from producing fields to terminals affects 
the cost of production, i .e .  the further the oil has to travel, the more expensive
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it becomes to produce. Offshore, the effects of geography can be seen in 
shipping points as well as production. Some countries have advantages 
over others in the depth of water at their terminals, which enables large ships 
to use the facilities easily. In other countries where there is insufficient 
water depth, long submarine pipelines have to be laid to offshore terminals. 
This again increases the cost of production, while the capacity of the terminal 
and its facility for expansion determines the amount of oil to be produced.
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CONCLUSION
In the first half of the 20th century, the possibility of exploiting 
a hitherto unknown mineral resource as a response to new demands from 
industrial technology, superimposed a completely different economic system 
on the old subsistence and small trading activities of society in Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, and Kuwait.
The basic climatic problem of drought had evolved a landscape devoid 
of vegetation and unresponsive to most forms of primary agricultural activity in 
both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The population was consequently dependent 
upon sea resources and trade for its precarious existence. These two countries 
were among the poorest in the world with regard to financial wealth and known 
natural resources, but have become two of the world's most prosperous nations 
since the discovery of o il, although their incomes are almost entirely dependent 
on revenue from the oil industry.
In the "pre-oil" period Iran was in a slightly better position, as the 
land will support agriculture. Revenue from oil since its discovery and develop­
ment, consequently constitutes a smaller percentage of the Iranian national 
income than it does in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
This thesis has attempted to analyse the development of this resource 
which made such wealth possible in these previously impoverished areas.
The first chapter has dealt with the location of the oil producing and 
consuming areas of the world in relation to the geographical position of the 
Gulf, and also with the varying effects of boundary disputes on those concerned 
with producing the o il . It was found that the oil producing areas of the world 
are widely separated. Some are favoured fn their location as they are near to
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the consuming centres of high population density and industrial development, 
but the Gulf's location is not ideal because of the great distance its oil has to 
travel to reach the consumers. There are two main consuming centres for Gulf
o il. They are Western Europe and the Far East -  mainly Japan. Thus the oil of 
the Gulf, although cheap to produce, is adversely affected by the distance it 
has to travel, which raises the price to the consumer.
O il production in the G ulf is greatly affected by boundary disputes, 
as oil companies are reluctant to exploit areas of dispute, even when these 
are strongly suspected to be oil-bearing. One of the most notable examples has 
been settlement of the onshore boundary between the Kuwait/Saudi Neutral Zone, 
and Kuwait proper. This led to problems for the oil companies operating in the 
area of the boundary. Kuwait O il Company had surveyed an area thought to be 
in Kuwait, which was included In the Neutral Zone when the boundary was fixed, 
giving a considerable advantage to both Aminoil and Getty, who took over 
operations in the area. As regards offshore boundaries, the position is similar.
The Kuwait/Shell Petroleum Company has ceased exploration activities in the 
offshore of Kuwait, pending a boundary settlement.
Although the main part of this thesis has examined different aspects 
of the exploitation of oil resources, these often contain elements which are not 
obviously directly geographical, for example the early history of oil exploitation 
and the granting of concessions, which, however, combine in their effect as 
basic features influencing the eventual patterns of oil exploitation and its in­
fluence on patterns of human activity in the areas concerned.
The structure of concessions has changed over the years. The earliest 
covered very large areas, sometimes entire countries. They were long-term with
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no provision made for relinquishment. Payments to host governments were in 
general low although some countries got better deals than others. In the early 
1950's the basis of payments to the host governments changed considerably. 
Instead of receiving a royalty per ton of oil exported, the governments were 
receiving 50% of the net profits. Towards the end of the 1950's, two new types 
of concession were introduced into the area. These were |oint-venture agree­
ments, and the contracting of foreign companies by national companies.
When examining the oil reserves of the area in Chapter I I I ,  if was 
noted that the three countries under examination combine to possess the largest 
oil reserves in the world. Because of this, and favourable physical conditions 
and low labour costs, these countries have the lowest cost of production in the 
world, and as far as actual oil production is concerned, they are among the 
world's leading producers.
The pattern of intermediate oil movements in the countries concerned 
showed that some countries have advantages over others in their topography, as 
far as oil movement is concerned. For example, Iran's mountainous countryside 
is an obstacle to the easy movement of o il, while Kuwait's relatively flat surface 
is a definite advantage. However, Iran makes up for topographical disadvantages 
in landward movement of oil by its many advantages in sea transport. Its 
terminal is located in the deep waters of the Gulf, and it has also the best 
opportunities for future expansion. If the terminals of the northern Gulf were 
rated by their utility, it would be clear that Iranian ports take first place, 
followed by Kuwaiti, Saudi Arabian, and Iraqi terminals, in that order.
Chapter V  dealt with the means of transporting oil from the Gulf to 
various parts of the world, mainly Western Europe, analysing the cost of oil 
transport by both tankers and pipelines. It can be seen that the increasing
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size of tankers is due in part to the economics of construction and operation.
They are cheaper in cost per ton both to build and to run than small ones.
The advent of the super-tanker led to the necessity for larger facilities, and 
although some receiving ports could be expanded, others had to be newly 
constructed. The closure of the Suez Canal also had an effect on the size of 
tankers, as it forced them to take a longer route, rendering smaller tankers 
impractical and uneconomic. The Suez crises of 1956and 1967 also helped to 
continue the trend towards larger tankers, as oil companies were concerned to 
find an alternative to the Canal. Pipelines are also adversely affected by
\
political crises, particularly when they cross more than one country, as disputes 
can lead to the disconnection of the pipeline. !t was noted that comparative 
costs of transport by pipeline and tanker at present favour tankers. However 
some countries, such as Israel, disregarded the various disadvantages of pipelines, 
and have constructed large ones, mainly to take advantage of the present situation 
in the Middle East, in which the Suez Canal is closed, and there is an oil 
shortage in the eastern Mediterranean.
' It is clear from the figures given in Chapter VI that the two main
consuming areas forGulf oil are Western Europe and Japan. However, in 
recent years, the percentage of oil from the Gulf area used by Western Europe 
is decreasing, while the percentage obtained from other sources, such as North 
and West Africa, is increasing. This is because Western Europe is trying to 
reduce its dependence on Gulf oil because of the political situation in the 
Middle East, and the consequent unreliability of supply. There is also much 
exploration activity taking place, particularly in the North Sea. Also the 
range of power sources is widening to include nuclear power and natural gas 
in greater proportions than previously.
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The amalgam of these features -  physical, economic, and political -  
has produced a zone of immense material wealth and relative stability within 
a larger area of lesser political and economic stability. The way ahead for 
the zone, however, is largely dependent upon the interaction of the various 
external factors. The resource is established and changes within will almost 
certainly come from changes in patterns of demand or transport. From the 
evidence in this thesis it would appear that these later changes, although they 
might be great in themselves, will have relatively small influence on the 
geographical patterns of oil exploitation and internal transport, except in 
modifications in scale.
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